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The present thesis seeks to explore knowledge generation methods in the field of 
psychotherapy, with a focus on qualitative clinical and systematic case study narratives. 
Currently, evidence–based practice (EBP) in psychotherapy prioritises quantitative 
methods (e.g., systematic reviews and meta–analytic reports, which summarise the 
findings of randomised controlled trials; RCTs). However, recent studies exploring 
psychotherapists’ decision–making processes in clinical practice suggest that there are 
significant difficulties in applying randomised and decontextualized statistical findings 
onto individual patients and their specific mental health experiences. Some of the 
concerns about large–scale quantitative findings include overlooking complex individual 
differences in treatment processes and outcomes. This contributed to an ongoing issue of 
research–practice gap: a lack of integration between the findings disseminated by 
researchers and the practical decisions made in the consulting room by therapists. 
To aid with these issues, this thesis considers the role of the case study method in 
psychotherapy research. From its inception, psychoanalysis used case studies to produce 
complex, longitudinally sensitive and detailed narratives to discuss clinical decision–
making processes and theoretical advancements. However, criticisms about researcher’s 
subjective bias, unclear research focus, and lack of generalisability continue for both 
classic psychoanalytic and contemporary psychotherapy case studies. Whilst there have 
been several historical misconceptions about case studies, there are also persisting 
methodological issues, such as lack of epistemic guidance for hypothesis generation and 
generalisability of case study findings. Crucially, there are currently no research appraisal 
tools for psychotherapy case studies. The thesis therefore seeks to i) address the long–
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standing criticisms directed at the case study method, ii) develop epistemic knowledge 
generation strategies for case study researchers, iii) address the philosophical 
underpinnings of thinking in cases as a scientific style, and iv) introduce a novel Case 
Study Evaluation–tool (CaSE), which will improve the evidential status of systematic 
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Chapters 2 through to 5 of this thesis were written as independent pieces of research, 
with the intent of being submitted as manuscripts for peer–reviewed scientific journals. 
For this reason, there may be some overlap between chapters, particularly in terms of 
background literature and explanations of key terms and concepts (e.g., definitions for 
clinical and systematic case studies).  
 At the time of writing, Chapter 2 has been tentatively accepted with revisions by 
Contemporary Psychoanalysis journal. Revisions have been completed and returned in 
March 2021. Revisions for this chapter involved shortening the paper to fit the journal 
requirements and including case study examples from relational and interpersonal forms 
of psychoanalysis to address the specific journal audience. The theoretical and conceptual 
components of the manuscript remain as they are presented in this thesis. 
 Chapter 3 has been submitted to Pragmatic Case Studies in Psychotherapy (PCSP) 
journal in February 2020. The journal returned the paper for revisions in March 2020. 
Revisions for this chapter involved adding a separate section on how systematic case 
studies can utilise multiple epistemological frameworks, with a detailed clinical example 
based on two systematic case studies from PCSP. These revisions were required due to 
the specific journal audience, as PCSP readership is largely geared toward systematic case 
study research. The revised manuscript was sent back in May 2020. The chapter in this 
thesis includes PCSP revisions, specifically the addition of the section 3.5 ‘The use of 
multiple epistemological concepts in systematic case studies’. At the time of writing, the 
revised manuscript remains under review due to COVID imposed delays. 
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In his now classic article, Five Misunderstandings about Case–Study Research (2006), 
social scientist Bent Flyvbjerg argues that, for a long time, the ‘conventional truth’ about 
the inferiority of single (N=1,”N” referring to the population size of individuals in the 
study) case studies to larger N studies (e.g., statistics) has been accepted by researchers 
in social sciences overwhelmingly uncritically. Flyvbjerg refers to textbooks and 
dictionaries in the field of sociology, which frequently defined case studies as incapable 
of “providing reliable information about the broader class” (Abercombrie, Hill & Turner, 
1984, p. 34). Well–known authors in the fields of social and psychological research have 
also publicly scrutinised the use of single cases, noting that “one can validly explain a 
particular case only on the basis of general hypotheses” (Dogan & Pelassy, 1990, p. 121) 
and “[case] studies have [...] a total absence of control as to be of almost no scientific 
value” (Campbell & Stanley, 1996, p. 6). In his later works, Flyvbjerg (2011) 
acknowledges that case studies are still held in low regard, despite recent efforts to 
demonstrate their methodological utility. 
 In psychology, and, more specifically, psychotherapy, the use of a specific method 
contributed to the (perceived) scientific status of the field. Statistical methods, 
traditionally associated with natural sciences, cause–and–effect relationships, and 
outcome measures, have become essential for the establishment of evidence–based 
psychotherapy (Aveline, 2005). This is because large N studies are seen as ideal for 
assessing whether particular interventions (e.g., therapeutic approach or technique) 
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have a measurable effect (e.g., positive outcome) across different clinical populations. The 
status of the single case study method, however, remains ambiguous in this modern, 
evidence–driven psychotherapy (this is explored in detail in the section 1.2.3 
‘Methodological Controversies’ and is central to discussions in thesis Chapters 2 through 
5).  
 In broad terms, case studies and single–subject research designs in psychotherapy 
are descriptive reports, which include (but are not limited/restricted to) components like 
detailed patient history and experiences, therapist interpretations, clinical assessment 
methods, therapeutic interventions, treatment processes and outcomes, theoretical 
applications, diagnostic conclusions and differential diagnosis (Foster, 2010) (specific 
case study definitions are provided in the section 1.2.1 ‘Different Forms of Case Study’ and 
1.2.2 ‘Case Studies in Different Therapeutic Modalities’). However, how (and, indeed, 
whether) these descriptive components in a single case study contribute to evidence in 
psychotherapy in a broader (i.e., beyond N=1) sense is less clear. It is therefore not 
uncommon to see questions and criticisms posed to researchers who choose to work with 
single case studies: ‘why N=1?’ 
 Following historian John Forrester’s argument that the specificity of the case is 
central (in the sense that describing methodological components without referring to the 
clinical narrative is epistemically superficial) (Forrester, 1996, 2017), I will discuss the 
main reasons for why I chose to undertake case study research in the present thesis with 
a reference to a case study example. Clinically rich material will be connected to 
methodological and theoretical components unique to single case studies; this will form 
the basis of my motivation to, on one hand, work through misperceptions of the case 
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study methodology, and on the other, to develop its epistemic practices in psychotherapy 
research. 
 1.1.1 ‘Why N=1?’ – a case example 
 
In a case study by Levine and Faust (2013), a patient called Edward described his 
experience of life as though he was “living in a personal hell” (p. 202). Edward saw himself 
as a profoundly flawed individual, “tortured by envy every second of every day” (ibid). He 
reported feeling unable to derive pleasure from day–to–day activities, was terrified of 
failure, and felt that he was not good enough. Edward learnt to internalise lengthy 
citations and mannerisms from famous philosophers, poets and musicians that he could 
spontaneously identify with and utilise in moments where he would lose his confidence 
and sense of identity. Additionally, Edward suffered from depressive tendencies, caused 
by feelings of inadequacy and inferiority; this led to intensified and persistent 
experiences of suicidal ideation, loss of appetite, inability to leave the house, and, finally, 
inability to form meaningful interpersonal relationships. Feeling irrevocably “damaged” 
as a human existence, Edward discarded omnipotent fantasies of marrying the woman he 
wished he could “merge” with (i.e., become as one with), which ultimately left him feeling 
isolated, lost, and meaningless. 
 The patient attributed his relational difficulties to genetically predisposed 
neurological problems. He recounted a memory of being in a gym class at the age of 7, 
and not being able to follow the teacher’s instructions for tying shoelaces. When asked 
how he felt about this, Edward replied, “it made me feel like I was mentally retarded” (p. 
203). The case authors picked up this and similar expressions pertaining to Edward’s 
self–assessment as potentially causal to the patient’s interpersonal impairments and lack 
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of relatedness. However, Levine and Faust are clear in their case narrative that the 
reported problem (patient’s perceived neurological deficit) is not necessarily central, 
causal or congruent with Edward’s personality issues; that it is not necessarily the 
presenting or underlying issue in the case (Levine & Faust, 2013):  
 
Edward’s substantial stress [...] stems from persistent thoughts about having a 
“defected” brain [...] was ruled out. [...] Although he has completed numerous 
neuropsychological evaluations that fail to discover the existence of memory 
problems, he continues to believe “something has been missed”. Nevertheless, he 
is able to consider the possibility that he does not actually have a serious cognitive 
defect; Edward has gone as far as saying “it might be all in my head,” thus 
constituting a rule out of delusional disorder (p. 206). 
 
Considerations about patient’s self–assertions and perceptions are part and parcel of case 
study research. This is because case studies in psychotherapy are particularly attuned to 
the contextual research component, with which multiple psychological, social, economic, 
and demographic factors are examined and assessed in ways that are not possible with 
larger participant samples (McLeod & Elliott, 2011). Following the example of Levine and 
Faust’s (2013) case, particularly detailed attention is drawn to Edward’s family history 
and early social life:  Edward grew up in a harsh interpersonal environment, with a 
mother who was unable to congruently address and mirror Edward’s psychological 
needs, and experiences of regular bullying from classmates at school. The case authors 
argue that these experiences effectively caused Edward’s personality to become split into 
the repressed (real) self and presenting (false) self; the real self, containing Edward’s 
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grandiose and affective needs, is concealed by his false self, which seeks to avoid further 
humiliation and rejection previously experienced with his mother and peers. The detailed 
contextual analysis enables the case authors to get one step closer in identifying the 
underlying issue in patient’s mental experiences (Brigati, 2009). 
 According to McLeod and Elliott (2011), the contextual element of single–subject 
research is deeply intertwined with the complexity of the case narrative. While large N 
studies produce typically small and/or less complex observations in relation to each 
research participant, case studies focusing on single individuals produce a large number 
of observations, leading to detailed analysis of complex therapeutic factors and 
processes. This is particularly important for diagnostic considerations: in Levine and 
Faust’s (2013) case, Edward was assessed for a variety of personality disorders due to 
his interpersonal problems. Furthermore, there is the challenge of Edward’s self–
reported neurological issues; however, as noted earlier, the patient presented doubts 
about this self–assessment. A complex analysis of Edward’s family relationships and 
social history allowed the case authors to consider an additional diagnosis: narcissistic 
personality disorder (NPD). Across multiple of Edward’s relationships, Levine and Faust 
observed Edward’s constant pre–occupation with his self–perceived cognitive 
limitations. However, this pre–occupation appeared to be most intense when Edward 
was no longer merged with some idealised object (e.g., a fantasised romantic partner, 
musician, poet, philosopher). This led the case authors to consider the possibility of closet 
narcissism (or Depressed/Depleted narcissism): a form of narcissism through which the 
individual becomes obsessed with their unfulfilled expectations of self, while repressing 
feelings of envy and resentment toward objects that are perceived as more successful. By 
identifying a new diagnosis (as well as a specific subtype of the diagnosis), Levine and 
Faust were able to formulate a suitable therapeutic plan (psychodynamic treatment), 
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with which they could target the patient’s underlying issue (impaired object relations and 
narcissistic defence mechanisms). 
 The intensive study of single individuals is particularly significant for clinicians 
who are interested in learning about therapeutic techniques, relationships, and 
interventions ‘in action’ (Mackrill & Iwakabe, 2013; Dattilio, Edwards, & Fishman, 2010). 
Indeed, case descriptions, whether formal (e.g., published as a case report in a scientific, 
peer–reviewed journal) or informal (e.g., a non–written clinical vignette used as an 
example in a teaching context), are considered to be central to the teaching and training 
of psychotherapy principles: “Without various forms of case materials, teaching of 
psychotherapy would be difficult and ineffective, if not impossible” (Mackrill & Iwakabe, 
2013, p. 251). In this sense, Levine and Faust’s (2013) case goes beyond the description 
of patient’s reported and underlying issues to concrete techniques, transference themes, 
and relational responses, all of which are presented in an attempt to address the patient’s 
specific treatment needs and, equally, to inform practitioners who are working with 
similar clinical issues and/or patients.  
 Due to their high clinical attunement, case studies have been identified as a 
potentially significant methodology in bridging the research–practice gap. The research–
practice gap has been defined as a gap (or a lack of integration) between the findings 
disseminated by researchers and the practical decisions made in the consulting room by 
therapists (Stinckens, Elliott, & Leijssen, 2009). In psychology and psychotherapy, this 
gap is often described as unidirectional, i.e., focusing exclusively on the flow of knowledge 
from researchers to clinical practitioners (Teachman et al., 2012; Westen, Novotny, & 
Thompson–Brenner, 2004). However, a bidirectional model of science and practice is 
increasingly suggested in the field of psychotherapy (Teachman et al., 2012). A 
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bidirectional model of knowledge generation would include the development of 
research–supported psychological treatments as well as increasing the role of clinical 
practitioners in the research process. Case studies and single–subject research designs 
are often developed by researchers who are simultaneously clinical practitioners 
(psychotherapists, psychologists, psychoanalysts, mental health and social care workers, 
etc.), which offers a methodologically unique perspective (Dattillio et al., 2010). The case 
example by Levine and Faust (2013) is no exception: Levine (the first author) conducted 
psychotherapy with the patient, while Faust (the second author) acted as a clinical 
supervisor. This enabled the case authors to link up clinical observations (e.g., Edward’s 
narcissistic defences) with methodological considerations (e.g., developing congruent 
countertransference reactions) in much greater detail. 
 Case studies in psychotherapy are also valuable in demonstrating the application 
of psychological theories ‘in action’, thus contributing to the theoretical advancement of 
the field (Mackrill & Iwakabe, 2013). Although it is argued that larger N studies (in 
particular, randomised controlled trials; RCTs) are already testing theories (in the form 
of therapeutic interventions) on a ‘macro’ level (by confirming or disconfirming the 
effectiveness of a therapeutic intervention within a specific clinical population), case 
studies are able to achieve this on a ‘micro’ level (Onwuegbuzie & Teddlie, 2003; 
Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2005). A single case study can make systematic observations 
about how theoretical ideas apply in practice with a specific patient in a way that would 
not be possible in a large–scale RCT: “The case study strategy is to compare each of many 
theoretically–based statements with one or a few [clinical] observations. [...] Because 
many statements are examined, the gain in confidence in theory may be as large as that 
from a statistical hypothesis testing study” (Stiles, 2007, p. 123). The key element here is 
particularisation, not generalisation: while RCTs demonstrate whether interventions 
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work on average in a group, case studies demonstrate whether they work with individual 
patients through a detailed description of therapeutic microprocesses (e.g., patient 
symptoms, treatment needs, therapeutic relationship dynamics, therapist attitudes, etc.). 
In Levine and Faust’s (2013) case, the detailed analysis of patient’s interpersonal issues, 
family history, and displays of grandiosity allowed the case authors to expand the 
theoretical definition and symptoms common to closet narcissism, a relatively 
uninvestigated clinical phenomenon. The analysis of ‘micro’ elements in case studies 
indicates a potentially significant contribution to evidence–based psychotherapy, and, 
specifically, findings from RCTs (Iwakabe & Gazzola, 2009). 
 Finally, there is something to be said about the value of narrative knowing in 
psychotherapy case studies (McLeod & Elliott, 2011). The idea is that reading case studies 
is more than just deciphering therapist interpretations and engaging with ‘micro’ data on 
patient experiences; it also involves an emphatic assimilation into a ‘closed world’ 
between the therapist and the patient (Mackrill & Iwakabe, 2013). This is the closest we 
can get to observing ‘live therapy’, which is usually not part of routine psychotherapy 
training. The psychological dimension of the case narrative elicits an empathic response 
(Von Wright, 1971) in many different kinds of readers. This includes not only therapists 
and trainees, but also students, researchers, social care workers, and, ultimately, patients 
and their own family members (Miller, 2004): 
 
It is only in the rich narrative possible in a case study that the clinical reality of 
human suffering and healing can be captured. The case study can describe the 
context, the meaning of the problem, to all those affected by the client’s problem 
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or illness, and the practical obstacles and resources available for its solution. (p. 
36).  
 
From this point of view, Levine and Faust’s (2013) case is significant not just in terms of 
its clinical techniques or theoretical advancements in the field of narcissism; it also 
conveys a lived experience of fragmentation and brokenness associated with early 
parental neglect and lack of a ‘real’ self. 
 As can be observed from the above review, different fields and authors have 
identified several strengths of the single case study method: the deeply contextual 
research component, complexity of the case narrative, pedagogical capacity 
(demonstrating treatment techniques ‘in action’), high clinical attunement (practice–
based element), theoretical advancement (via particularisation), and narrative knowing. 
However, these elements are rarely considered in a comprehensive and pragmatic 
manner. For example, narrative knowing is often seen as uncomplimentary or 
unnecessary for theoretical advancement, leading to some ambiguity of what constitutes 
a ‘good’ case study (McLeod, 2010a). However, as shown through Levine and Faust’s 
(2013) case example, all these components may be present in a single case study in a 
congruent and helpful way. Although this does not mean that each case study should 
contain all the different elements (as, indeed, case studies may be structured quite 
differently accordingly to their research aims; see Chapter 5 ‘Appraising Psychotherapy 
Case Studies in Practice–Based Evidence: Introducting Case Study Evaluation–tool (CaSE)’), 
it is crucial to assess how all of the aforementioned research components may contribute 
to the further development of the case study method. 
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 In this thesis, I seek to consider the significance of the key case study components 
by looking at how they may contribute to:  
 
(1) Epistemic knowledge generation practices in psychotherapy (broadly, across 
different forms of therapeutic schools, such as psychodynamic and Cognitive 
Behavioural Therapy) and psychoanalysis (specifically, given the historical 
significance of the psychoanalytic case study method for Freudians and post–
Freudians);  
(2) A specific form of scientific thinking called thinking in cases (which utilises 
different forms of non–statistical generalisation that can be seen ‘in action’ in both 
classic and contemporary case studies);  
(3) The body of evidence in psychotherapy in a broader (beyond N=1) sense (by 
exploring the role of contemporary case studies in evidence–based practice, EBP, 
and practice–based evidence, PBE).  
 
This thesis can therefore be considered as both a defence of the case study method in 
psychoanalysis and psychotherapy (as it seeks to address the methodological 
misperceptions and general biases toward single case studies) as well as a developmental 
project (as it acknowledges the ongoing methodological weaknesses in single case studies 
and presents further suggestions for knowledge generation practices and critical 
appraisal procedures). 
 The development of this thesis is timely, given the growing interest in the case 
study method in the past two decades. Case studies have been increasingly discussed and 
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used in social sciences (Hammersley & Gomm, 2000; Yin, 2014), psychotherapy (Iwakabe 
& Gazzola, 2009; Fishman, 1999, 2005; Stiles, 2007; Wedding & Corsini, 2013), and 
psychoanalysis (Desmet et al., 2013; Willemsen et al., 2015; Meganck et al., 2017). There 
are currently two case–based journals in the field of psychotherapy: Clinical Case Studies 
(which publishes innovative clinical case studies with individual patients, couples, and 
families) and Pragmatic Case Studies in Psychotherapy (PCSP) (which publishes rigorous, 
systematic case studies and papers that enhance knowledge generation practices in case 
studies). The Single Case Archive (SCA; https://www.singlecasearchive.com/) is the first 
online archive that compiles clinical, systematic, and experimental single case studies in 
the field of psychotherapy. SCA enables therapists, researchers, and trainees to search for 
relevant case studies in a variety of therapeutic schools. All these developments signal a 
move toward the singular in psychological sciences, which makes it all the more 
important to conduct a detailed investigation into the case study method. 
 
1.2 Case study method: a background 
 
A “case” is typically defined as “an instance of a particular situation; an example of 
something occurring” (Oxford English Dictionary). This definition exemplifies a key 
aspect of the case study method: it studies a particular instance of human behaviour or 
an event (whether related to a single individual, a group community or a society), with 
the goal of producing a rich description that captures “the actual state of affairs” (Midgley, 
2006a, p. 124). This is true of all case–based disciplines: in psychotherapy, medicine, law, 
and criminology, cases are used to describe diagnoses, investigations, crimes, and 
histories of particular events.  
12 
 
 Flyvbjerg (2011) notes that case studies have been “around as long as recorded 
history” (p. 302). Besides psychology (where one may argue case studies had a 
constitutive role), case studies had a significant impact in the fields of sociology and 
history (Stewart, 2014; Simons, 2009), while their methodological origins can be traced 
back to detailed ethnographic studies of individuals and cultures in anthropology 
(Harrison et al., 2017). Such investigations took place in naturalistic settings: researchers 
sought to understand people’s experiences within the social and cultural context of their 
world, i.e., how individuals understood, interpreted, and constructed the meaning of their 
life experiences (Johansson, 2003). Some of the most famous anthropological case studies 
include Thomas and Znaniencki’s (1958) study of Polish peasants’ experiences in Europe 
and America and Malinowski’s (1913/2013) ethnographic work in the Trobriand Islands, 
Melanesia on the Australian Aborigines. Both case studies are considered to be 
foundational in the fields of sociology and anthropology due to their explicit focus on the 
relationship between the individual and the society, as well as detailed experiential 
accounts of culture in group dynamics. In particular, Malinowski’s work is considered a 
first of its kind qualitative research that involved the researcher (i.e., Malinowski himself) 
in the “imponderabilia” of everyday life of the Australian Aborigine culture. Malinowski 
argued that the researcher’s daily contact with a different culture leads to a better 
understanding of the research subjects’ worldview. This novel approach toward the 
research process and researcher’s role undoubtedly contributed to further development 
of the case study method, and, in particular, its focus on human historicity (Hanly, 1996). 
 In the fields of psychoanalysis and psychotherapy, case studies are at the origin of 
theory development and research (Meganck et al., 2017). According to Pletsch (1982), 
the intellectual history of psychoanalysis is directly engraved into classic case studies by 
Sigmund Freud, namely: the case of Dora (1901/1905), Ratman (1909a), Little Hans 
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(1909b), Schreber (1911), and Wolfman (1918). These case studies include the 
development of key psychoanalytic techniques (e.g., dream analysis), the changing 
theoretical positions and attitudes (e.g., from seeing transference as something that must 
be ‘dispelled’ or ‘avoided’ to using it as an analytic toolkit), and discoveries of novel 
clinical phenomena (such as paranoia, hysteria, infantile neurosis, psychosis). Even 
Freud’s less known cases, such as A Child Is Being Beaten (1924) and the analysis of 
Freud’s dream of Irma’s injection in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900), continue to 
function as “canonical examples” and “points of reference” for psychoanalytic theories 
(Creager, Lunbeck, & Wise, 2007, p. 2). 
 Freud, who began his career as a neurologist (Solms, 2000) and saw himself as a 
man of science (Kaye, 2003), described the shift from his earlier scientific work in 
neurology to psychoanalytic case studies in the following manner (Freud, 1895/1950): 
 
Like other neuropathologists, I was trained to employ local diagnoses and 
electroprognosis, and it still strikes me myself as strange that the case histories I 
write should read like short stories and that, as one might say, they lack the serious 
stamp of science. [...] The fact is that local diagnosis and electrical reactions lead 
nowhere in the study of hysteria, whereas a detailed description of mental 
processes such as we are accustomed to find in the works of imaginative writers 
enables me, with the use of a few psychological formulas, to obtain at least some kind 




This passage is historically significant for both the genre of case study writing and 
psychoanalysis as a discipline. Initially, Freud intended to develop psychoanalytic 
psychology in line with a neurobiological tradition. For example, the early concept of 
psyche was described by Freud as a neurobiological apparatus; its disturbances were 
associated with perceptual neurones and mnemic images of the object that causes (or 
excites) the pain. Pain itself, however, was not understood as a subjective experience. 
Instead, it was explained as a property consisting “in the irruption of large Qs [Quantities] 
into ψ [impermeable neurones]” (Freud, 1895/1950, p. 307). Subsequently the patient’s 
subjective experiences of pain and displeasure were to be understood under the general 
neurobiological concepts of “stimulus”, “response”, “drive”, and “instinct”. Freud 
envisioned that these concepts would be used to explain the constitution of the psychic 
world, just like physics and chemistry explain the constitution of the corporeal world 
(Harrington, 2000). However, Freud quickly discovered that such an approach (or, more 
specifically, reasoning style) was not sufficient in the study of mental phenomena; that it 
“led nowhere”.  
 After his first real dream analysis (the analysis of Irma’s injection), Freud began 
to direct his scientific ambition inwards, towards the subjective and hidden meanings of 
the psychic life (Freud, 1900). Freud began to postulate that understanding the meaning 
of the dream requires an uncritical attitude to all of the dreamer’s free associations 
(expressions containing unconscious material): “The dreamer does know what his dream 
means: only he does not know that he knows it and for that reason he thinks he does not 
know it” (Freud, 1924/1963, p. 101). In other words, thinking about external causes and 
biological processes for Freud was not enough: in order to reveal the underlying 
unconscious processes of mental phenomena, one must attend to patients’ life histories, 
their subjective experiences, as well as their own attempts to understand their problems. 
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 Freud’s shift from neurological to psychological thinking had a direct influence on 
his choice of research methodology. First, Freud needed a format through which he could 
disseminate qualitatively rich data and observations about patients’ unconscious 
processes, behaviours, and feelings to the medical community (Willemsen et al., 2017). 
Second, this format would need to be suitable for the theoretical advancement of 
psychoanalysis as a science (Freud, 1926). The medical case study format seemed 
appropriate for the fulfilment of these two tasks but pending further changes that would 
enable Freud to attend to the psychological (rather than physiological) material 
(Forrester, 2017). Medical case studies were standardised accounts, which included 
patient’s name, occupation, medical family and social history, and a pathological report 
(Sturdy, 2007); consequently, medical cases were rarely more than several paragraphs 
to several pages long (Sealey, 2011). Indeed, brevity was regarded as a sign of seriousness 
in the medical community (Nowell–Smith, 1995). 
 However, cases in medical practice have been used not only as professional 
examples (depicting specific patient scenarios and treatment processes that could then 
be used for similar cases in the future) but also as teaching examples. In the 19th century, 
French neurologist Jean–Martin Charcot (who supervised Freud’s work for a brief period 
in 1885) used case presentations as a special form of teaching, in which patients suffering 
from neurological diseases would demonstrate their symptoms in front of the students 
(Kumar et al., 2011). Using real–life patient cases as teaching examples made Charcot’s 
Salpêtrière Hospital famous: it was a direct and powerful representation of medical 
pathologies and human suffering. These case presentations were more convincing and 
moving than any medical article due to their sheer experiential quality (despite such 
‘demonstrations’ involving ethically questionable practices; see Stephenson, 2001). 
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 Although Freud did not choose the medical ‘demonstration’ format for his case 
genre (unsurprisingly, given the privacy required for the therapeutic relationship and the 
analytic task; see Freud, 1912), he nonetheless maintained that there was something 
important in keeping – and, indeed, developing – the detailed description of mental 
processes in the same powerful manner as Charcot’s expositions (even at risk of losing 
what Freud earlier identified as a “serious stamp of science”). As such, the psychoanalytic 
case study underwent a dramatic transformation from the classic medical case: it was no 
longer a data file, in which the patient was described through a number of classifications 
and diagnostic evaluations (Forrester, 2017). Instead, the Freudian psychoanalytic case 
became a kind of “Kranken Geschichten” (Willemsen et al., 2017), bravely and wildly 
placing the reader into the patient’s world. This creates an immersive effect, with which 
the readers are able to experience patient’s interpersonal family drama, transference 
struggles, and neurotic symptoms as if they were ‘played’ out (or ‘acted’ out) right in front 
of them, within close psychological proximity. For example, in the case of Dora (Freud, 
1901/1905), Freud clearly goes beyond depicting patient’s hysteric symptoms: he writes 
in detail about her emotional experiences, family life, traumas, and desires, as well as his 
own ability (or lack thereof) to understand her as a psychoanalyst. Not unlike Malinowski 
(1913/2013), Freud describes his regular contact with Dora’s psychic experiences and 
unconscious conflicts: “I found it totally inadequate for dealing with the finer structure of 
neurosis. I now let the patient [herself] choose the subject of the day’s work, and in that 
way I start out from whatever surface [her] unconscious happens to be presenting to 
[her] notice at the moment” (Freud, 1901/1905, p. 12). Therefore, the research process 
in classic Freudian case studies is revelatory not just of patient history and unconscious 
conflicts, but also of changes in theory (e.g., the move from therapist–initiated 
interventions to free association), initiated via the therapeutic process. 
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 Although Freud’s case studies are now a century old, they remain among the most 
famous psychological artifacts of the 20th century (Sealey, 2011). The clinical techniques 
described in Freud’s cases are still discussed during clinical training and education 
(Ellman, 2002), while Freud’s theoretical postulations continue to be studied, criticised, 
and re–assessed by contemporary psychoanalysts, social theorists and psychologists 
(Sulloway, 1991; Berkenkotter, 2008; Mahony, 1996; Hinshelwood, 2013). It is evident 
that, despite fierce criticisms put forward for the psychoanalytic case study method and 
theory (this is explored further in the section 1.2.3 ‘Methodological Controversies’ and 
Chapter 2 ‘Learning from Past Practices: An Overview of Criticisms for Psychoanalytic Case 
Studies’), Freud was able to utilise this genre in order to effectively disseminate his mode 
of scientific thinking (Kaluzeviciute & Willemsen, 2020) and further cultivate communal 
psychoanalytic activity (Bazerman, 1988).  
 After Freud, due to increasing influence from the French model of patient 
observation and German model of laboratory experimentation, case studies generally 
became less popular and entered a state of flux (Sealey, 2011). However, as a medium, 
the case study found a way to shift, develop, and transform in spite of these challenges. 
This is particularly evident in the field of psychotherapy: new modes of single–case 
experimental designs (Smith, 2012), systematic case study research (McLeod & Elliott, 
2011; Davison & Lazarus, 2007), meta–analytic case study findings (Timulak, 2009) and 
case–comparison techniques (Iwakabe & Gazzola, 2009; Willemsen et al., 2015) continue 
to emerge at an exciting speed. The resurrection of the case study method is undoubtedly 
instigated by the persisting research–practice gap, in which the chosen methodology 
(large N studies, such as RCTs) is seen as incongruent or insufficient for the study of the 
object (namely, the human mind and mental health experiences) (Meganck et al., 2017; 




 1.2.1 Different forms of case study 
 
Following recent methodological innovations in psychotherapy research, it is important 
to point out that the case study method has become increasingly pluralistic, both in terms 
of its research process and research aim (Widdowson, 2011). This contributed to several 
different types of case studies, which need to be clearly differentiated.  
 Clinical case studies are narrative reports written by therapists. They usually 
involve detailed descriptions of treatment processes as well as therapist interpretations 
(Iwakabe & Gazzola, 2009). Although it is not impossible that quantitative methods (such 
as questionnaires or psychometrics) might be used in a clinical case study, the therapist 
using them will still discuss the findings in relation to clinical interpretations, which are 
seen as central to the case. 
  In psychotherapy, clinical case studies are particularly suitable for teaching and 
training: clinical trainees can learn about therapeutic interventions from detailed 
narratives with ‘real life’ patients, including descriptions on how to navigate therapeutic 
issues (Miller, 2004). Furthermore, clinical case studies are useful for generating 
hypotheses: since they start off with a “thick” description containing many contextual 
data points (Geertz, 1973), the case researcher can begin to make inferences between 
patient’s history and their current experiences. However, how (and if) research 
hypotheses generated in clinical case studies featuring single patient observations can be 
confirmed or falsified is a subject of ongoing methodological debates (Midgley, 2006a) 
(this is explored further in the section 1.2.3 ‘Methodological Controversies’). Clinical case 
studies typically revolve around experiential or narrative questions (“What is the story of 
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what happened, from the patient’s or therapist’s point of view?”); however, 
contemporary clinical case studies may also tackle pragmatic questions (“What strategies 
and methods did the therapist use in this case that contributed to the eventual 
outcome?”) related to clinical practice or theory–building questions (“How can the data in 
this case be used to test and refine an existing theoretical model?”) focused on the 
application of a specific theory and/or concept in the treatment process (McLeod, 2010a). 
 In systematic case studies (otherwise known as naturalistic), data is gathered from 
multiple different sources (questionnaires, observations by the therapist, interviews, 
statistical findings) in order to construct a comprehensive account of the case. Data is 
then triangulated among a team of researchers (which may include therapists, data 
analysts, researchers, clinical supervisors) to see whether findings from different sources 
converge or differ. This enables a more rigorous and critical outlook on case study 
findings (McLeod, 2010a).  
 Systematic case studies are considered to be an accessible method for developing 
research evidence–base in psychotherapy (Widdowson, 2011), especially since they 
‘correct’ some of the methodological limitations inherent to classic clinical case studies 
(Iwakabe & Gazzola, 2009). Fishman’s (1999, 2005) work has been particularly 
significant for developing standardised guidelines for published systematic case studies. 
Systematic case studies will often include a “thick” description of patient’s presenting 
problems, similar to clinical cases; beyond this, however, a systematic case narrative 
should also include researchers’ theoretical approach, intervention methods, 
professional experiences, and a review of related research (Fishman, 2005). The 
standardisation of case study narrative enables systematic case studies to address 
outcome (“How effective has therapy been in this case?”), theory–building and pragmatic 
questions (McLeod, 2010a) in a clear and structured manner. Experiential or narrative 
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questions may still be important, although to varying and/or lesser degree than in clinical 
case studies. It is important to note, however, that systematic case studies maintain 
descriptions of treatment processes and clinical encounters ‘as they occur’ (hence the 
term naturalistic, i.e., without the manipulation of the therapeutic set–up or 
decontextualization of specific variables). 
 Experimental case studies (otherwise known as single subject designs or N=1 
subject experiments) are used for testing hypotheses about treatment effects. 
Experimental case studies are considered an alternative to large–scale outcome research 
(Barlow & Hersen, 1984). Researchers utilising experimental cases record and address 
changes observed in patients that can be attributed to administration of specific 
interventions (e.g., medication). Standard behaviour assessment is conducted and 
recorded regularly, and changes are then compared with a baseline of target behaviours 
(Iwakabe & Gazzola, 2009).  
 Given the focus on behavioural change, experimental case studies have been used 
almost exclusively for research of behavioural therapies (Widdowson, 2011). The 
experimental case material usually consists of a time–series analysis comparing the effect 
of interventions along with graphic presentations of data. This enables the reader to 
examine and identify clinical changes visually (Iwakabe & Gazzola, 2009). Although the 
theoretical rationale and general treatment processes are reported, these case study 
components are usually not central to experimental case studies. As such, experimental 
cases are mostly concerned with outcome questions (McLeod, 2010a). 
 Although the terminology for different case study types may vary in 
psychotherapy literature (e.g., Fishman developed the term pragmatic case study, which 
generally corresponds to systematic case study; see Fishman, 1999), while other 
researchers developed separate modes of case–based research (e.g., Elliott developed 
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Hermeneutic Single Case Efficacy Design (HSCED) Studies to address single outcome 
variables based on both qualitative and quantitative data; see Elliott, 2001), Iwakabe and 
Gazzola’s (2009) terminology of clinical, experimental and systematic case studies 
remains to be the most frequently used case study identifier, and as such, these terms will 
be used throughout the thesis.  
 Furthermore, since this project is at an intersection of psychoanalysis and 
psychotherapy, it will predominantly focus on developing the first two types of case 
study: clinical and systematic. Although experimental case studies (or single subject 
designs) have been used in psychotherapy research (Smith, 2012), their methodological 
components are significantly different from clinical and systematic case studies due to 
high focus on physiological (specifically, observable and measurable) patient responses. 
However, as will be shown in the section 1.3 ‘Approach of this thesis’, this work seeks to 
address the ongoing issue of capturing qualitatively rich psychological data in 
psychotherapy case studies. As such, experimental case studies were deemed to be less 
relevant than other types, both in terms of their methodological standing (experimental 
case studies are generally considered to be more credible in terms of their validity than, 
for example, clinical case studies; see Aveline, 2005) and research material (which is 
generally less invested in exploring complex micro–processes like therapeutic 
relationships, patient responses, therapist attitudes, etc.). 
 
 1.2.2 Case studies in different therapeutic modalities 
 
Most forms of psychotherapy utilised clinical case studies at (or during) their origin: 
theoretical developments were often based on direct clinical observation and experience 
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with innovative interventions, long before outcome studies or controlled empirical 
research (e.g., laboratory studies) were implemented (Stiles, 2005). Freud’s classic 
psychoanalytic case studies are exemplary of this approach. 
 Contemporary clinical case studies, such as those published in the journal Clinical 
Case Studies, tend to be mainly from psychodynamic/psychoanalytic, CBT (Cognitive 
Behavioural Therapy), DBT (Dialectical Behavioural Therapy), and object relational 
approaches. On the Single Case Archive, out of 1915 clinical case studies, 1211 case 
studies were found to be psychodynamic/psychoanalytic (accounting for 63,2% of all 
clinical cases), 189 case studies were found to be CBT (accounting for 9,8% of all clinical 
case studies), 107 case studies were from Client–centered/Humanistic/Existential 
therapeutic approaches (accounting for 5,5% of all clinical case studies), with the rest of 
clinical case studies coming from mixed therapeutic modalities. These results indicate 
that the clinical case study format is still prominent within psychodynamic and 
psychoanalytic approaches, which have been historically close to this mode of writing.  
 It is also worth noting that the contemporary mode of clinical case study has 
significantly changed since Freud’s time: clinical case studies published in psychotherapy 
journals are generally shorter (which is partly due to journal word length requirements, 
although it may also be seen as a consequence of increasing standardisation; see Sealey, 
2011), and are usually more structured (including not only therapist interpretations but 
also a theoretical and/or research basis, case introduction, presenting complaints, course 
of treatment, complicating factors, etc.). These developments undoubtedly contributed to 
the relatively recent theoretical diversity in clinical case studies, especially since CBT 
research has been historically aligned with experimental case studies. 
 Systematic case studies are becoming increasingly common in contemporary 
psychotherapy research (Meganck et al., 2017; Fishman, 2005), and have been used in a 
23 
 
variety of therapeutic modalities. For instance, systematic case studies published in 
Pragmatic Case Studies in Psychotherapy (PCSP) are very diverse: recent issues (from 
2017 to 2020) feature case studies from Telephone–Based CBT and DBT, CBTp (Cognitive 
Behavioural Therapy of psychosis), AEDP (Accelerated Experiential Dynamic 
Psychotherapy), and CBIT (Comprehensive Behavioral Intervention for Tics) therapeutic 
modalities, to name a few. On the Single Case Archive, out of 1101 systematic case studies, 
427 case studies were found to be CBT (accounting for 38,7% of all systematic case 
studies), while 283 were psychodynamic/psychoanalytic (accounting for 25,7% of all 
systematic case studies), with the rest of systematic case studies coming from mixed 
therapeutic modalities. The theoretical diversity in systematic case studies indicates that 
methodological developments initiated by psychoanalytically–oriented researchers (like 
Wallerstein’s first of its kind Menninger Foundation research project consisting of 42 
systematic psychoanalytic case studies; see Wallerstein, 1989) have also brought in 
practitioner–researchers from other therapeutic approaches, such as CBT. Moreover, 
there is growing evidence that clinical psychodynamic and psychoanalytic case studies 
are also becoming increasingly systematic in terms of their methodological components 
(Meganck et al., 2017; Desmet, 2013), which could indicate a more general shift in case 
study writing practices. 
 Historically, experimental case studies have been closely aligned with behavioural 
therapies (pioneered by Watson, Skinner and Pavlov), and later, CBT (McLeod, 2010a). 
This remains to be the case: on the Single Case Archive, out of 214 experimental case 
studies (single case experiments), 143 were found to be from behavioural therapeutic 
approaches and interventions (e.g., Applied Behavior Analysis, Third–Generation 
Behavioural Therapies, Aggression–Contingent Physical Restraint, etc.) (accounting for 
66,8% of all experimental case studies), and 51 were found to be CBT (accounting for 
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24,2% of all experimental case studies), with the rest of experimental case studies coming 
from mixed (systemic, cognitive, and other) therapeutic modalities. 
 
 1.2.3 Methodological controversies 
 
According to Midgley (2006), cotemporary criticisms against the case study method can 
be grouped into three distinct categories: the data problem (observations in case 
narratives are not reliable and/or valid), the data analysis problem (the methods used for 
analysing and reporting observations in case narratives are lacking validity and 
accuracy), and the generalisability problem (even if some of the observations in the case 
narratives are reliable, they cannot be generalised beyond the particular case narrative).  
 The first issue of clinical data is relevant to all forms of case reporting: it is difficult, 
if not impossible, to separate the case–subject (e.g., patient) with the case author’s (e.g., 
therapist’s) understanding of the subject’s psychological reality (Walsh, 2020). This feeds 
into a broader debate on whether there can be ‘clinical facts’ that are epistemically 
constitutive of another subject’s experiences in the ‘real’ world, or whether all case 
narratives are constructions within the therapist’s mind (O’Shaughnessy, 1994; Gabbard, 
1997). The American Psychoanalytic Association reported this issue in the late 1980s, 
highlighting the fact that most clinical observations are gathered retrospectively, lack 
primary data about patient history and clinical assessment, and conflate observations 
with causal inferences (Klumpner & Galatzer–Levy, 1991). Increasingly, video and audio 
recordings have been suggested as ways to combat unduly case reporting, although not 
without clinical and ethical objections (Tessier, 2012). 
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 The second issue of clinical data analysis can be related to Donald Spence’s (1984, 
2001) criticism of “narrative smoothing”: a selective portrayal of the clinical situation by 
eliminating contradictory evidence. According to Spence, since we cannot directly 
observe therapists at work, they may freely substitute clinical evidence with a variety of 
narrative truths that are convenient for theoretical confirmations. As an example, Spence 
cites Burland’s (1997) article, in which a sample of 450 case reports was evaluated. In 
each and every one of the cases, Burland found the same exact patient scenario: “A step–
by–step regression into a revisitation of their past, in memory, in the transference, and in 
current reality [...] The patients struck me as sharing more or less common repertoire of 
affects and struggling with them in similar ways” (Burland, 1997, p. 469). Both Spence 
(2001) and Burland (1997) note that it is highly unlikely for a sample this large to report 
narratives of such high similarity. Spence suggests a variety of reasons for “narrative 
smoothing” in psychotherapy case studies: therapists may feel the need to generate 
normative or unexceptional case studies in order to get more easily certified; received 
theory may influence the analyst on a conscious or preconscious level; the narrative may 
be significantly modified in order to protect patient’s identity; and lastly, the narrative 
may be generated in a way that would reassure the theoretical field about the stability of 
its core theoretical concepts (Spence, 2001; Widlöcher, 1994; Goldberg, 1997). 
 Lastly, the issue of generalisability is arguably the most detrimental criticism for 
classic and contemporary case studies, as well as the most debated criticism in social 
sciences (Wallerstein & Sampson, 1971; Fonagy & Moran, 1993; Hanly, 1996; Lincoln & 
Guba, 2000; Yarkoni, 2019; Shean, 2014; Donmoyer, 2000; Meganck et al., 2017; Iwakabe 
& Gazzola, 2009; Tacq, 2010; Longhofer et al., 2017; Hinshelwood, 2019; Kaluzeviciute & 
Willemsen, 2020). This criticism follows from the first issue of data (Midgley, 2006a): 
since case studies provide (what might be perceived as) unregulated clinical observations 
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as well as deeply contextual data, it is unclear how (if at all) findings from a single case 
can be generalised or transferred onto a broader population. This criticism is usually 
made by the proponents of the statistical method and thinking style: since randomisation 
techniques (pertaining to study samples) and decontextualisation of specific variables, 
components that are crucial to most statistical models, are not relevant or possible in the 
case study method, statistical inferences pertaining to a general population cannot be 
made.  
 It is worth noting that the issue of generalisability is also highly contested in 
statistical psychology, which was recently described as experiencing a ‘generalisability 
crisis’ (Yarkoni, 2019), and has become a dividing point between qualitative (relying on 
in–depth, contextual data obtained by researchers from first–hand observation, 
interviews, questionnaires, case narratives, participant–observations, etc.) and 
quantitative (relying on data acquired through experimental control, manipulation of 
variables, and statistical analysis) research methods (Tacq, 2010; Lincoln & Guba, 2000). 
Numerous authors suggested other forms of generalisability that are more attuned with 
the case study method (Stake, 1995; Yin, 2013, 2014; Kaluzeviciute & Willemsen, 2020). 
This, as well as the previous two criticisms, will be addressed in greater detail throughout 
the thesis.  
 
1.3 Approach of this thesis 
 
Following recent developments in case study methodology (Meganck et al., 2017; Datillio 
et al., 2010; Desmet et al., 2013; Goodheart, 2005; Stiles, 2015; Timulak, 2009), this thesis 
seeks to perform a two–fold task: to defend the significance of case studies (and, more 
broadly, the significance of idiographic clinical narratives) as a quintessential 
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methodology for psychotherapy research, and to address some of its persisting 
methodological shortcomings. This section will briefly explain how both elements are 
approached in this thesis, along with an outline of key research questions explored in 
Chapters 2 through to 5. 
 First, it is important to clarify how the term “case study” is understood in this 
thesis. The rationale for focusing on clinical and systematic case studies (Iwakabe & 
Gazzola, 2009) has been outlined in section 1.2.1 ‘Different forms of case study’; these 
terms will be used to differentiate between the two methodologically distinct types of 
case study. Instances of therapeutically–oriented case study terminology, such as 
“psychotherapy case studies” or “psychoanalytic case studies”, should be understood in 
the following manner: case studies in psychotherapy refer to contemporary clinical and 
systematic case studies published in psychotherapy journals according to recent research 
criteria and guidelines (Fishman, 2005; Willemsen et al., 2017). Case studies in 
psychoanalysis refer to classic Freudian and other ‘originating’ cases developed by early 
psychoanalysts. Lastly, the term “case” should be understood in a broad manner: case as 
an epistemic genre (not only in psychoanalysis or psychotherapy but also in social 
sciences) encompassing written clinical cases, cases as teaching examples, cases for 
supervision (clinical vignettes), patient case files, etc. 
 As identified earlier, the case study method is uniquely equipped in approaching 
research data: complex and contextually embedded case narratives allow readers to ‘re–
live’ therapeutic relationships, reactions, attitudes, and changes in close psychological 
proximity (Mackrill & Iwakabe, 2013). This approach – central to case studies but also 
common to all forms of idiographic narratives (Jupp, 2006) – has proven to be 
problematic in recent methodological discourse. Multiple authors noted the exclusion of 
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complex patient and treatment data in contemporary diagnostic evaluations (e.g., 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, DSM; see Vanheule, 2012), 
evidence–based practice (Cartwright, 2007, 2011) and big data (Kitchin, 2014; O’Neil, 
2016) approaches. A radical move toward the general (i.e., tightly controlled clinical 
populations, diagnostic classifications, and data systems) risks omitting those data 
components that can only be explicated via small N research: the complexity and 
singularity of each patient’s history, treatment needs, therapeutic approach, treatment 
outcome, etc.  
 Furthermore, it has become evident that these data components are not just 
‘additional’ to large N studies like RCTs; that, in fact, case studies containing detailed 
micro–processes and/or specific treatment outcomes have the potential to inform and 
revise research findings from large–scale studies (Dattilio, Edwards & Fishman, 2010). 
This is an unsurprising yet often omitted fact: although RCTs are excellent in establishing 
the efficacy of treatment interventions in large groups, they cannot trace symptom, 
outcome or treatment process deviations in individual patients (Westen et al., 2004; 
Westen & Morrison, 2001), which is central to case studies in psychotherapy.  
 Therefore, this thesis will seek to reposition the significance of the case study 
method by capitalising on its qualitatively rich approach to psychological experiences in 
therapeutic practice. The latter has been identified as foundational for psychotherapy 
research, clinical practice and training (Mackrill & Iwakabe, 2013), despite the obvious 
difficulties in observing and measuring complex psychological data like patient attitudes 
(Truijens et al., 2019).  
 In defending the status of the case study method, however, the thesis does not seek 
to diminish the significance of other methodologies, such as RCTs. On the contrary, the 
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thesis considers a pragmatic dialogue between case studies and large N studies in an 
attempt to capture the complexity of clinical practice. Although this form of 
methodological pragmatism has been suggested by several authors (Fishman, 2005; 
Dattilio et al., 2010), unfortunately there remains a large divide between qualitative and 
quantitative research methods, leading to a form of methodological “fetishism” in 
scientific discourse (Burman, 1997). Therefore, as a case study researcher, I sought to 
offer some perspective on how qualitative and quantitative methods (specifically, 
systematic case studies and RCTs) may work together (or at the very least, co–exist) in 
the field of psychotherapy without losing their epistemological roots.  
 Some of the key questions that will be explored in relation to the defence of the 
case study method in Chapters 2 to through to 5 include:  
 
i. What is the historical significance of the case study method in the fields of 
psychoanalysis and psychotherapy? 
ii. What are some of the persisting misconceptions and biases toward the case 
study method? 
iii. What is the role and significance of subjective experiences in psychotherapy 
research? 
iv. How did the case study method evolve post–Freud? 
v. How can case studies contribute to systematic research in psychotherapy? 
vi. What are some of the epistemic practices and forms of reasoning used (but not 




As a project that seeks to contribute toward the development of the case study method, 
this thesis identifies some of the key methodological weaknesses that can be observed in 
both classic psychoanalytic as well as contemporary psychotherapy case studies, 
discussed in the earlier section 1.2.3 ‘Methodological controversies’. In an attempt to 
respond to some of these drawbacks, the thesis offers a set of epistemological concepts 
that would equip practitioner–researchers in the fields of psychotherapy and 
psychoanalysis with much needed methodological guidance pertaining to retroductive 
reasoning (Sayer, 2000), analytic generalisation (Yin, 2013, 2014) and working 
hypothesis (Crombach, 1975) research models. The thesis also offers a more explicit 
discussion of different forms of non–statistical generalisation through three distinct 
styles of thinking in cases (Forrester, 2017). Lastly, the thesis includes an introductory 
paper to a novel Case Study Evaluation–tool (CaSE), containing a checklist and framework 
approach with guidelines for systematic case study appraisal.  
 Some of the key questions that will be explored in relation to the development of 
the case study method in Chapters 2 through to 5 include:  
 
vii. How can case study researchers justify their findings on formal 
epistemological grounds? 
viii. What are some of the guidelines for researchers interested in retroductive 
reasoning, analytic generalisation and working hypothesis research models? 
ix. How can social science theories and concepts be utilised in research situated 
within psychotherapy and psychoanalysis? 
x. What are some of the alternative modes of generalisation (beyond statistical), 
appropriate for case studies in psychotherapy and psychoanalysis? 
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xi. How do clinicians and researchers ‘think and reason’ through case studies?  
xii. What is (or what may be considered as) evidence in psychotherapy case 
studies? 
xiii. How should case study researchers approach critical appraisal? 
xiv. What are some of the guidelines in developing a high–quality systematic case 
study? 
 
Although these developments do not fully solve all methodological shortcomings in the 
case study method (as, indeed, no method is without flaws, whether quantitative or 
qualitative; see, Shean, 2014), the thesis introduces new modes of epistemic practices, 
thinking and reasoning styles, and critical appraisal procedures, which previously were 
not considered or sufficiently explicated in psychotherapy and psychoanalytic case 
studies. Continuing with the pragmatic approach, many of the suggested developments 
for the case study method in this thesis draw from other fields and disciplines, such as 
philosophy of science and social sciences (e.g., education, management, science and 
technology studies, social work, etc.). Concepts from other fields are translated and 
explained in a way that would be accessible to researchers in psychotherapy and 
psychoanalysis, with references to clinically rich and systematically rigorous case study 
examples from the Single Case Archive, Pragmatic Case Studies in Psychotherapy, Clinical 
Case Studies and other relevant venues. 
 
1.4 Outline of thesis 
 
The thesis is structured as follows: 
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 Chapter 2 highlights the key criticisms put forward for psychoanalytic case 
studies at different (yet interrelated) levels: suggestive influence and scientific judgment 
(case study as a form of classification and judgment); (counter)transference as a ‘problem 
child’ (case narrative as an emotionally biased communication); validation (case study as 
an anecdotal report with non–generalisable findings). In doing so, the chapter also 
reviews some of the historical responses to the said criticisms, including the response 
from the scientific community (a move toward context–independent, generalisable 
research) and the psychoanalytic community (a move toward insularity and 
unresponsiveness). Explicating these historical strands is relevant for contemporary case 
studies in psychotherapy since they ‘inherited’ many of the original criticisms. The 
chapter shows how the case study method developed since Freud (and subsequently, 
how these developments address some of the criticisms aimed at classic psychoanalytic 
case studies) and suggests how contemporary case studies can move forward. The 
chapter is aimed at psychoanalytic and psychoanalytically informed practitioner–
researchers. 
 Chapter 3 seeks to attend to the widespread issue of lack of formal 
epistemological reasoning in case study research. In the fields of psychotherapy and 
psychoanalysis, lack of epistemic rigour contributed to the decline of the case study 
method as a form of valid evidence. Drawing from different social science resources, the 
chapter provides detailed discussions of three epistemological concepts that were 
established as relevant for the case study method: retroductive reasoning, analytic 
generalisation and working hypothesis. All three epistemological concepts were found to 
be implicitly present in psychoanalytic and psychotherapy case studies; however, all 
three concepts also suffer from methodological limitations and lack of research 
guidelines. The chapter develops some of the existing epistemological rules and provides 
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novel suggestions for those concepts that are underdeveloped, along with further 
considerations about canons of evidence. The chapter is positioned at an intersection of 
case study research in psychotherapy, psychoanalysis and social sciences; as such, it is 
aimed at researchers within these fields who are interested in conducting epistemically 
rigorous case study research. 
 Chapter 4 attends to a style of scientific thinking and reasoning called “thinking 
in cases”. The aim of this chapter is to clarify what Forrester meant by referring to 
thinking in cases as a distinct form of scientific reasoning. The chapter argues that some 
of the criticisms for psychoanalytic (and, later, psychotherapy) case studies are 
misdirected due to a confusion between statistical and experimental thinking styles and 
thinking in cases. The chapter outlines how thinking in cases differs from other forms of 
scientific thinking styles not only in how (process) but also what (end–goal) knowledge 
it produces. Beyond Forrester, the chapter proposes that there are several ways of 
thinking in cases: we can think not only in cases as exemplars for analytic generalisation 
(Forrester’s initial point), but also in cases as exemplars for analogical learning and cases 
as part of a population for empirical generalisation. The chapter is positioned at an 
intersection of psychoanalytic theory, social sciences and philosophy of science; as such, 
it is aimed at psychoanalytic and psychoanalytically informed practitioner–researchers 
and philosophers. The chapter involves collaboration with Prof Jochem Willemsen 
(details of which can be found in Author’s note). 
 Chapter 5 introduces a novel Case Study Evaluation–tool (CaSE). The chapter is 
presented as an epistemological exposition, showcasing the process of developing a 
critical appraisal tool for systematic case studies. This format was chosen consciously, 
due to the fact that the majority of existing critical appraisal tools for qualitative and 
quantitative research methods provide little (if any) epistemological rationale and 
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guidance for reviewers. Since CaSE is the first critical appraisal tool for systematic 
psychotherapy case studies, it is also important to discuss the significance and utility of a 
critical appraisal tool, the relationship between systematic case studies and the notion of 
‘evidence’, and the relevance (or lack thereof) of existing appraisal tools. The chapter 
develops purpose–oriented evaluation criteria for systematic case studies through CaSE 
Checklist for Essential Components in Systematic Case Studies and CaSE Purpose–based 
Evaluative Framework for Systematic Case Studies. A case example from the Single Case 
Archive is used to demonstrate the application of the tool ‘in action’. The chapter also 
indicates further research trajectories and some of the limitations in using the tool. The 
chapter should be seen as an introductory piece to what will (hopefully) flourish as an 
ongoing, long–term project beyond this PhD thesis. The chapter is positioned at an 
intersection of systematic psychotherapy research and practice–based evidence; as such, 
it is aimed at practitioner–researchers in psychotherapy who are interested in critically 
appraising case study findings. 
 Finally, Chapter 6 is the concluding chapter, in which I draw together all the 
different lines of research presented in this thesis, discuss limitations of the current work, 







Chapter 2: Learning from Past Practices: An Overview of Criticisms 
for Psychoanalytic Case Studies 
 
Abstract 
Since Freud, psychoanalytic case studies have been scrutinised as irredeemably 
subjective anecdotal reports. This paper explores criticisms at three different levels: 
suggestive influence and scientific judgment (case study as a form of classification and 
judgment); (counter)transference as a ‘problem child’ (case narrative as an emotionally 
biased communication); validation (case study as an anecdotal report with non–
generalisable findings). In exploring these different criticisms, the paper also considers 
two historical reactions toward the genre of psychoanalytic case study and the practice 
of case writing. The first response is from the scientific community, which prioritised 
context–independent and generalisable research. The second is from the psychoanalytic 
community, which has been described as insular and unresponsive toward sceptics. By 
bringing these criticisms and responses together, the paper seeks to provide a snapshot 
of how case studies survived the sceptics, and what past lessons can be learnt in 
developing the case study method further. 
 
Keywords: Psychoanalytic case study; Clinical case study; Freud; Transference; 






Through Freud’s psychoanalytic oeuvre, the case study genre underwent a 
transformation from a medical case file to a psychological case narrative (Willemsen et 
al., 2017). In his now classic five long case studies – Dora (1905), the Rat Man (1909a), 
Little Hans (1909b), Schreber (1911) and the Wolf Man (1918) – Freud was interested in 
much more than just making diagnostic observations about his patients (whether they 
were patients in his clinical practice or patients ‘via proxy’, such as Schreiber’s 
autobiography or Little Hans’ analysis through Hans’ father’s notes); he also sought to 
trace how these patients developed their symptoms.  
Consequently, psychoanalytic case studies became home to mental phenomena 
that are difficult or impossible to study in a decontextualized manner. Detailed and 
intricate case narratives allow clinicians to gain an in–depth understanding of specific 
mental experiences across concrete clinical populations (McLeod & Balamoutsou, 1996). 
This understanding is achieved due in no small part to therapist’s interpretations and 
reasoning processes in unique clinical scenarios: “Our tacit knowledge of psychotherapy 
derives from personal experience with people generally and from formal practice and 
supervision but also from others’ verbally reported experience” (Stiles, 1995, p. 126). In 
other words, the psychoanalytic case study seeks to reveal the subjective experience of 
the patient’s psyche as well as the interpretive and relational work carried out by the 
therapist.   
But psychological experiences and their representation in psychoanalytic case 
studies soon fell under pressing scrutiny. Scepticism about the irredeemably subjective 
nature of case studies can be observed at several different (yet interrelated) levels, of 
which this paper will explore: issues of suggestive influence and scientific judgment 
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(psychoanalytic case narratives as forms of classification, judgment, and correction 
between the psychoanalytic expert and the passive patient); (counter)transference as a 
‘problem child’ (psychoanalytic case narratives as inherently flawed modes of 
communication due to emotional bias in therapeutic relationships); issues of validation 
(case study as an unscientific anecdotal report with non–generalisable findings). 
In exploring these different criticisms and scepticisms, the paper considers two 
historical reactions toward the genre of psychoanalytic case study and the practice of 
writing psychoanalytic (and more broadly, clinical) cases.  The first, and most debated, 
response is to move away from context–dependent knowledge of subjective experiences 
to the study of predictable and generalisable signs and symptoms. Historically, this 
response falls in line with the rise of positivism and the prioritisation of quantitative 
methods (Miller, 1999). More recently, a similar research prioritisation can be seen in 
evidence–based research and practice hierarchies (Aveline, 2005; Truijens, 2016). Since 
case studies do not prioritise (or, as some argue, are incapable of) producing 
generalisable data, they risk falling into the category of ‘anecdotal reports’. This remains 
to be one of the most persistent issues not only for the genre of psychoanalytic case study 
but also for psychoanalysis as a science (Luyten et al., 2006).  
The second, and perhaps less discussed, response is that of the psychoanalytic 
community itself. Although it is tempting to argue that the decline of the case study 
method occurred due to a broader shift in scientific research priorities, some argue that 
the psychoanalytic community was all too quiet in its response to the sceptics. Kline and 
Sonnenberg (2001) assert that many psychoanalysts chose to respond to scepticism 
about their discipline and methods with a scepticism of their own: “no one ever thought 
that psychoanalysis was a science anyway—it’s [just] an art” or “case histories were 
never meant to be evidence for the theory, they’re just instructive parables of technique” 
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(p. 241) as examples. Furthermore, in an article titled The Impending Death of 
Psychoanalysis (2001), Bornstein controversially states that “psychoanalysis is dying, and 
maybe it should” (p. 3). For Bornstein, psychoanalysis committed too many self–
destructive behaviours, some of which are specific to the attitudes of psychoanalytic 
researchers and clinicians: indifference, inefficiency, and insolence. The key to saving 
psychoanalysis, according to Bornstein, is to save it from the psychoanalysts. 
By reviewing the different sceptical accounts and responses to them, this paper 
seeks to explicate a few concrete historical strands that contributed to the problematic 
status of psychoanalytic case studies. The paper does not seek to resolve or respond to 
all sceptics and critics; rather, it seeks to draw on divergent theoretical accounts and 
perspectives to point out both misunderstandings amongst sceptics as well as genuine 
methodological shortcomings in the case study method. Particular attention is drawn to 
transference and countertransference issues, the process of generalisation, and the 
significance of research pragmatism in clinical research. Although the paper looks back 
at historical trends and developments, it also provides considerations on how the case 
study method has developed since Freud (and subsequently, how these developments 
address criticisms aimed at Freud’s classic case studies), and how it can move forward.  
 
2.2 The ‘irredeemable’ subjectivity of psychoanalytic case studies 
 
Early criticisms by philosophers of science Popper (1959) and Grünbaum (1984, 1988) 
stressed that psychoanalytic case studies fail to meet the criteria for good scientific 
evidence. Case study data was deemed untested and selective, leading to biased 
confirmations of the analyst’s theoretical expectations (Luyten et al., 2006). More 
recently, psychologist Frank Sulloway argued that Freud’s case studies were no more 
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than a powerful rhetoric set to develop ritualistic functions amongst Freud’s followers. 
Sulloway labelled Freud’s cases as “dramatic showpieces of the healing powers of 
psychoanalysis […] and of Freud’s own brilliance as an investigator and physician” 
(Sulloway, 1991, p. 271–272).  
 These and similar criticisms are not simply suggesting that there is room for 
improvement. Rather, they seek to show that psychoanalytic case studies are inherently 
flawed and irredeemably subjective. As a result, many of these critical accounts call for 
alternative, systematic modes of research, that would ultimately replace the genre of 
psychoanalytic case studies. In the next three sections, I will review some of the most 
persistent issues in psychoanalytic case studies as they emerge in classic and 
contemporary writing.  
Whilst much of the psychoanalytic literature has focused on responding to 
criticisms and misunderstandings that are specific to Freud’s work, this paper aims to 
show which criticisms are still pertinent to contemporary case studies, and which 
criticisms are less relevant to post–Freudian case studies due to recent developments in 
case study research and methodology. The paper considers how recent psychotherapy 
and social science research informs the practice of writing psychoanalytic and clinical 
case studies. 
 For purposes of clarity, the paper refers to two kinds of case studies: classic 
psychoanalytic cases (most notably Freud’s five long case studies) and contemporary 
clinical case studies (which feature therapist narrative reports but may also include other 
forms of data such as (semi–)structured assessments, questionnaires, interviews, etc.). 
The term ‘practitioner–researcher’ is used to describe the special status held by analysts 
and therapists who are simultaneously producing research about their clinical practice. 
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The term ‘analyst’ is used to refer to psychoanalytic clinical practice and research, whilst 
the term ‘therapist’ denotes a wider relevance to the field of psychotherapy. 
 
 2.2.1 (Counter)transference as a ‘problem child’ 
 
Freud (1912) defined transference process as the sine qua non of analytic treatment: the 
patient engages with the analyst not only as a helper and advisor, but also as an 
unconscious reincarnation of some past figure (usually a parent or a lover). The patient 
transfers some of the feelings or reactions from the prototype figure onto the analyst; 
these feelings are often highly charged emotionally, verge from expression and 
repression, and contain positive, negative and/or ambivalent reactions toward the 
analyst and the analytic relationship (Saul, 1962). In return, the analyst is able to access 
the patient’s life history by re–experiencing their past relationships in a way that goes 
beyond patient’s own narrative (i.e., instead of reporting it, the patient acts it out).  
Although the concept of transference has been central to psychoanalysis and 
psychoanalytic treatment (Freud, 1901/1905, 1912, 1915, 1937a), it has been used 
widely in all psychotherapy orientations. Furthermore, transference feelings, reactions 
and patterns are some of the most frequently discussed topics in psychoanalytic and 
clinical case studies. 
 And yet, transference is also thought of as a ‘problem child’. The idea of an analyst 
becoming involved personally and emotionally with a patient naturally distances any 
clinical interpretation from being objective and bias free data. Furthermore, there is a 
concern that transference and countertransference exchanges may lead to a trespassing 
of boundaries in therapeutic relationships. Freud acknowledges this by stating that, when 
mishandled, transference may be a “source of serious dangers” (Freud, 1940/1949, p. 
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175). In contemporary literature, Gabbard (1995) describes the paradox of the analytic 
situation: the analyst who functions as a clinical authority on the basis of their expertise, 
training, and experience, generates a cure (an interpretation) in the face of most sensual 
and fundamental human emotions arising in positive and negative transference 
processes. As such, it is impossible to write off the emotional complexity of transference 
(and subsequently, the emotionally taxing nature of the analytic encounter) despite its 
clinical (or as some may say scientific) task. 
This emotional complexity can be seen in many psychoanalytic and clinical case 
studies. Freud’s case of Dora (1901/1905) exemplifies the intricate challenge of, on one 
hand, acknowledging and responding to patient’s transference, and on the other, 
producing an interpretation. Freud agreed with Dora in that her experiences of sexual 
abuse led to a hysterical disorder. At the same time, however, Freud also maintained that 
Dora’s hysteria is an expression of a forbidden wish. That is, Freud interpreted that Dora 
had repressed sexual impulses towards her perpetrator, Herr K., as well as her father and 
Freud himself. As her analyst, Freud contended – to Dora and the psychoanalytic 
community – that Dora’s “no” signified “yes”, all whilst being aware of Dora’s personal 
history, abuse and family circumstances (Renn, 2007). This had a severe impact on the 
therapeutic relationship: after 11 weeks, Dora left the treatment.  
The case of Dora has been dubbed as an exemplary case of mishandled 
transference. Mahony (1996) described it as:  
 
…one of the greatest psychotherapeutic disasters; one of the most remarkable 
exhibitions of a clinician’s published rejection of his patient; spectacular, though 
tragic, sexual abuse of a young girl, and her own analyst’s published exoneration 
of that abuse; an eminent case of forced associations, forced remembering, and 
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perhaps several forced dreams, forced remembering of dreams, even forced 
remembering of forced dreams (p. 148–149). 
 
The scientific validity of Freud’s conclusions in the case of Dora have also been contested 
for several reasons. First, there is the issue of Freud prioritising the advancement of 
psychoanalysis over genuine engagement with his patient’s emotional crisis and trauma. 
Modern reviews point out Freud’s lack of engagement in building a therapeutic alliance 
with Dora (Greenson, 1967; Dickes, 1975). Indeed, Freud acknowledged that he failed to 
facilitate a productive therapeutic relationship with his patient, stating that he was 
“anxious to subject [his] assumptions to a rigorous test” (Freud, 1905, p. 31).  
Second, speculations about Freud’s research bias remind us that the original title 
for the case was Dreams and Hysteria – Freud had a clearly set out ambition to write up a 
case study that would confirm his theory and hypotheses about hysteria, potentially at 
the cost of an objective interpretation (Mitchell, 1993).  
Finally, and perhaps owing to many of the aforementioned issues, Freud failed to 
acknowledge his own countertransference feelings: “Owing to the readiness with which 
Dora put one part of the pathogenic material at my disposal during the treatment, I 
neglected the precaution of looking out for the first sign of transference” (Freud, 1905, p. 
118). Collectively, these issues demonstrate what McLeod (2010) called “profound 
limitations of the traditional clinical case study method” (p. 4): unacknowledged 
transference and countertransference issues leading to various forms of bias that prevent 
case studies from being regarded as reliable forms of evidence.  
Difficulties associated with describing and documenting transference and 
countertransference phenomena are not exclusive to Freud’s work. In a paper called Love 
in the Countertransference: Controversies and Questions (2003), Rabin argues that much 
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of the post–Freudian psychoanalytic literature remains concerned with the classic 
‘patients falling in love with their analysts’ narrative (Rapaport, 1959; Menninger, 1958). 
The analyst’s feelings, on the other hand, remain largely a taboo subject. Experience–near 
terms such as ‘love’ are usually masked by technical terms such as ‘libidinal’ or 
‘countertransferential reaction’. It took at least a few decades for literature on ‘analysts 
falling in love with their patients’ to emerge (Gabbard & Lester, 1995). This is 
unsurprising: while many analysts might feel discomfort about caring and potentially 
loving their patients (Coen, 1994), revealing these feelings to patients and the 
psychoanalytic community may sabotage the credibility of their clinical work, 
professional status and personal life. Indeed, this may have been a significant reason 
behind Freud’s choice to not disclose his countertransference feelings in the case of Dora 
(1901/1905) or to denounce his role as an acting analyst altogether in the case of Little 
Hans (1909). 
Rabin (2003) refers to three of his own clinical cases to illustrate the challenges of 
countertransference feelings. In one of the clinical vignettes, he provides a rather 
transparent account of how he fell in love with a female patient ‘Louis’, and the kinds of 
personal and professional doubts this led him to (Rabin, 2003):  
 
I began to feel strong loving and sexual feelings toward Lois. I imagined us very 
happily married, taking long walks, laughing together, sharing intimate thoughts, 
and even raising a family. This shocked me and scared me to death. So, I became 
deeply involved with self–analysis and discussed these issues with my peer 
supervision group. Was my sexual and love life with my wife poor or mediocre? 
Did I have a history of sexual exploitation or unfaithfulness with women? Was this 
patient being especially seductive? My peers and I, with careful deliberation over 
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a period of weeks, could not answer affirmatively to any of these questions. But 
with my powerful feelings still worrying me, I wondered: Could I really keep my 
head about me and continue this effective treatment? On both ethical and clinical 
grounds, should I consider referring Lois to another analyst? (p. 680) 
 
In a more recent paper, Sharma and Fowler (2016) consider how unexamined 
countertransferential reactions impact clinical interpretations and create ruptures in 
therapeutic relationships. In one of the clinical vignettes, Sharma (the therapist) was 
working with a female patient ‘Jenny’ who deeply wished to be liked by Sharma and her 
colleagues. However, Jenny seemed to treat most of her interactions as battles in which 
desire for affection was often mixed with hostility and defensiveness due to anticipated 
rejection. As a result, Sharma found it difficult to own up to her own countertransference 
feelings of hostility and anxiety, which can be seen in the case interpretations (Sharma & 
Fowler, 2016): 
 
I experienced dealings with Jenny as extremely challenging and exhausting, an 
experience shared among the other members of the staff. The main dynamic 
seemed to be that of her feeling under attack, or attacking the staff. To my extreme 
frustration, I found myself pulled into this dynamic. Encounters with her left me 
feeling disappointed, defeated, and defensive. I experienced her as needy but 
extremely difficult to comfort and satisfy. Her response to my attempts to help felt 
rejecting and brought up feelings of inadequacy and incompetence, which I 
countered by irritation and impatience toward her, instead of acknowledging my 
limits. She felt unheard and demanded more time and attention. I tended to 
withdraw in order to escape her [demands] and she experienced me as depriving. 
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Faced with the mounting feeling of being defeated and failing Jenny, I turned to 
my colleagues, but remained unable to successfully navigate the cyclical relational 
pattern playing out between the two of us. Slowly and gradually, I began to feel 
wary of Jenny and started to avoid interacting with the outside of the scheduled 
meetings (p. 303). 
 
The above cases by Rabin (2003) and Sharma and Fowler (2016) demonstrate challenges 
that can also be observed in Freud’s classic case studies. Practitioner–researchers, of all 
times and of all clinical orientations, straddle two difficult sides: one in which they 
provide treatment to patients (and as such, engage with their subjective experiences 
through the analytic encounter), and another, in which they document treatment 
processes, many of which will ultimately involve not only patients but also therapists. As 
Hinshelwood (2019) puts it, the subjective patient data unique to psychoanalytic and 
clinical cases can only be gained by “using a subjective instrument of observation; that is, 
the mind of the analyst” (p. 108). The obvious difficulty is that using our mind as an 
instrument can lead to severe bias and disacknowledgement of one’s own 
countertransference feelings. 
  Differently from Freud’s case of Dora (1901/1905), however, Rabin (2003) and 
Sharma and Fowler’s (2016) cases not only identify (counter)transference phenomena 
but also explicitly engage with the issues that arise from them. That is to say, their cases 
are not positioned exclusively at a cognitive level of thoughts and beliefs; they also 
demonstrate the underlying emotions and feelings behind complex clinical situations and 
dialogues with patients. This indicates a degree of reflexivity on behalf of the clinician 




A high degree of reflexivity and transparency about therapeutic processes enables 
the reader to understand how it might have felt to be in the session with patients in 
concrete clinical situations. Rabin’s (2003) case involved personal feelings of love and 
sexual desire that he identified to be inappropriate and potentially harmful for patient’s 
therapeutic progress. Sharma and Fowler’s (2016) case involved difficulties in examining 
and working through Sharma’s countertransference reactions of hostility and hatred. 
There is no doubt that the degree of reflexivity exercised in such narratives can be 
difficult to achieve due to reservations around exposure, particularly when it comes to 
describing professional doubts, feelings of inadequacy or clinical malpractice. Rabin 
(2003), for example, noted that “in writing this article, [he] struggled with what and how 
much of [his] own subjectivity [he] could reveal to the analytic public and still feel 
comfortable enough with my exposure” (p. 678).  
An in–depth case narrative should expose something private not just about 
patients but also about their therapists. By documenting their own subjective 
experiences, particularly countertransference feelings, practitioner–researchers are 
more likely to develop robust and reflexive case narratives that are more closely attuned 
to clinical situations ‘in real life’ (Willemsen et al., 2017). This allows other therapists 
working with similar clinical situations identify techniques and theories that may be 
relevant to their practice. Furthermore, a high degree of reflexivity can help practitioner–
researchers process difficult feelings post hoc, days or years after therapeutic work has 
taken place. Rabin (2003), for instance, reflected on his feelings for ‘Louis’ 30 years after 
his therapeutic work with her; this time frame likely provided for a very different 
reflection on Rabin’s feelings and attitudes. 
In a somewhat similar way, Freud revisited his work on hysteria three weeks after 
publishing The Aetiology of Hysteria (1896) in a much–cited letter to Wilhelm Fliess: “Let 
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me tell you straight away the great secret which has been slowly dawning on me in recent 
months. I no longer believe in my neurotica” (Freud, 1950, p. 215–216). At this time, Freud 
began to doubt whether hysteria derived from real occurrences of sexual abuse. 
Increasingly, he considered hysterical symptoms as derivatives of unconscious wishes 
and phantasies. The insistence on unconscious, phantasised sexual motivations can be 
undoubtedly seen in Dora’s case. But the scientific doubt that Freud was able to profess 
in private letters to Fliess was crudely lacking in Dora’s treatment and case narrative 
dedicated to the psychoanalytic scientific community. As Kahane (1985) argues, Freud 
confidently constructed a narrative of Dora’s compulsory sexuality whilst, ironically, 
excluding himself – along with his scientific doubts and countertransference feelings – 
from the case entirely. The lack of transparency on Freud’s behalf had immense 
repercussions on the scientific reputation of psychoanalytic case studies (Pletsch, 1982). 
 
 2.2.2 Issues of suggestive influence and scientific judgment  
 
Psychoanalytic case studies have also been criticised as dichotomous narratives that 
classify and define patients, which in turn allows the practitioner–researcher to correct 
or modify behaviour and attitudes that are deemed pathological. This criticism 
emphasises issues around the processes of scientific judgment and suggestibility: as the 
subject of a case narrative produced by the expert figure (e.g., the analyst), the patient 
becomes de–individuated, understood via subject–specific criteria (e.g., symptom criteria 
associated with the experience of neuroses) prescribed to him or her by the clinical 
discourse (e.g., psychoanalytic theory).  
The danger is that the expert narrative can be inaccurate, reductive or flat out 
incorrect; that there may be a genuine disparity between the patient’s psychic reality and 
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the case narrative. In this sense, case study data can be ‘contaminated’ not just by 
unacknowledged countertransference reactions but also by overconfident or suggestive 
expert assumptions about the patient’s subjective experiences (and there is no reason to 
assume that the two issues cannot overlap) (Hanly & Hanly, 2001). 
According to sociologist Nikolas Rose (1990), this criticism is not exclusive to the 
psychoanalytic case study; rather, it encompasses the entire field of psychology. ‘Psy’ 
sciences – sciences that focus on the theory and treatment of the human mind – hold 
different yet overlapping promises on how the ‘self’ can be changed, and which 
rationalities and techniques can be utilised for this: “On  the  territory  of  the  therapeutic,  
the  conduct  of  everyday existence is  recast  as  a  series  of manageable  problems  to  
be  understood  and  resolved  by technical  adjustment  in  relation  to  the  norm  of  the  
autonomous  self aspiring  to  self‐possession and happiness” (Rose, 1990, p. 11).  
At the same time, Rose reminds us that ‘psy’ sciences claim to generate truthful 
knowledge about the subject’s ‘self’. Thus, there is an uncomfortable juxtaposition 
between the claim to cure and ‘make better’ and the claim to understand the psyche ‘as 
is’: “The healthy self is to be ‘free to choose’. But in embracing such an ethic of 
psychological health construed in terms of autonomy we are condemned to make a 
project out of our own identity and we have become bound to the powers of expertise” 
(ibid, p. 13).  
The latter issue is central to Michel Foucault’s body of philosophical work. 
Foucault acknowledged that, unlike psychiatry, psychoanalysis played a different part in 
the way it conceptualises and treats pathology. While psychiatry focused on the biological 
assessment of intelligence, race, gender, and sexuality, psychoanalysis rejected 
essentialist biologism (Foucault, 1979). Freud, for instance, challenged Charcot’s 
biologistic formulation of hysteria; appearance and visually observable signs were 
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deemed to be insufficient markers for mental pathology (Cartwright, 1995). By focusing 
on listening to the patient (instead of simply observing and seeing), psychoanalysis 
effectively moved away from empirical proof based on visual observation (Gilman, 1988). 
This is also evident in psychoanalytic case studies: they do not focus on physically 
observable signs and symptoms (as in early medical case files) but instead rely on verbal 
exchanges and subjective experiences. 
Nonetheless, Foucault maintained that psychoanalysis played a critical role in 
outlining psychic deviations and anomalies as well as developing the psychological 
practices that allow for their management and correction. During an interview with the 
editorial collective of Quel Corps?, Foucault (1975) stated that “[Freud] was aware of the 
superior strength of his position on the matter of normalisation. So why this sacralising 
modesty that insists on denying that psychoanalysis has anything to do with 
normalisation?” Foucault criticised psychoanalysis as a discipline that ‘disciplines’ 
through its ‘confessional’ nature, and in particular, its evaluative method – the 
psychoanalytic case study.  
The processes of normalisation and scientific judgment re–emerge in Foucault’s 
definition of the psychoanalytic case study vis à vis case studies in jurisprudence and law 
(Foucault, 1979):  
 
The case is no longer, as in casuistry or jurisprudence, a set of circumstances 
defining an act and capable of modifying the application of a rule; it is the 
individual as he may be described, judged, measured, compared with others, in his 
very individuality; and it is also the individual who has to be trained or corrected, 




The psychoanalytic case turns the individual into a “describable, analysable object”; 
instead of reducing the patient into naturalistic and concrete biological categories as in 
psychiatry, however, it maintains the “individual features, particular evolution, aptitudes 
or abilities under the gaze of a permanent corpus of knowledge” (Foucault, 1979, p. 190).  
Foucault argues that the psychoanalytic ‘corpus of knowledge’, used by 
psychoanalytic experts (clinicians, practitioners, therapists) in case narratives, is not free 
from socio–political and epistemological influences, and it can go wrong. We do not have 
to go all the way back to Freud’s classic psychoanalytic cases to see how theoretical 
assumptions and unacknowledged countertransference dynamics may impact the way in 
which patients’ pathologies are described and ‘corrected’. Contemporary psychotherapy 
research points out ongoing issues in conceptualising and diagnosing patients’ 
experiences, which often leads to incorrect therapeutic applications and further patient 
distress (Ruggero et al., 2010). Newspapers regularly report on ‘misunderstandings’ 
between practitioners and patients in mental health (Devlin & Smith, 2009). There is a 
general awareness that the expert ‘corpus of knowledge’ is not infallible. 
This fallibility, however, can become incredibly difficult to identify in the privacy 
of psychoanalytic (or therapeutic more broadly) treatment or within the asymmetrical 
relationship between the case study researcher and case subject. After all, psychoanalytic 
case studies are not just neutral documentaries of patient experiences or, as Foucault put 
it, “madness at the level of its language” (1961, p. 198); they also retain the ‘doctor–
patient’, ‘expert–subject’ division within the linguistic landscape of the case narrative. 
The case author is “an unreachable Judge” (Whitebook, 2006, p. 323) who uses the case 
narrative to ascribe (whether consciously or unconsciously) scientific, moralistic, and 
personal assumptions onto the patient.  
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Furthermore, the patient may become convinced by the expert psychoanalyst’s 
narrative. Grünbaum notoriously called this suggestibility: the patient is at risk of 
becoming an ‘ideological disciple’ of psychoanalytic psychotherapy, succumbing to 
‘proselytizing suggestion’ (Grünbaum, 1984, p. 130).  
For psychoanalytic case studies, scientific judgment and suggestibility pose two 
problems at once: the practitioner–researcher has linguistic leverage over the patient 
(e.g., by describing, judging, and comparing the patient with others in the case narrative 
as per Foucault’s criticism) as well as epistemic leverage (e.g., by suggesting false or self–
confirming theories and techniques and indoctrinating patients as per Grünbaum’s 
criticism). Both criticism deem the case study method as incapable of producing reliable 
data ‘from the couch’. 
Sulloway’s (1991) criticism seemingly hit the final nail in the coffin for case 
studies. Following Grünbaum’s footsteps, he proposed that Freud’s psychoanalytic 
narratives are exemplary of suggestibility. Patients like Dora (1905) and Little Hans 
(1909b) were, according to Sulloway, epistemically bombarded by Freud’s hypotheses 
about hysteria and Oedipus complex in order to “get the case history to come out in a 
psychoanalytically correct fashion” (Sulloway, 1991, p. 252).  
The case of Schreber (1911), on the other hand, removes the necessity to enforce 
psychoanalytic concepts onto the patient altogether; Freud has never met Schreber and 
conducted the case on the basis of a published memoir. Sulloway contends that the 
linguistic leverage in Schreber’s case allowed Freud to disregard important information 
about Schreber’s father, Moritz, which conflicted with his theory of paranoia: “Why Freud 
suppressed information about the father becomes clear from Zvi Lothane’s reappraisal of 
the evidence for Schreber as a homosexual. Freud was anxious to show that paranoia 
originated in repressed homosexuality, which in Schreber’s instance was supposedly a 
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repressed homosexual attachment to the father” (p. 253–254). Although Freud described 
Moritz Schreber as “an excellent father” (Freud, 1910b, p. 215) in the published Schreber 
case, in a letter written to Ferenczi he revealed that Schreber’s father was in fact a “despot 
in his household” (Freud, 1910b, p. 78). Once again, there is a discrepancy between what 
is revealed to scientific colleagues in private communications and published case studies 
aimed at psychoanalytic and medical communities.  
Accusations of suggestion and scientific judgment remain pressing for post–
Freudian therapists and case study researchers. But these criticisms have also enabled 
lasting changes in the way psychoanalytic and clinical case studies are formulated. One 
immediate difference is the presentation and amount of interpretive material in 
contemporary case studies. Published case studies (e.g., in Clinical Case Studies and 
Pragmatic Case Studies in Psychotherapy journals) generally feature the following 
components: theoretical and research basis for treatment, case introduction, presenting 
complaints, patient history and assessment, case conceptualisation, outcomes, follow–up, 
recommendations to clinicians and researchers, etc. Explicit clinical interpretations are 
usually included in case conceptualisation and assessment components, with clear 
differentiation from other case components. The interpretation to data ratio in 
contemporary case studies is a stark contrast to classic Freudian cases, which, although 
detailed in patient and treatment descriptions, focused largely on Freud’s theoretical 
expositions and the novelty of psychoanalytic treatment (Sealey, 2011).  
Where possible, case studies are also accompanied with raw data in the form of 
transcripts, case notes, audio and/or video recordings (Cutts, 2012). Although the ethics 
of using recorded material from clinical sessions are still debated, this material seeks to 
counter the issue of narrative smoothing (Spence, 2001) by which analysts may eliminate 
contradictory evidence. These developments should be acknowledged when reviewing 
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criticisms posed by Grünbaum, Foucault and others who focused predominantly on 
Freud’s work. 
In addition, increasing efforts have been made in researching treatment failures 
and the nature of therapeutic relationships, two aspects that both Sulloway (1991) and 
Grünbaum (1988) found to be lacking in classic psychoanalytic case studies. For example, 
Bowie et al. (2016) provide important qualitative observations about cases in which 
patients found it difficult to communicate their dissatisfaction about therapeutic progress 
to expert therapists. A sample of 10 participants who engaged in different forms of 
psychotherapy (psychodynamic, person–centred, bodywork and integrative) reported 
instances in which they felt abandoned, unseen, distressed, and unimportant to their 
therapists: “The theme of destructive use of therapist power runs through many client 
accounts of experiences of having been harmed or damaged by therapy. [...] [Some] 
participants used the term ‘shell shocked’ to describe the point when they realised that 
they knew that therapy was not helping” (p. 80, 83). The study legitimises the previously 
discussed concerns about narrative construction, patient de–individuation, and 
suggestibility. 
In response to these issues, case studies should provide transparent narratives 
that attend to both therapist and patient experiences, including experiences of 
therapeutic failure, rejection, and malpractice. Recommendations for presenting patient 
experiences, therapist interpretations, interpretive heuristics and reflexivity can be 
found in Willemsen et al.’s (2017) guidelines for psychoanalytic case studies.  
It is also worth pointing out the difference between abuse of therapeutic power 
(which is implied in Foucault’s scientific judgment and Grünbaum suggestion) and 
genuine professional errors (Tasca & Mcquiad, 2016). Although Bowie et al.’s (2016) 
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study reports patient experiences with disengaged therapists, it is not always clear 
whether this disengagement is a result of therapeutic abuse or a professional error.  
In another study, Rabu and McLeod (2017) explored how therapeutic 
relationships are experienced by senior practitioner–researchers in Norway. Their 
research findings provide a different perspective to Grünbaum’s criticism about patients’ 
compliance to clinical treatment via analytic suggestion. Most senior therapists reported 
frequent feelings of struggle and humility rather than feelings of suggestive power. 
Beyond this, therapists reported difficulties in applying therapeutic concepts in clinical 
practice and maintaining clear boundaries between professional and personal lives 
(Rabu & McLeod, 2017):  
 
The most difficult cases, and patients with very early, deep injuries, in cases where 
it also appeared a very strong negative transference that I struggled to handle, and 
have needed help from colleagues to deal with [are those] I feel I have learned 
much from. Perhaps they have taught me [….] that one must have both a space for 
oneself and a space for the patient [….] with this kind of patients; they live within 
you… I think one important aspect is to have an inner boundary and to keep an 
inner space for oneself (p. 9).  
 
The study found that collaboration, trustworthiness and real engagement with patients 
are considered to be the key criteria for the development of a safe therapeutic space by 
therapists. This is important as it demonstrates the vital role played by patients in 
treatment, something that is scarcely acknowledged by Grünbaum: “Much more is 
happening in the [patient] than meets the eye. Grünbaum’s account of suggestion pictures 
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[patients] as passive victims of the suggestive influences of psychoanalysts, and 
suggestion as an insidious and undetectable force” (Jopling, 2008, p. 212).  
 Finally, the analyst’s influence, as Jopling further suggests, can be very far from 
that of suggestion or scientific judgment. Indeed, case studies from various 
psychotherapy orientations have documented instances where patients disengaged from 
therapeutic process or rejected therapist techniques altogether (see for example, Strupp, 
1990; Bugatti & Boswell, 2016). It is therefore crucial to consider how different patients 
– and therapists – may experience issues of scientific judgment, suggestion and narrative 
construction beyond the scenarios laid out by Foucault, Grünbaum, Sulloway and others, 
where patients are implicitly defined as passive recipients of psychoanalytic treatment. 
 
 2.2.3 Issues of validation 
 
The last and most persistent criticism against case studies is that they generate anecdotal 
reports rather than actual clinical evidence. This criticism emphasises the context–based 
component of psychoanalytic case studies: the case researcher seeks to understand 
patient experiences within the social and cultural context of their world. In turn, the case 
narrative involves what might be called a meta–subjectivity: the case researcher 
documents how patients understand, interpret, and construct the meaning of their own 
life experiences (via dialogue and self–report measures), whilst also presenting their own 
understanding of the said experiences as clinical practitioners and researchers (via 
interpretations, inferences, clinical techniques and interventions) (Hanly, 1996).  
But the historicity of human nature and the context it finds itself embedded in, 
once so valued by anthropologists, sociologists, and psychoanalysts alike, has been slowly 
pushed away due to the lack of generalisability. Since case studies provide detailed, 
56 
 
context–dependent knowledge of individuals (or small samples), it is difficult to 
decontextualise and specify which data variables can be generalised onto which 
populations: “One can validly explain a particular case only on the basis of general 
hypotheses. All the rest is uncontrollable, and so of no use” (Dogan & Pelassy, 1990, p. 
121). This shortfall is considered to be a scientific dead–end by many researchers: “If 
there is no generalizing beyond the data, no theory. No theory, no insight. And if no 
insight, why do research?” (Mintzberg, 2005, p. 10). 
 The concept of generalisation can be traced back to the British philosopher John 
Stuart Mill who insisted on discovering the “uniformity in nature” (Mill, 1843/1988, p. 
386), thus creating a long–lasting standard for successful scientific research. A ‘good’ 
science is that which is capable of producing “increasingly successful prediction and 
control of the environment” (Hesse, 1980, p. 188). As a result, base predictions and 
controlling actions became part and parcel of research in both natural and social sciences. 
The end result is knowledge that is context free and of enduring value, applicable to each 
and all of a class or order (Lincoln & Guba, 2000), and conveying “real” knowledge about 
natural phenomena, a conception of “something which really is in the facts” (Mill, 
1843/1988, p. 651). It is argued that knowledge of this kind can be found in statistical 
data, such as randomised controlled trials (RCTs), meta–analytic and systematic reviews. 
The ability to generalise knowledge has become equivalent with the ability to 
validate knowledge. Through internal validity researchers can measure the degree to 
which populations, settings, treatment and measurement variables can be generalised 
(Campbell & Stanley, 1966). Replicability is at the heart of internal validity: “Would the 
results be reproducible in those target instances to which one intends to generalize – the 
population, situation, time, treatment form or format, measures, study designs and 
procedures?” (Krathwohl, 1985, p. 123). Since case studies (arguably) feature neither of 
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these components, positivist critics argued that case study findings cannot be validated 
(Janis in Wallerstein & Sampson, 1971). Several critics have accused Freud of pseudo–
science in his case studies on the grounds of generalisability and replicability as key 
scientific standards (Eysenck & Wilson, 1973; Wolpe, 1981).  
 As of recently, however, there have been significant re–evaluations of just how 
generalisable research findings can be. One reason for this is the so called ‘generalisability 
crisis’ in the human sciences and, most notoriously, psychology: generalisations drawn 
from isolated or decontextualised studies are difficult, if not impossible, to apply in real–
life situations or even situations with similar (yet not identical) variables. For example, 
Yarkoni (2019) argues that generalisations in psychology research are often formed too 
fast and are (wrongfully) conceptualised as near–universal:  
 
I think it’s readily apparent that the vast majority of psychological scientists have long 
operated under a regime of (extremely) fast generalization. One has only to scan the 
table of contents of our journals to observe paper titles such as “Local Competition 
Amplifies the Corrosive Effects of Inequality”, “The Intent to Persuade Transforms 
Language via Emotionality”, and “Inspiration Encourages Belief in God”. Such claims 
are typically supported by a small number of experiments conducted under narrow 
conditions, with virtually no discussion of the presumed boundary conditions of the 
effect. The assumption appears to be that a phenomenon demonstrated once (or 
twice, or five times) under very narrow conditions can be expected to hold in general, 
pending new evidence to the contrary (p. 2). 
 
These concerns are not new to the fields of psychoanalysis, psychotherapy, counselling, 
social care, etc. Clinicians often struggle to make use of large–scale findings in practice 
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(Shean, 2014). Randomly selected samples are difficult to apply to particular individuals 
and their unique situations; as such, clinicians will always be required to determine 
whether research generalisations apply to their patients, sometimes having to abandon 
generalisations altogether (Donmoyer, 2000).  
It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that despite the shift toward generalisable 
scientific research, clinical practitioners prefer reading and learning from case studies 
rather than statistics or RCTs (Miller, 2004; Stewart & Chambless, 2007; Safran et al., 
2011). This is because case studies particularise different clinical scenarios and show the 
use various clinical approaches and techniques. Through systematised case study 
archives such as The Single Case Archive (https://singlecasearchive.com/), clinicians can 
search for cases that are highly relevant to their particular clinical model or patient 
population.  
The newly re–invigorated interest in psychoanalytic and clinical case studies 
shows that generalisation is not a be–all and end–all criterion in scientific research. 
According to Mackrill and Iwakabe (2013), reading detailed and intricate case studies has 
a cardinal importance to clinical research and training: 
 
Table 1. The contribution of case studies to clinical research and training in 
psychoanalysis/psychotherapy 
(1) Offers trainee and novice clinicians access to a closed world;  
(2) Demonstrates the application of psychological theories ‘in action’;  
(3) Provides practical explorations between different clinical approaches;  
(4) Encapsulates significant therapeutic moments, including therapeutic 
relationships, outcomes, follow–ups, as well as mishandled therapeutic 





From Macrill and Iwakabe’s (2013) point of view, even questionable or rigour lacking 
cases can be thought of as exemplary of ‘bad’ practice or ‘poor’ interpretations: “Even 
case studies that are methodologically questionable and lack necessary research 
requirements can be important educational tools, for example, if used to develop critical 
thinking by having trainees engaged in assessing the validity of interpretations, 
inferences, and interventions” (p. 251). 
 Take, for instance, Freud’s case of Dora (1901/1905): although it is frequently 
considered to be an exemplar case of therapeutic failure (Mahony, 1996; McLeod, 2010a), 
it is a case that all clinicians and researchers return to in order to learn about the 
significance of transference (and the consequences of unacknowledged transference).  
 Similarly, Freud’s case of Schreber (1911) enables clinicians and researchers to 
critically study Freud’s interpretations alongside Schreber’s autobiography. Different and 
contrasting perspectives about Schreber’s symptoms and condition have emerged since 
(Schatzman, 1973; Lothane, 1992). The detailed analysis of a single case can help case 
study researchers and clinicians compare and assess interpretations, inferences and 
interventions with scrutiny; this is particularly important when combating insular 
attitudes in scientific communities and knowledge generation methods (Bornstein, 
2005).  
 A contemporary example featuring contrasting approaches to a single case study 
is Dumont and Corsini’s book Six Therapists and One Client (2006), which demonstrates 
how six different therapists would approach the same case from different theoretical 
orientations (Ericksonian Hypnotherapy, Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy (REBT), 
Multimodal Therapy, Individual Psychotherapy, Person–centered Therapy, and Cognitive 
Behavioural Therapy (CBT)). Although the book revolves around one particular case, it 
60 
 
provides invaluable insight into how several different therapeutic schools work ‘in 
action’.  
 Finally, there is no reason to assume that idiographic, qualitative narratives 
cannot exist alongside nomothetic, quantitative data. Indeed, a long–existing polarisation 
between quantitative and qualitative research paradigms promoted ‘purist’ views that 
exclusively focus on either ‘positivist’ or ‘interpretivist’ ways of studying the human mind 
(Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2005). However, focusing exclusively on one kind of 
methodology and abandoning other forms of data would lead to a reductive perception 
of complex behavioural and mental health phenomena: “This posture ignores the fact that 
we are not dealing with an either/or proposition; the alternatives include more than 
deciding between generalizations, on the one hand, and unique, particularized 
knowledge, on the other” (Lincoln & Guba, 2000, p. 27). A third way approach 
emphasising research pragmatism is discussed later in the section ‘Case studies in 
systematic research’. 
 
2.3 ‘What now?’: responses from the sceptics 
 
Although this paper sought to demonstrate not only the key criticisms but also the recent 
developments in psychoanalytic and clinical case studies and psychotherapy research, it 
is evident that the case study method is still considered a problematic mode of research. 
Currently, case studies lie at the bottom of evidence–based practice and research 
hierarchies dominated by systematic reviews and meta–analytic reports (Aveline, 2005). 
Specifically, psychoanalytic case studies fall somewhere in the bottom categories of 
uncontrolled, descriptive, and expert opinion studies. As discussed in ‘Issues of validation’ 
section, systematic modes of research are prioritised over case studies due to their ability 
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to generalise research findings onto broader populations. For similar reasons, 
psychoanalytic case studies are rarely integrated into public health policy research 
(Fotaki, 2006). 
Beyond these issues, there is also an overarching concern about the way in which 
the psychoanalytic community generates (arguably scientific) knowledge. 
Psychoanalysis is still seen as a reigning theoretical orthodoxy by many; case study 
narratives, then, are not used to illustrate the veracity and qualitative depth of patient 
experiences but to simply confirm pre–existing theories and hypotheses (Messer, 2007).  
Although this criticism has been considered earlier against Freud’s case studies 
(Sulloway, 1991), it must be acknowledged that a certain degree of orthodoxy has 
remained in post–Freudian psychoanalytic knowledge generation practices (Bornstein, 
2001; Plous, 1993). This includes writing psychoanalytic case studies in a way that that 
does not acknowledge competing viewpoints, alternative perspectives, and different 
research methodologies and/or techniques. This leads to ritualistic inhibitory effects, 
insularity, and ‘groupthink’ in the field.  
Below I briefly discuss two responses associated with the above issues coming 
from psychoanalytic and scientific research communities. Although issues surrounding 
(counter)transference, suggestibility, scientific judgment, and lack of generalisation have 
certainly contributed to the problematic status of psychoanalytic case studies, I argue 
that the responses to these criticisms have been equally problematic. Calls to move from 
context–dependent, subjective knowledge in scientific research on one hand, and 
scepticism toward any form of objectivity or validity in psychoanalytic communities on 
the other, contributed to a stagnant division between case studies and quantitative 
research methods more broadly (Hoffman, 2009; Fonagy, 2002, 2013; Safran, 2012). 
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Further suggestions and considerations are provided on what the case study method can 
offer for systematic and clinically attuned forms of research. 
 
 2.3.1 Case studies in systematic research 
 
A basic presupposition and criterion amongst positivist proponents (Popper, 1959; 
Hempel, 1965) is that there is, at a general and suitably abstract level, a single kind of 
scientific truth that responds to the causal question ‘why?’. This question can only be 
tackled by models of scientific explanation that investigate objects “from the outside” 
(such as experiments and statistics), rather than “from the inside”. The former position is 
unreachable for practitioner–researchers who are simultaneously involved in the 
therapeutic process as well as the creation of the case narrative. This difference 
contributed to a long–standing division and polarity between quantitative and qualitative 
research methods (Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2005). 
This division, however, goes beyond methodological difference. Qualitative and 
quantitative researchers employ entirely different thinking and reasoning processes or 
what Tacq (2010) calls languages. A statistician thinks, reasons and interprets data by 
using concepts such as things, events, laws, causes, and causal explanations. A case study 
researcher, on the other hand, refers to the concepts of persons, actions, rules, reasons, 
motives, and mental explanations (understanding). These are by no means exhaustive lists 
of concepts, but they point to what is considered to be at stake in qualitative and 
quantitative forms of research (Tacq, 2010):  
 
Exact measurement and generalization as opposed to being close to the data, to do 
no violence to the unique character of reality and its complexity, to let the persons 
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involved formulate their own interpretations, to let concepts emerge during the 
research; further also a deductive as against an inductive approach; statistical 
testing as opposed to exploratory research; “testing” versus “gauging”; objective 
against subjective approach; searching for laws that hold for all time–periods and 
contexts as against looking for insights into the “here and now context” (p. 271). 
 
It is clear, then, that there is a difference not only in the choice of method but also in 
research priorities more generally: quantitative methods prioritise general, objective, 
context–independent knowledge over subjective, practical, context–dependent 
knowledge (Flyvbjerg, 2005). Increasingly, significant efforts have been made to combat 
this research–onesidedness by demonstrating the value of context–dependent and 
clinically attuned forms of qualitative research (see for example, Iwakabe & Gazzola, 
2009), some of which were discussed in the earlier sections about the irredeemable 
subjectivity of case studies.  
But the pathway toward methodological pluralism – where both context–
dependent and context–independent knowledge are considered on equal grounds – is yet 
to be properly paved. And, potentially, for good reason: quantitative researchers are wary 
about irrevocable epistemological differences (Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2005), whilst 
those on the psychoanalytic territory argue that a nonobjectivist hermeneutic paradigm 
is best suited for psychoanalytic and clinical research (Hoffman, 2009).  
 Despite these difficulties, several suggestions have been put forward by 
researchers in the fields of psychoanalysis, psychotherapy, and social sciences on how we 
may tackle and think about this research polarity. First, there is the acknowledgment of 
subjectivity as a crucial data point rather than a research difficulty. Such experiences as 
trauma, abuse, fragmentation, loss, and mourning are embedded in patient’s social, 
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cultural, and physical environments; as such, they are not context–independent and may 
change over time (Shean, 2014; Markova & Berrios, 2009). The articulation of patients’ 
subjective experiences has always been important for psychoanalytic case histories: 
although analysand’s statements are not taken at face value, the analyst is interested not 
only in the “realness” of these subjective experiences (in the sense of historical truth) but 
also in the underlying unconscious motivations to resist the truth (Brigati, 2015). 
Psychoanalysis continues to teach us that if we want to arrive at causal explanations, we 
cannot conveniently ignore the subjective – albeit messy – elements of the clinical 
encounter. 
 The second point concerns the epistemic presentation of the said subjective 
experiences in case studies. Wolpert, for example, argues that the epistemological claims 
made in case narratives are significant but often lack a coherent theoretical framework, 
which means that there is “nothing useful to be learned from a case report on an 
individual that could help other patients. Each case is essentially the relationship 
between an analyst and the patient” (Wolpert & Fonagy, 2009, p. 483). If case studies are 
to be considered part of systematic research, then they should provide the necessary 
theoretical framework to account for their findings. 
 In light of these considerations, research pragmatism has been suggested as a 
third–way solution to research polarity. Onwuegbuzie and Leech (2005) define research 
pragmatism as a flexible approach toward investigative techniques regardless of 
researchers’ philosophical orientation. They argue that it is much more useful to consider 
quantitative and qualitative methods as exploratory and confirmatory modes of inquiry. 
Onwuegbuzie and Teddlie (2003) developed a model in which quantitative (descriptive 
statistics and cluster analysis) and qualitative (thematic and narrative analyses) are 
conceptualised as exploratory. Confirmatory research, on the other hand, features 
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quantitative data–analytical techniques (inferential statistics) and qualitative 
confirmatory techniques (analytic generalisation). In this way, both quantitative and 
qualitative forms of research are able to produce research driven (replicability of 
previous findings) and theory driven (testing new theories) findings. The remaining 
challenge is to choose which methodologies are best suited for a given research purpose 
(or how to combine multiple methodologies in a pragmatic manner). 
Research pragmatism of this kind can be seen in psychotherapy case studies. 
Fishman (2000) developed the concept of a pragmatic psychology as an alternative to 
positivist epistemology: it takes place in context–dependent individual case studies, 
where patients’ problems are described in detail along with the therapeutic mode that is 
being offered by the clinician. On the other hand, pragmatic psychology embraces aspects 
of the positivist model, such as testing hypotheses, applying them to individual situations, 
seeking to replicate research findings, etc. In this sense, pragmatic psychology is an 
epistemologically integrative approach that blends the standardised measures 
associated with the positivist tradition with the qualitative case formulations and 
descriptions. Crucially, pragmatic psychology revolves around real–life problems, and as 
such, it maintains the significance of concrete case studies and practice: “actual cases 
should be the starting and ending points of psychological research” (Fishman, 2000, p. 6). 
The epistemology of pragmatism can be seen ‘in action’ in a case study by Truijens 
et al. (2019), which combines quantitative (self–report questionnaires such as The Beck 
Depression Inventory) with qualitative data (phenomenological and visual analysis of 
patient’s therapeutic narrative and annotated paper–and–pencil questionnaires). By 
combining several different methodologies, Truijens et al. (2019) found that there are 
significant issues in translating patient experiences into numerical language via self–
report questionnaires: “Respondents are asked to reflect on their feelings, attitudes, and 
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behaviors and then translate those into a quantitative language, which puts a weight and 
therefore an evaluation to their experiences” (p. 3). Their case study demonstrates how 
(1) phenomenological observation of patients’ therapeutic narratives enrichens the 
treatment process and contributes to positive treatment outcome, and (2) how the 
descriptive precision of meaning–making process contributes to quantitative data 
analysis: “If we treat the numbers as a story and actively listen to how that story is told, 
it is possible to gather valid data on the nature of symptoms, the changes of symptoms, 
and even their development throughout psychotherapy” (p. 40). In this sense, pragmatic 
case studies can contribute to the advancement of both clinical and methodological 
techniques without losing the in–depth clinical narrative. 
 
 2.3.2 Case studies in psychoanalysis 
 
When behavioural, biological, and cognitive perspectives grew and expanded in the field 
of scientific psychology, only some psychoanalytic authors wrote about how new theories 
and methods will impact psychoanalysis (Wachtel, 1977; Epstein, 1994). Similarly, not 
many psychoanalysts tackled the philosophical challenges posed to psychoanalytic causal 
claims or case study efficacy (for a review of these issues, see Hinshelwood, 1997): 
“Philosophers, so far as they took notice of psycho–analysis at all, condemned its basic 
concepts as muddled and self–contradictory. And analysts silently responded by 
dismissing philosophy” (Money–Kyrle, 1958, p. 102). Bornstein (2001) argues that 
unresponsiveness of this kind in psychoanalysis is a form of ritualistic ‘group thinking’ 
and a historical ‘deadly sin’: the sin of indifference. 
Instead of actively engaging with the sceptics, Bornstein asserts that 
psychoanalysts have decided to “look backward (at seminal but dated contributions of 
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early psychoanalytic practitioners)” and “inward (at their like–minded colleagues’ own 
analytic writings)” (p. 7). This created an isolated “psychoanalytic universe of ideas” (p. 
9), disconnected from other disciplines and discourses. The issue, as Bornstein contends, 
is not about whether psychoanalytic theory and psychoanalytic case studies are ‘valid’ or 
‘systematic’ enough as they are. Rather, the question is whether psychoanalysts are 
willing to develop their research and practice in a way that responds to new challenges 
and issues.  
Although Bornstein’s (2001) article is now nearly 20 years old, we can still see the 
consequences of earlier indifference amongst psychoanalytic practitioners and 
researchers. Psychoanalytic theory and methods have been misrepresented, 
oversimplified or ‘written off’ as dead in universities and scientific discourse. Take, for 
instance, the following descriptions of psychoanalysis and psychoanalytic case studies: 
“From a scientific point of view, classical Freudian psychoanalysis is dead both as a theory 
of the mind and a mode of therapy” (Kihlstrom, 1999, p. 376); “Knowledge about singular 
isolated objects, is found to be illusory upon analysis [...] It seems well–nigh unethical at 
the present time to allow, as theses or dissertations in education, case studies of this 
nature (i.e., involving a single group observed at one time only)” (Campbell & Stanley, 
1966, 6–7).  
Although these views may appear unwarranted and extreme, many authors 
remind us how earlier indifference amongst psychoanalytic thinkers contributed to 
negative perceptions about our discipline and methodology. For example, Shakow and 
Rapaport (1964) discuss American psychologist Saul Rosenzweig’s laboratory data 
supporting Freud’s core psychoanalytic concepts. Freud, who received the data directly 
from Rosenzweig, was reluctant to accept the idea of “extra–clinical” research that does 
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not come from the ‘analytic situation’ and dismissed it as an unnecessary form of 
research.  
Moving past Freud, Turkle in her book Psychoanalytic Politics (1992) writes about 
signs of repression, schisms and hierarchy amongst psychoanalytic practitioners and 
researchers in the international analytic community. She notes that the development of 
psychoanalysis as a science is subverted by the essentially political nature of 
psychoanalysis as an institution, which she characterised as “a curious amalgam of [...] 
literary school, professional association, political party, and church” (p. 97). Similarly, 
knowledge generation in psychoanalysis has been notably compared to religion by Lacan 
(1953) who was concerned by its increasingly dogmatic functions (complete with 
“‘mysteries,’ and a pope”; Turkle, 1992, p. 126).  
Beyond the issue of insularity, Bornstein (2001) pushes further by claiming that 
psychoanalysis has also failed to generate theoretical and clinical knowledge efficienly, in 
a way that clearly demonstrates the relevance and effectiveness of psychoanalytic 
treatment. This issue has an obvious implication for psychoanalytic case studies: many 
case studies are still read as a form of ‘argument by authority’, serving a long–standing 
dialectical tradition of psychoanalytic theory rather than documenting genuine 
therapeutic processes and outcomes. Indeed, Kernberg (1993) observed that 
authoritarianism of this kind is particularly widespread amongst younger analysts who 
are forced into providing inaccurate descriptions of their case histories in order to 
appease senior analysts’ views and well–established theoretical principles. 
Although we may think that case studies have been used to validate the 
effectiveness of psychoanalytic treatment ever since Freud, it is not clear how, if at all, 
they were ‘measuring’ or ‘documenting’ the effectiveness of psychoanalytic treatment 
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and techniques (especially since most Freud’s long case studies overtly report 
therapeutic failures).  
Kline and Sonnenberg (2001) argue that even psychoanalytic clinicians and 
researchers underestimate the importance of clinical narratives in empirically based 
research:  
 
Some practicing analysts ignore the controversies, sometimes with a complacent 
attitude of confidently superior knowledge [...]. Some analysts take a somewhat 
bitter comfort in theories that expressly adopt a skeptical posture about the 
possibility of objective knowledge, such as those that stress the coconstruction of 
personal narrative as the central experience of analysis (p. 242). 
 
The above attitudes and epistemic positions are part of a longer discourse on the 
attainability of objective facts in the clinical realm (Gabbard, 1997). Indeed, many 
sceptics overlook the importance of ‘researcher–as–instrument’ (Morrow, 2005): the 
practitioner–researcher is an unapologetic participant within the analytic dyad as well as 
the co–construction of the case narrative. Because of this, therapeutic relationships 
should also be considered as radically different researcher–participant relationships 
from those in quantitative investigations (Eide & Kahn, 2008):  
 
[Psychotherapy] research requires a mutual standpoint, researcher to participant, 
human being to human being. We cannot query a microbe or engage in 
conversation with a star; however, conversation and dialog between people are 
among the expected processes in qualitative research, which has as the focus of 
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study the actions, reactions, recollections, and meaning–making of human beings 
in response to their passage through life (p. 199). 
 
Scepticism toward any form of objectivity or ‘real’ knowledge (existing outside of the co–
constructed experience between the analyst and analysand), however, produced a 
curious and unhelpful paradox in psychoanalysis. If the clinical situation is merely a co–
construction of different narratives and idiosyncratic experiences, then it is somewhat 
paradoxical that we need qualified psychoanalysts to perform them (Kline & Sonneberg, 
2001):  
 
If psychoanalysis is nothing more than the co–construction of a narrative, or the 
literary interpretation of symbols, why do institutes not regard writers and 
literary critics as the best candidates? [...] If it is a consideration of the central 
values of the human life, why are not philosophers best qualified to undertake 
analytic training? If there is no true knowledge acquired in the analytic process, then 
what happens to the intense and daily felt reality of the clinical setting? (p. 242). 
 
There is something to be said about how psychoanalytic practitioners work with patients 
truthfully. Which interpretations are acceptable; which ones are farfetched? What 
reasoning processes are being employed behind different therapeutic techniques; how 
do they impact each individual patient and treatment outcome? Amongst many different 
competing therapeutic modalities – of which psychoanalysis is just one – there remains 
an overarching responsibility to produce knowledge about clinical work and techniques 
not in an insular but an open and transparent way that is also accessible to non–
psychoanalytic practitioners and researchers, social workers, patients, etc. After all, 
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knowledge about clinical situations in psychoanalysis is not exempt from examination, 
whether by psychoanalysts or those outside of our field (Cooper, 1984). 
This is an opportunity to utilise the case study as a method suitable for scrutinising 
and developing clinical practice. Rather than treating case narratives as mere ‘anecdotal 
reports’ or ‘parables’, we should acknowledge the distinctive contributions they bring to 
empirical research. For example, whilst large–scale outcome measures such as RCTs are 
well suited to provide information about the effectiveness of therapeutic interventions, 
they may overlook specific factors that lead to variations between different patients and 
therapeutic modalities (McLeod & Elliott, 2011). Case studies are ideal for filling this gap: 
they can ‘zoom in’ to microscopic detail and thematically analyse differences in the 
application of therapeutic techniques, patient symptoms and responses, outcomes, 
assessment, etc. (Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2005).  
Van Nieuwenhove et al.’s (2019) case study about childhood trauma–related 
interpersonal patterns is a good example of how case studies can inform evidence–based 
research and practice. Although interpersonal features related to childhood trauma have 
been studied comparatively to other forms of non–interpersonal traumata, Van 
Nieuwenhove et al. (2019) found that there are almost no detailed, qualitative 
descriptions on the nature of different interpersonal patterns. This, however, is 
particularly crucial for therapeutic progress as therapists will need to find appropriate 
responses and techniques in each case of childhood trauma. The case of ‘Amy’ helped Van 
Nieuwenhove et al. (2019) identify some of the core interpersonal patterns associated 
with the patient’s childhood trauma: non–assertiveness, neediness, 
domineering/controlling behaviour, frustration and inability to express herself. Drawing 
from attachment theory, attempts to control and manipulate others were connected with 
the interaction patterns experienced by ‘Amy’ in her relationships with primary 
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caregivers. Identifying these specific interpersonal patterns enabled Van Nieuwenhove 
et al. (2019) to determine the appropriate therapeutic format (psychodynamic 
psychotherapy), length (short–term) and relationship (therapist maintained neutral, 
acknowledging and empowering interactions) that would suit Amy’s therapeutic needs. 
The case study demonstrates how new relational experiences can help trauma patients 
feel more open and self–confident within and outside the therapy room. These findings 
are also important in the broader context of empirical research on childhood trauma as 
they specify the core interpersonal issues arising from early traumatic relationships, and 
how these traits can be managed within the therapeutic context. 
 
 
2.4 Concluding comments 
 
By reviewing classic and contemporary criticisms, this paper sought to disentangle some 
of the misconceptions surrounding knowledge generation practices in psychoanalytic 
case studies, including:  
 
Table 2. Common case study misconceptions 
(1) Subjective experiences are obstacles to good research; 
(2) Practitioner–researchers in therapeutic contexts cannot have effective 
relationships with research participants (patients); 
(3) Therapeutic relationships are generally ‘constructed’ via suggestibility and 
scientific judgment; 
(4) Generalisation is the end–goal for all forms of clinical research. 
 
Psychoanalytic and clinical case studies are unique in the sense that they offer a glimpse 
of theory ‘in action’: what was it like to work with patient x in clinical scenario y? Meta–
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subjectivity of this kind has been crucial to Freud’s classic psychoanalytic case studies, 
and it remains to be significant for contemporary case studies, a few of which were 
discussed in this paper (Dumont and Corsini, 2006; Truijens et al., 2019; Van 
Nieuwenhove et al. (2019). These case studies were generated by particularising – not 
generalising – significant therapeutic moments, outcomes, and exchanges with specific 
patients. It is therefore important that we do not discard the significance of context–
dependent subjective narratives, which has happened all too often in systematic research 
(Berg, 2019a). 
From a social science perspective, it is also important that we do not equate 
subjectivity with bias or research fallibility (Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2005). On the 
contrary: acknowledging the complexity and variability of subjective experiences will 
bring us to a richer, more complicated picture of everyday clinical reality (Rabu & 
McLeod, 2017; Bowie at al., 2019). The complexity of different therapeutic relationships 
and therapist/patient attitudes is especially important when considering criticisms in 
which therapists and patients are ascribed specific – often binary – roles or attitudes (e.g., 
‘scientific judge’ or ‘expert’ vs ‘ideological disciple’ or ‘passive receiver’) (Grünbaum, 
1984, 1988; Foucault, 1979). For example, although Rabu and McLeod’s (2017) study 
does not discredit the fact that there are problematic therapeutic relationships and case 
narratives, it points to a far more complicated clinical picture where expertise is often 
accompanied with feelings of humility and failure.  
By comparing early psychoanalytic case studies to contemporary research 
developments in psychotherapy and social sciences, this paper shows how the case study 
method improved since Freud’s time. Contemporary case study researchers seek to 
explicitly discuss countertransference reactions and issues in case narratives; clinical 
case studies are structured more rigorously with components that go beyond 
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interpretation (e.g., assessment and follow–ups); some case studies include raw data 
(transcripts, case notes, video recordings) to provide additional evidence; and finally, 
many case studies are pragmatic and utilise multiple methodologies.  
However, the paper identifies several methodological shortcomings that are still 
relevant for contemporary case study researchers:  
 
Table 3. Further developments for case studies in psychoanalysis and psychotherapy 
(1) Providing a reflexive assessment of the therapeutic situation and 
(counter)transference phenomena; 
(2) Maintaining explicit interpretive heuristics which describe the case researcher’s 
theoretical frame of reference; 
(3) Leaving room for alternative interpretations, perspectives and viewpoints; 
(4) Employing other methods to provide a more complex account of the clinical 
situation. 
 
We need not lose the qualitatively rich narrative and the distinctive advantages of 
working with single cases; however, we should consider which investigative techniques 
will help making our research more complex, transferrable, and comprehensive. 
Although significant efforts are being made to ‘resurrect’ the case study (Willemsen et al., 
2017; Meganck et al., 2017; Iwakabe & Gazzola, 2009; McLeod, 2016) there is no doubt 
that new methodological suggestions will create disagreements and hurdles in our field. 
As psychoanalytic clinicians and researchers, however, we should seek to make the case 
for the case study – not just by being sceptical or wary of such concepts as ‘objectivity’ 
and ‘validity’, but through detailed, reflexive, and clinically attuned case narratives that 
can fill the qualitative gaps in evidence–based research and practice. The aim of this 
paper is to show what we can learn from past case study practices – both good and bad – 
when engaging with new and recurring sceptics in the future.   
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Chapter 3: Epistemological Guidelines for Case Studies in 
Psychotherapy and Psychoanalysis 
 
Abstract 
In the fields of psychoanalysis and psychotherapy, case study researchers rarely justify 
their knowledge claims on formal epistemological grounds. This poses several issues to 
the case study method. Firstly, without articulating the standards by which our 
knowledge is being justified, we are potentially enabling the criticism that case studies 
are mere anecdotal reports and should not be treated as forms of evidence. Secondly, 
without the guidance of wider epistemological standards for case study research, we risk 
falling into somewhat arbitrary justifications of other as well as our own cases. This paper 
seeks to address these issues by examining and developing epistemic practices in 
psychoanalytic and psychotherapy case studies. Drawing from different social science 
resources, the paper describes three epistemological concepts appropriate for case study 
research: retroductive reasoning, analytic generalisation and working hypothesis. 
Retroductive reasoning was identified as a suitable epistemological concept for case 
studies that seek to trace causal powers and mechanisms in clinical practice. The case–
to–theory logic in analytic generalisation is useful for researchers who wish to generalise 
from single case observations to theory. Working hypothesis case studies can be used 
when assessing and revising existing theoretical propositions by testing them in practice 
with specific patients. Although all three epistemological concepts are embedded in some 
form of rules or definitions, this information in itself was found to be insufficient from the 
perspective of a case study researcher wishing to apply epistemological guidelines to 
research. To attend to this issue, the paper seeks to develop existing rules and guidelines 
for each epistemological concept. Social science definitions and principles are applied in 
a psychotherapy and/or psychoanalytic context, and further considerations about canons 
of evidence are provided. Finally, the paper considers the use of multiple epistemological 
concepts in systematic case studies.  
 
Keywords: Clinical Case Studies; Systematic Case Studies; Epistemology; Retroduction; 





It is a matter of fact that case studies have contributed to knowledge generation in several 
fields. For example, Sigmund Freud’s case of Dora (1901/1905) has become a classic in 
the fields of psychoanalysis and clinical psychology, where, despite its negative treatment 
outcome and short length, Dora’s case demonstrated the clinical significance of negative 
transference. Another key example is Vic Meyer’s (1966) case of two patients with 
compulsive washing rituals, which led to a breakthrough in cognitive behavioural 
therapy (CBT). Meyer’s case introduced the method of exposure and response 
prevention, which revolutionised the treatment of obsessive–compulsive disorder. John 
Bowlby’s (1952) early cases of children separated from their parents in hospitals 
demonstrated the effects of maternal deprivation and separation anxiety. The 
experiences of distress and anguish of just few children became the main theoretical 
drive behind attachment theory and children–in–hospital research.  
Despite the significance of the above cases, literature on theory development from 
case study research is scarce. In fact, case study researchers rarely justify their 
knowledge claims on formal epistemological grounds (Easton, 2010). As a broad 
philosophical field, epistemology is concerned with the belief in and the justification of 
knowledge, and it answers to the question “What is knowing and the known?” (Ferrier, 
1854, p. 46). Every researcher will have an implicit or explicit epistemological reasoning 
attached to their study, which means that epistemology is inevitably personal (Bateson, 
1979). However, each individual epistemology is also part of a wider form of ‘knowing’ 
that creates overarching epistemic practices within the field of study.  
In the fields of psychoanalysis and psychotherapy, case study researchers 
frequently use implicit forms of epistemological reasoning to arrive at their findings. 
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However, without articulating the standards by which our knowledge is being justified, 
we are potentially enabling the criticism that case studies are mere anecdotal reports and 
should not be treated as forms of evidence (Aveline, 2005). Furthermore, without the 
guidance of wider epistemological standards for case study research, we risk falling into 
somewhat arbitrary justifications of other as well as our own cases. 
This paper seeks to address the above epistemology issues by examining and 
developing epistemic practices in psychoanalytic and psychotherapy case studies. Three 
different epistemological concepts have been identified as relevant to this discussion: 
retroductive reasoning, analytic generalisation and working hypothesis. The rationale for 
selecting these three epistemological concepts involved: their compatibility with 
research in the fields of psychotherapy and psychoanalysis; their ability to provide 
concrete guidelines and/or canons of evidence for case study findings; and existing 
psychoanalytic and psychotherapy case studies that utilise (implicitly or explicitly) these 
epistemological concepts to generate knowledge. The case study examples used in this 
paper include both clinical (narrative reports written by therapists with a focus on rich 
descriptions of psychotherapy processes as well as therapist interpretations) and 
systematic (involving researcher teams and utilising multiple sources of data, such as 
questionnaires, therapist observations, interviews, statistical findings, etc.) case studies 
(Willemsen et al., 2017). A separate section at the end of the paper considers the use of 
multiple epistemological concepts in systematic case studies.  
Although all three epistemological concepts are embedded in some form of rules 
or definitions, this information in itself was found to be insufficient from the perspective 
of a case study researcher wishing to apply epistemological guidelines to research. To 
attend to this issue, this paper explicates existing rules and guidelines for each 
epistemological concept, clarifies how they are relevant for case study research, and 
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assesses conceptual and research applicability issues. Social science definitions and 
principles are applied in a psychotherapy and/or psychoanalytic context, and further 
considerations about canons of evidence are provided. By describing the epistemological 
diversity of case study research, this paper seeks to show that case studies can be used to 
develop different kinds of knowledge in a rigorous way. 
 
3.2 Retroductive reasoning 
 
Retroductive reasoning or retroduction is a strategy of inference originating from the 
philosophical approach of critical realism (CR). The aim of CR is to produce reliable 
knowledge about the world as it is by tracing phenomena to their causal (generative) 
powers (Bhaskar, 1977). According to social scientist Andrew Sayer (2000), retroduction 
is a suitable epistemological concept for this task:  
 
Merely knowing that ‘c’ has generally been followed by ‘e’ is not enough: we want 
to understand the continuous process by which ‘c’ produced ‘e’, if it did. This mode 
of inference in which events are explained by postulating (and identifying) 
mechanisms which are capable of producing them is called ‘retroduction’ (p. 207).  
 
In order to understand the process of retroductive reasoning, it is important to outline its 
function within the broader CR epistemology. In the above passage, Sayer clearly 
differentiates between the process of retroduction and the process of generalisation: 
instead of producing knowledge about the frequency or regularity of phenomena, 
retroductive reasoning involves a move backwards from the phenomenon of interest to 
powers and mechanisms that generated it (Lawson, 1997).  
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This is a crucial difference, and one that is generally thought of as a realist criticism 
of the positivist account of causality. Instead of seeking to identify regularly occurring 
causal relations, CR assumes the existence of a world comprised of multiple complex and 
different structures that do not generate regular patterns or events. For this reason, the 
process of retroduction seeks to describe what causes change by outlining the powers 
that “produce”, “generate”, “create”, “determine” or “enable” (Sayer, 1992, p. 104) things 
to happen within their context (the time and space in which they are exercised). From 
this point of view, retroduction is considered to be an appropriate form of reasoning for 
the study of complex social phenomena that involve multiple causal powers (e.g., 
situations and events involving relationships, discourses, identities, economic activities, 
kinship, etc.).  
In addition, CR acknowledges that our world is largely socially constructed (i.e., 
we cannot think about the world independently of our ideas and beliefs of it). However, 
the very premise of retroductive reasoning is that we can arrive at realistic and causally 
meaningful interpretations to explain social phenomena. Thus, although CR shares with 
social constructionism scepticism about scientific descriptions and categories, it 
nevertheless does not assume that the study of social phenomena is yet another 
discursive practice in itself. Tracing the way our social and linguistic practices influence 
and change theories, classifications, and language is therefore part of retroductive 
reasoning.  
Finally, retroduction is not one researcher’s job: it is a meta–process that requires 
multiple researchers and studies to obtain sufficient causal explanation of one 
substantive phenomenon. This serves a two–fold function: firstly, it ensures that no single 
causal account is being accepted uncritically, and secondly, it encourages a “cut and come 
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again” disposition (Easton, 2010) by which researchers are able to assess and compare 
contrasting versions of reality.  
 
Table 4. KEY CONCEPT: Retroductive reasoning 
Retroductive reasoning is a strategy of inference that is closely associated with the 
philosophical approach of critical realism (see table 5). It involves moving backwards 
from the phenomenon of interest to powers and mechanisms that generated it. The 
researcher applying retroductive reasoning seeks to describe the causal powers that 
produce, generate, create, determine or enable things to happen within their context.  
 
Table 5. KEY CONCEPT: Critical realism 
Critical realism is a performative epistemology that works against the grain of both 
positivism and social constructionism. It assumes that there is a real world out there 
(we behave as if it is real) and explains things by reference to their causal (generative) 
powers. The end goal is to explain what causes change in complex social phenomena. 
 
 3.2.1 Epistemological guidelines for retroductive reasoning 
 
Despite its centrality to CR epistemology, existing descriptions of retroductive reasoning 
are abstract and often do not entail guidelines for research application. As a result, most 
of the literature on retroduction involves either metaphysical analyses containing no 
methodology or empirical reports that refer to retroductive reasoning, and yet stop short 
when it comes to providing a detailed methodological description (Fletcher, 2017). 
 In order to demonstrate how retroduction can be used in case studies, I will first 
compare Sayer’s (1992) eight key CR assumptions about the world and our research 
practices with some of the core features of the case study method. The similarities 
between CR assumptions and the case study method will provide an epistemological 
foundation for retroductive reasoning, which is developed in table 7.  
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Table 6. Critical realist assumptions about the world (Sayer, 1992, p. 5) 
(1) The world exists independently of our knowledge of it; 
(2) Our knowledge of the world is fallible – it is not immune to bias; 
(3) Knowledge develops neither wholly through a steady accumulation of facts, nor 
discontinuously through changes in concepts; 
(4) Natural and social objects have particular causal powers; 
(5) The world is differentiated and stratified in different structures that may be present 
everywhere and do not generate regular patterns or events; 
(6) Social phenomena (actions, texts, institutions) are concept dependent. The goal is 
not to explain their material effects, but to understand, read and interpret what 
they mean; 
(7) Science and knowledge production is a social practice. Knowledge is largely 
(although not exclusively) linguistic, and the way we communicate our findings is 
not incidental to what is known and communicated; 
(8) Social science must be critical of its studied object. In order to explain and 
understand social phenomena we have to evaluate them critically. 
 
The case study method is attuned to several of Sayer’s CR assumptions. According to Yin 
(2014), case studies are ideal for the study of complex phenomena, especially when the 
“boundaries between phenomenon and context may not be clearly evident” (p. 17). This 
corresponds to Sayer’s points about the openness and messiness of social realities as seen 
in assumptions 3 and 5. Furthermore, Flyvbjerg (2006) has argued that, since “human 
behaviour cannot be meaningfully understood as simply rule–governed acts” (p. 6), it is 
necessary to use interpretation to develop a realistic and nuanced view of human 
behaviour. This interpretive element is particularly important for CR assumptions 6 and 
7. Finally, it is rare that a single case study would claim that it has generated a full or 
whole picture of its studied object. Rather, each case will contain unique or different 
information, thus only ever revealing different elements of reality. CR does not take issue 
with this: as can be seen in assumptions 7 and 8, there is an implication that the research 
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process requires multiple researchers, perspectives, and interpretations to arrive at a 
sufficiently critical explanation. 
 Following Sayer’s key CR assumptions, the process of retroductive reasoning in a 
case study may present as follows: 
 
Table 7. The process of retroductive reasoning in a case study 
Frequently implicit 
(1) Carefully conceptualizing the components and influences of the studied object; 
(2) Considering how (and if) these influences and components interact; 
(3) Outlining the possible causal mechanisms on the basis of the latter interaction; 
Frequently unaddressed – require formal epistemological reasoning 
(4) Choosing between rival and/or competing causal accounts; 
Considering the linguistic and social influences on the case narrative. 
 
As Easton (2010) argues, most case studies will provide a description of a “problem 
defined situation in great detail” (p. 119) (thus fulfilling component 1 in table 7). This 
allows the case study researcher to explicate multiple causal powers that could have 
generated the studied phenomenon (components 2 and 3). As such, many case studies 
are already utilising some form of retroductive reasoning (between components 1–3) 
implicitly.  
 However, there is a significant difficulty in going beyond hypothetical causal 
explanations: how can we assess which causal account (or accounts) explain the studied 
object or event realistically? Why this particular account over others? How can we avoid 
causal misattributions? And finally, how can researchers maintain criticality toward their 
own theoretical and clinical orientations? These questions pertain to components 4 and 
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5 in table 7, and require a set of explicit epistemological guidelines in order to be formally 
attended.  
 
 3.2.2 Canons of evidence: choosing between competing causal accounts 
 
Since clinical situations are complex and almost always have multiple causal mechanisms, 
there is an inherent difficulty in formulating and justifying a causal account that is 
representative (i.e., portraying realistic aspects) of each case. This difficulty is well 
elucidated by Pocock (2015) who discusses a complex family therapy case: a child with 
chronic anxiety has a caregiver who appears to be offering high levels of protection even 
when there are no external threats. The psychotherapist might immediately form a causal 
hypothesis that goes something like this: “A problem maintained by maladaptive 
attempts to solve it” (p. 176). Although this causal hypothesis may be correct in principle, 
Pocock (2015) argues that subscribing to such a hypothesis uncritically means that the 
researcher did not utilise retroductive reasoning beyond outlining the possible causal 
mechanisms (component 3 in table 7). Pocock offers the following critical points for 
consideration: 
 
1) Does the caregiver’s behaviour have an enabling effect on the child’s anxiety? In a family 
psychotherapy context, assessing this question would involve a careful observation of 
the caregiver and child’s relationship; the child’s safety strategies; the caregiver’s 
comforting strategies; social and cultural factors; general family dynamics, etc. It is 
also anticipated that a retroductive analysis of any clinical hypothesis will involve a 
number of psychotherapy sessions (i.e., beyond preliminary assessment). 
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2) If there is evidence for this causal hypothesis, the theoretical and clinical positions from 
which this conclusion is made need to be acknowledged. Pocock’s example is based on 
the clinical model of Brief Strategic Therapy and the theory of dynamic–maturational 
model of attachment and adaptation. Reasoning strategies implicit to these models 
need to be explicated. 
3) The researcher should anticipate that this may be just one out of a number of interacting 
causal powers and influences. Chronic anxiety is a complex mental phenomenon, 
which increases the likelihood of multiple causal forces.  
 
Pocock’s (2015) example is useful when thinking about retroductive reasoning in clinical 
practice because it demonstrates the simultaneous existence of two realities: physical 
(currently observable aspects of reality ‘as it is’ – symptoms or events) and social 
(subjective and interpersonal experiences and exchanges). For example, the physical 
symptoms of the child’s anxiety in the presence of the caregiver may be indicative of their 
relationship and comforting strategies. Therefore, addressing both physical and social 
realities without reducing one to the other is essential to retroductive analysis. 
 However, the example above still does not inform us on how to choose between 
competing causal accounts; it only informs us of further critical questions in assessing 
causal hypotheses. According to White (1997), this issue persists because existing 
definitions of retroduction rely too much on falsification and scepticism and say too little 
about evaluation and meaning: “Retroduction alone does not sufficiently advance the 
hypothethico–deductive method to make it adequate for the purposes of evaluating the 
content of [the psychotherapy] encounter. Evaluation is about more than falsification and 
scepticism, it is about meanings and it is about consequences” (p. 746). Since there are no 
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explicit canons of evidence with which we can evaluate the standard of retroductive 
analysis, there is no way to distinguish between a realistic and a naïve retroduction in a 
meticulous way. 
 CR has paid surprisingly little attention to this issue. In his work, Bhaskar (1977) 
suggested the concept of judgmental rationality. It is a process by which the researcher 
seeks to “select theories which most accurately represent the ‘domain of the real’ given 
our existing knowledge” (Hu, 2018, p. 118). Unfortunately, the concept of judgmental 
rationality has remained ambiguous as no judgment criteria have been explicated. Whilst 
Bhaskar (1977) implies that some concepts and accounts are better equipped in 
representing reality than others, he also argues that “there are no general philosophical 
criteria” which can be “laid down” (Bhaskar, 1977, p. 168) for this assessment. This poses 
an important question: if there are no criteria of validity, then how can researchers come 
to an agreement on which account provides a more realistic perspective?  
 Groff (2000) acknowledges this issue, noting that Bhaskar’s inattention to 
judgmental rationality may be because the “intersubjective agreement itself [...] is the 
criterion of validity” (p. 417). That is to say, a causal account can be regarded to be true 
insofar as researchers in a given field agree it to be true. However, one may argue that the 
very premise of a CR epistemology and retroduction (as an alternative to inductive and 
deductive reasoning) already implies validity criteria for plausible causal accounts. We 
have determined, through Sayer’s guidelines, what is not good enough for retroductive 






Table 8. What constitutes a naïve retroductive analysis? 
(1) Treating all knowledge about reality as socially constructed; 
(2) Generating causal explanations for complex social phenomena on the basis of 
regularity and frequency; 
(3) Neglecting the context (time and space) in which causal powers operate; 
(4) Ignoring that there may be multiple causal forces for a single phenomenon; 
(5) Reducing or failing to differentiate between physical (observable aspects of 
“reality as it is”) and social (subjective) realities; 
(6) Ignoring the social, theoretical and linguistic processes behind research (lack of 
criticality); 
(7) Reducing causal powers to their material effects (as opposed to trying to 
understand, read, and interpret their meaning). 
 
These criteria can be regarded as epistemological red flags: the more of them are present 
in a given explanation, the more likely the explanation is epistemologically flawed or 
naïve. One may compare two causal explanations of the same phenomenon and see which 
explanation is more fallible (in the sense that it falls prey to naïve retroduction), and 
which is more realistic (in the sense that it explicitly works through the problematic 
criteria in table 8). Although some of the criteria still revolve around scepticism of 
knowledge (criteria 1 and 2 are strongly attuned to CR and its ontological assumptions), 
most of the criteria imply an evaluation of content, meaning, and consequences of a given 




 3.2.3 Considering the linguistic and social influences: reflexivity 
 
By referring to the epistemological red flags outlined in table 8, we may be able to 
compare and assess the explanatory power of different causal explanations for one given 
case. However, this task can become increasingly difficult if these causal explanations are 
being generated from different theoretical and clinical orientations. The latter will 
influence not only the reasoning process, but also the language and the methods that are 
being used to explain the case. This point is made by Kanye (1995) in the context of 
psychotherapy research:  
 
Research questions posed from within the parameters delimited by the canons of 
scientific research tend to be disconnected from psychotherapy and indeed 
transform it into something else. […] The questions we bring to therapy [are] 
theory laden, […] our theories construct the phenomena they are designed to 
explain (p. 38). 
  
One of the main aspects of retroduction is that it seeks to attend not only to changes that 
are being caused by different structures “out there”, but also by our linguistic, 
methodological and social choices as researchers. Bhaskar (1977) referred to the latter 
process as reflexivity, with which it is possible to make critical judgments about the 
research process. According to Belfrage and Hauf (2017), reflexivity starts with the 
researcher acknowledging their own position in retroductive reasoning: “Retroduction is 
not some abstract movement of thought taking place far away from the field, but is 
implemented and experienced by the corporeal researcher” (p. 10). This means that the 
researcher acts as an “acknowledged vehicle”: they have a subjective, social, and 
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theoretical position that will have an impact on the way causal powers and mechanisms 
are being traced and inferred. From this point of view, retroduction involves not only a 
temporal movement (studying the effect/event by tracing the conditions and 
mechanisms that produced it), but also a move between theoretical and empirical work.  
 
Table 9. KEY CONCEPT: Reflexivity 
Reflexivity refers to the researcher’s awareness of the overarching professional and 
theoretical principles that govern the research process, as well as the ability to disclose 
personal epistemic practices within the wider theoretical framework.  
 
In psychotherapy and social work research, there have been two forms of reflexivity: 
textual and epistemic (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). Textual reflexivity has been defined 
as the researcher’s capacity to disclose their theoretical, social, and value positions; to 
present a small–scale “autobiography of the research experience” (White, 1997, p. 748). 
Epistemic reflexivity, on the other hand, refers to the researcher’s awareness of the 
overarching professional and theoretical principles governing their research process. 
Epistemic reflexivity is generally preferred over textual; for example, Bourdieu (in 
Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992) has argued that, since researchers often fail to describe 
their relation to the studied phenomenon, they should instead focus on describing the 
wider epistemic principles of their field. 
CR is arguably most clear on this epistemological issue: it accepts that any form of 
data is “fundamentally interpretivist in character” (Easton, 2010, p. 124). However, this 
does not mean that the researcher should not seek to articulate the degree to which their 
epistemological reasoning is personal (Bateson, 1979). For example, in psychoanalytic 
case studies, psychoanalysts often refer to their theoretical frame of reference (Freudian, 
Object–Relations, Kleinian, etc.), which accounts for their epistemic reflexivity. But as 
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Willemsen et al. (2017) point out, each clinical and theoretical orientation contains 
different (and at times conflicting) modes of theorising and practicing. It is therefore 
important that the researcher articulates their personal epistemic practices (textual 
reflexivity) within a wider theoretical framework (e.g., which concepts the researcher 
depends on or deviates from). A high degree of reflexivity enables what Easton (2010) 
calls the “cut and come again” disposition: researchers can see why a given case study 
interpreted a clinical scenario in the way that it did. In turn, this allows for a thoughtful 
consideration of alternative or contrasting interpretations between researchers from 
different theoretical orientations. 
To draw the above epistemic practices closer to psychotherapy case studies, I will 
discuss the use of retroduction in Wolf and Jandasek’s (2017) systematic case study about 
concurrent treatment of depression in parents and adolescents by following the process 
of retroductive reasoning outlined in table 7.  
 
Table 10. CASE EXAMPLE: A retroductive analysis of parent and adolescent depression 
(Wolff & Jandasek, 2017) 
(1)  Carefully conceptualizing the components and influences of the studied 
object. Depression is conceptualised from the point of view of parent–adult 
interactions. The risk of developing depression among children has been closely 
linked with having depressed parents (between two and four times greater than for 
children with non–depressed parents). 
 
(2)  Considering how (and if) these influences and components interact. The case 
suggests a causally bidirectional relationship between parent and child experiences 
of depression. Parental depression is hypothesised to (1) contribute to the early 
onset of adolescent depression, and (2) have a continuous influence on adolescent 




(3)  Outlining the possible causal mechanisms. Drawing on existing research, the 
authors propose that parental psychopathology is frequently transmitted to 
children through direct and indirect interpersonal processes. Direct processes 
involve: impaired parent–adolescent communication, higher levels of expressed 
emotion, poor emotional regulation, and maladaptive coping skills. Indirect 
transmission may occur due to issues in parents’ behavioural modelling (e.g., 
ineffective coping skills, poor problem–solving ability, cognitive distortions, etc.).  
 
The case of a 34–year–old mother Lynn and her 14–year–old daughter Sophia is 
used to illustrate the causal interrelatedness of parent–adolescent depression. 
Lynn demonstrated severe depression and mild suicidality. Her daughter Sophia 
also reported a long history of depression and symptoms of attention–deficit 
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). Both mother and daughter reported that their 
relationship was conflictual and that they were reactive to each other’s behaviours.  
The case authors identified several direct and indirect interpersonal processes 
affecting Lynn and Sophia’s depressive symptoms. Both engaged in isolative 
behaviours, emotional outbursts, and maladaptive coping skills. These 
interpersonal processes were found to trigger Lynn’s negative feelings about her 
parenting abilities, which in turn increased her anxiety and depressive symptoms. 
Similarly, Sophia reported experiencing increased depressive symptoms, guilt, and 
suicidal ideation.  
 
(4)  Choosing between rival or competing causal accounts.  Given the strong 
influence of parental depression on adolescent symptoms, the study aims to 
develop a treatment approach that can target both parental and adolescent 
psychopathology. Interpersonal Psychotherapy for adolescents (IPT–A) was cited 
as a developmentally appropriate approach. However, the authors conclude that 
IPT–A does not target parental psychopathology, even if the latter may be causal to 
the adolescent patient’s depression. Similarly, cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) 
for youth with depression features minimal parental involvement. As such, both 




The authors propose a novel treatment approach for depression that involves both 
parents and adolescents. The proposed model for the concurrent treatment of 
depressed parents and teenagers has a two–fold aim: (1) to address how parental 
psychopathology affects adolescents in general, and (2) to assess how specific 
family dynamics affect parental and adolescent depressive symptoms.  
 
Two therapists worked with Lynn and Sophia, both individually and in conjoined 
sessions. Across several sessions, Lynn’s behaviours were found to have a 
significant impact on her daughter’s depressive symptoms. In one of the sessions, 
Lynn discovered Sophia’s inappropriate interactions with a male peer and became 
so upset she hit her daughter on the arm. Sophia reported feeling “like a disgrace” 
(p. 21). Both reported an increase in depressive symptoms after this incident.  
 
The impaired interpersonal processes were identified as causal to both Sophia’s 
and Lynn’s increasing experiences of depression and anxiety. In subsequent 
sessions, the treatment focused on re–establishing a positive communication 
between the mother and daughter. This involved practicing listening and 
responding to each other, communicating concerns openly, and learning problem–
solving skills. Thus, although half of the treatment process focused on improving 
Lynn and Sophia’s depressive symptoms individually, the treatment’s main aim was 
to improve the mother and daughter’s relationship dynamics concurrently.  
 
(5)  Considering the linguistic and social influences on the case narrative. The 
authors note that their treatment protocol requires two therapists working in 
tandem per case, which may prove to be “logistically challenging in some treatment 
settings” (p. 24). Although the authors provide no further consideration for this 
issue, we may assume that the increased number of therapists working on the same 
parent–adolescent cases could introduce significant theoretical and clinical 
disparities into the case narrative. It is therefore important to establish clarity over 





 3.2.4 Recommendations for future research 
 
At this point, a question may arise on whether retroduction can be used outside of CR 
epistemology. Sayer (2000) is clear that retroductive reasoning can be used in a wide 
range of research methods and theoretical frameworks. Just like inductive and deductive 
reasoning, retroduction is a method for data interpretation, and is most appropriate for 
research that seeks to identify change in complex social phenomena. Although 
retroduction is deeply embedded in CR epistemology, the researcher does not have to 
identify with the entire CR paradigm. However, the research should attend to those CR 
assumptions that are relevant for a formal retroductive analysis (see tables 6 and 7).  
 Although retroduction is a promising epistemological concept, particularly in 
areas where the clash between positivism and social constructionism created a research 
paralysis (Pilgrim & Bentall, 1999), it still suffers from many epistemological drawbacks. 
If retroduction places a high value on invoking causal language and making causal 
judgments, then it certainly requires more than just implicit criteria of what is realistic 
and naïve knowledge. Moreover, there needs to be a clearer connection between 
retroductive reasoning and social science research; as it stands now, retroduction 
remains to be a metaphysical concept with no methodological underpinnings. Future 
direction for retroduction should therefore involve the development of clearer canons of 
evidence and their applicability to different research methodologies. 
 
3.3 Analytic generalisation  
 
It is generally agreed by case study researchers that generalisation and replicability are 
not at the heart of case study methodology, and that the goal is not to produce a 
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standardised set of results that can be replicated by another researcher. This is because 
most case studies entail a high number of variables and contextual conditions that make 
generalisability of data far more difficult than in experimental or survey research. 
However, the issue of generalisability has become central to psychotherapy 
research, and therefore unavoidable for case study researchers. Although case studies 
were historically crucial for theory development, they are now in the lowest position in 
the hierarchy of evidence (Aveline, 2005). At the top, we have systematic reviews, meta–
analytic reports and randomised controlled trials (RCTs). Whilst this hierarchy and its 
‘gold–standard’ implications for generalisability received a fair share of criticisms (see 
for example, Shean, 2014; Westen et al., 2004), the fact is that the methodologies at the 
top have a very clear logic when it comes to producing generalisable knowledge. Case 
studies, on the other hand, have a far more ambiguous relationship with the process of 
generalisation.  
 Increasingly, social scientist Robert Yin (2013, 2014) proposed a different form of 
generalisation from that used by quantitative methodologies. Whilst case studies do not 
pursue a sample–to–population logic (as in statistical generalisation), a single case study 
can generate a more abstract level of ideas and questions that pertain to other individuals 
and situations outside of the original case. This process is known as analytic 
generalisation: “a previously developed theory is used as a template with which to 
compare the empirical results of the case study. If two or more cases are shown to 
support the same theory, replication may be claimed” (Yin, 2014, p. 31). This means that 
a single case study, albeit not having any statistical power, can have important theoretical 





Table 11. KEY CONCEPT: Analytic generalisation 
Analytic generalisation is a strategy of generalising from single cases to theory. It 
involves case studies that are concerned with questions that are of wider significance 
to the field. The end goal is to contribute to theory building as well as to be applicable 
to other cases in the field. 
 
 
 3.3.1 Statistical vs analytic generalisation 
 
Earlier in the paper, I referred to Freud’s case of Dora, Meyer’s case about compulsive 
washing rituals, and Bowlby’s child case studies as cases that have undoubtedly 
contributed to theory development. However, I would also go one step further and call 
these cases exceptional in terms of the impact that they continue to have on knowledge 
generation. For example, the case of Dora is still one of the most read case histories in the 
field of psychology: in Google Scholar, it appears more than 19,000 times in articles 
emerging from a variety of disciplines (Longhofer et al., 2017). This kind of knowledge 
output produced by a single case can be attributed to several factors:  
 
(1) It is the first psychoanalytic case study that describes in detail the significance of 
transference;  
(2) It is a first thorough report of a negative treatment outcome in psychoanalysis;  
(3) It is the first case study to break away from the medical case study format by 
demonstrating the complex and open system dynamics implicit to everyday 




All these factors make Freud’s Dora a ‘first–of–its–kind’ classic: psychoanalytic 
practitioners go back to this particular case because its contents are relevant to many of 
their own cases. In a similar vein, CBT therapists working with obsessive compulsive 
disorder often find themselves returning to Meyer’s case, whilst nurses and child 
psychologists still rely on Bowlby’s studies of attachment and separation anxiety.  
 However, powerful ‘first–of–its–kind’ cases are not that common: a revolutionary 
exposition of negative transference is not an everyday commodity in clinical research. In 
fact, most case studies in psychotherapy have little to no intention for generalisability: 
they describe the treatment process of particular patients (with the intention to teach 
other clinicians rather than generalise findings) or provide clarification and additional 
evidence to already existing theories. But even if we are treating particular patients, we 
still want to know general information about their experiences. This provides us with an 
expectation of how a clinical scenario might go or which clinical technique should be 
used.  
 For this reason, statistical generalisation is frequently used for producing 
‘ordinary’ (average) generalisations. It involves measuring ratios, effects, frequencies, 
and average values of different parameters of a population based on a random 
representative sample. In order to choose a representative population, researchers 
typically use probability methods of sampling, by which every member of population has 
an equal chance to be included in the study (Polit & Beck, 2010). As such, statistical 
generalisation follows a sample–to–population logic.  
 To strengthen a statistical generalisation, researchers perform replication studies, 
which employ the same conditions to see if the dataset is replicated. The more times a 
dataset is replicated (and by extension, the statistical findings are replicated), the more 
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generalisable the results are to the general population. The end goal is to produce 
knowledge about an average value of the studied phenomenon in a population. 
 Analytic generalisation differs from statistical generalisation in both process and 
end–goal. As pointed out earlier, analytic generalisation does not follow a sample–to–
population logic. Instead, it involves a case–to–theory logic: “By analytic generalisation is 
meant the extraction of a more abstract level of ideas from a set of case study findings − 
ideas that nevertheless can pertain to newer situations other than the case(s) in the 
original case study” (Yin, 2013, p. 325). A researcher pursuing analytic generalisation will 
start with an in–depth case study suitable for a higher–order abstraction. This means that 
the case describes a multitude of variables within its relevant context and provides a 
rationale of how these variables may be relevant to other instances in the field. It is also 
important that the case is articulated in a manner that is authentic and credible to the 
reader (i.e., understandable to the audience of a specific field) (Polit & Beck, 2010).  
 Instead of running a statistical replication study, analytic generalisation follows 
the logic of experimental reasoning. A single case is like a single experiment: if the case is 
unique in relation to the established theory (e.g., by introducing a new phenomenon), it 
can then be used as a pilot or prototype for other cases. If multiple case studies produce 
similar results (literal replication) or contrasting results but for predictable reasons 
(theoretical replication), then there is strong evidence for the original propositions in the 
first unique case (Rowley, 2002). The end goal is to contribute to theory building as well 








Table 12. Comparing different forms of generalisation 
Statistical generalisation Analytic generalisation 
Large sample 




Knowledge about an average value of a 
phenomenon in a population 
Small sample (N=1; multiple cases) 




Knowledge about a theory that 
pertains to a population 
 
 3.3.2 Epistemological guidelines for generalising from “ordinary” case studies 
 
After establishing how analytic generalisation differs from statistical generalisation, is it 
evident that the problem of producing generalisations from ‘ordinary’ case studies still 
remains. By ‘ordinary’ case studies, I refer to cases that, despite containing important new 
findings, have limited explanatory power in comparison to the ‘first of its kind’ classic 
cases. Paula Heimann’s (1950) clinical work on countertransference can be considered 
an exemplar of an ‘ordinary’ case study within its timeframe: 
 
Table 13. CASE EXAMPLE: Analytic generalisation of the countertransference concept 
(Heimann, 1950) 
German psychoanalyst Paula Heimann’s (1950) clinical work demonstrated that 
countertransference does not always have to be an obstacle to the therapist’s 
understanding of the patient’s situation. Heimann’s central suggestion was that 
patients often project feelings and thoughts that are felt as unbearable onto their 
therapists. In turn, therapists begin to perceive the patients’ projected feelings as their 
own. Heimann continued to suggest that this projective identification can be assessed 
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and explored by focusing on the conscious and pre–conscious countertransference 
feelings toward patients. 
 
In one of her case examples, Heimann described a male patient in his forties who 
originally sought treatment to resolve his marriage problems. The highly promiscuous 
patient told Heimann in the third week of analysis that he was going to marry a woman 
whom he had met very recently. Heimann interpreted the patient’s wish to get married 
as a form of resistance against the analytic task. However, Heimann felt apprehended 
and worried about her feelings, which struck her as strange and unprofessional.  
 
After an additional analysis of one of the patient’s dreams, Heimann came to realise 
that the patient unconsciously wished to damage her and supress her as the voice of 
reason: “Out of guilt for his sadistic impulses he was compelled to make reparation, but 
this reparation was of a masochistic nature, since it necessitated blotting out the voice 
of reason and caution” (p. 82). It is at this point of analysis that Heimann acknowledged 
her previous feelings of worry as an unconscious reaction to the patient’s sadistic and 
self–destructive patterns. She concluded that countertransference is an important 
criterion not only in selecting the relevant interpretations, but also in detecting aspects 
of patient’s personality: “From the point of view I am stressing, the analyst’s 
countertransference is not only part and parcel of the analytic relationship, but it is the 
patient’s creation” (ibid). 
 
Given the original rigidity of the classic psychoanalytic approach to 
countertransference, Heimann’s arguments were initially met with considerable 
scepticism. In this sense, her case work had limited explanatory power and required 
further support from other clinical cases. With the emergence of relational 
psychotherapy, an increasing amount of clinical case studies across multiple clinical 
orientations began to incorporate Heimann’s arguments about the use of 
countertransference (see for example, Dalenberg, 2000; Eizirik et al., 1991). This case–
based research produced similar conclusions to Heimann’s: when therapists are 
engaged with their feelings toward patients, they often reveal new information about 
the patient’s unconscious processes; build a stronger therapeutic alliance; and provide 
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relational support for vulnerable patients. Thus, on the basis of several common 
attributes (identifying and dealing with countertransference and projective 
identification processes) between many clinical cases, a contemporary theory about 
countertransference as a viable clinical tool has emerged. 
 
It is now possible to trace back aspects of Heimann’s work that led to the analytic 
generalisation of the countertransference concept since there have been many cases that 
replicated Heimann’s conclusions. However, if generalisable aspects remain largely 
implicit or undefined, this can make it difficult to establish whether or not a given case is 
‘representative’. Therefore, we need epistemological guidelines not only for generalising, 
but also for identifying a ‘representative’ case study from which the generalisation can be 
made. 
The question of representability is, of course, not exclusive to case studies. As Polit 
and Beck (2010) argue, this is one of the key limitations to statistical generalisation: “The 
vast majority of studies with human beings do not involve random samples. [...] In the 
rare study in which participants are sampled at random, cooperation is rarely perfect, 
which means that random sampling seldom results in random samples” (p. 1453). In their 
view, random sampling is a research ideal that is rarely achieved: since most researchers 
have an explicit (non–random) accessible population, this makes generalisation onto 
other populations and settings difficult and messy. Despite this limitation, however, it is 
important that statistical generalisation has a research ideal or ‘norm’ (in the forms of 
random sampling and replication) in the first place. This ‘norm’ means that there is a 
concrete set of guidelines, however flawed, that can be undertaken to assess the validity 
of a given statistical generalisation. 
As an epistemological concept, analytic generalisation is still lacking a research 
ideal or ‘norm’. This has been acknowledged by the educational researcher Mary Kennedy 
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(1979): “What seems to be needed before single case studies will be widely accepted is a 
set of rules for drawing inferences about the generality of findings from a case study or 
even from studies of very few cases” (p. 663). She notes that this single weakness of case 
methodology is enough to discourage many researchers from employing it. As such, 
Kennedy offers a set of epistemological rules that seek to tackle two problems at once: 
they outline an ideal research process for analytic generalisation (epistemological 
guidelines), and they determine the representability of a given case (canons of evidence 
for a generalisable case). In the review below, I place Kennedy’s rules in a psychotherapy 
research context.  
 
Table 14. Epistemological rules for analytic generalisation 
(1) Examining a wide range of attributes within a single case (or multiple 
cases). Since patients and mental experiences vary considerably, we must be 
careful not to confuse idiosyncratic outcomes with generalisable outcomes. 
Therefore, the researcher must outline specific patient criteria or treatment 
aspects within the case that they will be generalising from. For example, analytic 
generalisation from a series of case studies on depression would involve a 
meticulous outline of such patient criteria as gender, age, the level of disruptions 
in emotional stability, experiences of depressive states, etc. Any significant 
differences and variations between the patients should be noted. 
 
(2) Ensuring that there are many common and/or similar attributes between 
the cases and the population of interest. This helps forming a basis for 
generalisation. In order to do this, the researcher may rely on existing knowledge 
about a certain kind of population (e.g., patients with a diagnosis of depression as 
per DSM–5); they may choose to make assumptions about some of the 
population’s attributes thus generating a new hypothesis (e.g., patients with a 
diagnosis of depression have difficulties engaging with psychotherapy due to 
anxiety over social interactions); or they may be able to define a hypothetical 
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population based on its shared attributes thus directly generalising to theory 
(e.g., a population of patients who are not able to form a transference relationship 
– including but not limited to patients with depression). 
 
(3) Limiting the number of unique attributes between case studies from which 
the generalisation is being made. This ensures that case generalisability is 
uninhibited. Kennedy notes that unique attributes are difficult to isolate because 
the researcher may not be fully aware of them (e.g., a patient may not wish to 
disclose a traumatic event), however, the researcher must attempt to look for 
them and separate the unique features from the common ones. It is also 
acceptable to define unique attributes post hoc (which is more preferable than 
not defining them at all). 
 
(4) The attributes between the cases must be relevant. This point requires the 
researcher to identify the relevancy of attributes for further generalisation. For 
example, patient gender may not always be relevant: if the researcher wants to 
generalise case findings in order to theorise about the connection between 
negative transference relationships and patients with depression, it is likely that 
both male and female patient cases will be of relevance to theory (although 
significant variations between male and female patients may need to be outlined, 
as per rule 1). 
 
Kennedy’s rules, whilst not exhaustive (as she herself notes, they “can be continuously 
refined by practicing evaluators”, p. 664), are clearly important for setting up both 
research ‘norms’ and canons of evidence for analytic generalisation from ‘ordinary’ cases. 
In particular, the rules that discuss the relevance and similarity of attributes between 
different cases ensure that the desired analytic generalisation goes beyond a working 
hypothesis (see section 3.4, ‘Working Hypothesis’). Whilst the latter requires further 
study, a stable analytic generalisation should be readily applicable to new situations (Yin, 
2013). If replication is achieved through common attributes between two or more cases, 
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then this may serve as powerful evidence for the generalisability of the original case, even 
if the original findings had limited explanatory power on their own. Thus, the research 
‘norm’ in analytic generalisation can be based on the logic of experimental replication 
(literal or theoretical), whilst its canons of evidence can be based on the strength of 
common attributes between the cases.  
 
 3.3.3 Recommendations for future research 
 
Unlike retroductive reasoning, the concept of analytic generalisation is not embedded in 
a philosophical approach that involves concrete epistemological and ontological 
preconceptions about the world. In this sense, analytic generalisation in itself is not new 
to the fields of psychotherapy and psychoanalysis and has been implicitly present in the 
research practices across these two fields. On one hand, its implicit existence is helpful 
when trying to explicate the relevant epistemological guidelines. On the other, there 
appears to be a temptation amongst researchers in these fields to remain on implicit 
epistemic grounds; since analytic generalisations have been made before without formal 
epistemological reasoning, this can be done again. 
 As is clear from Heimann’s (1950) example, one does not always have to follow 
‘fixed’ epistemological rules to produce generalisable claims. However, it is important 
that both the logic as well as the intent of analytic generalisation are clear and explicit. 
This allows other case study researchers to immediately identify the representability of 
a given case (via concrete generalisable attributes), and to determine how it compares to 
the attributes found in other cases.  Further research direction for analytic generalisation 
should involve an expansion of criteria for ‘representative’ cases. Although Kennedy’s 
(1979) rules provide a helpful start, the research process for analytic generalisation 
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needs to be developed more clearly in the context of psychoanalytic and psychotherapy 
case studies in which analytic generalisation has been almost exclusively implicit. 
 
3.4 Working hypothesis 
 
Few people debate the value of case studies in preliminary or exploratory research 
stages. But even in this instance, case studies are often described as being valuable only 
as a first step in the research process; that, in order to test a hypothesis generated within 
a case, one must rely on other kinds of research methods that can further assess whether 
the hypothesis is applicable to a larger population (see for example, Campbell & Stanley, 
1966). Once again, this relates to the issue of generalisability: a single case study is seen 
as insufficient data for testing new or existing theoretical propositions. 
Educational psychologist Lee Cronbach (1975) criticised the view that we must 
rely on generalisable data in order to test theories. All generalisations begin by collecting 
information from individuals and situations (‘local conditions’). However, the end goal 
should not always be generalisation. If a single case contradicts, informs or deviates from 
the general law, then the researcher ought to stay with it and particularize it. As such, 
Cronbach proposed a reversal of research priorities: “As results accumulate, a person 
who seeks understanding will do his best to trace how the uncontrolled factors could 
have caused local departures from the modal effect. That is, generalisation comes late, and 
the exception is taken as seriously as the rule” (1975, p. 125).  
From Cronbach’s point of view, there are unique, context–dependent factors in 
every research situation: “When we give proper weight to local conditions, any 
generalisation is a working hypothesis, not a conclusion” (1975, p. 125). Given Cronbach’s 
focus on local conditions, testing theories on the basis of generalisability does not make 
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sense because conditions in each population sample vary and change over time. For this 
reason, Cronbach suggested that theory testing should be performed through working 
hypothesis case studies. This involves moving from case to case, “describing and 
interpreting the [studied] effect anew” (ibid) and particularising the unique factors of 
each case.  
In this regard, case studies can offer far more than just preliminary scouting for a 
research project; they can be used to test whether theories work and how they can be 
improved or revised. However, Cronbach does not clearly define what a working 
hypothesis case study is. I will follow the work of Stiles (2003; 2007), Mahrer (1988) and 
Edelson (1985, 1986) on theory testing case studies in order to define a working 
hypothesis case study more clearly. 
 
Table 15. KEY CONCEPT: Working hypothesis case study 
Case studies that propose important new distinctions, discoveries or revisions to 
existing theories are called working hypothesis case studies. Although such case studies 
may involve a falsification of a theoretical proposition, they generally go beyond 
falsification by outlining new theoretical suggestions or hypotheses based on detailed 
case observations. The end goal is to revise theories by assessing how (and whether) 
they translate to practice. 
 
 3.4.1 Theory testing in psychotherapy: working hypothesis vs falsification 
 
Theories do not entail specifications or moment–to–moment situations of clinical 
practice, which means that their validity can vary greatly across different clinical 
instances. For this reason, Stiles (2003), much like Cronbach, argued that theory testing 




By simultaneously bringing many observations to bear on a theory, case studies 
offer both a way to test and an opportunity to improve the theory. [...] For example, 
Freud’s case studies [...] permeated psychoanalytic theory (that is, the theory was 
altered by them), and the detailed fit between the theory and the cases helped 
increase confidence in theory (p. 9). 
 
As such, most case studies in psychotherapy and psychoanalysis function as working 
cases: by demonstrating how patients’ behaviour manifests in accordance to a theoretical 
model or changes in response to a clinical technique, they test how theory works in 
practice. If there is a good fit between the theory and the case material, then this increases 
confidence in theory. The advantage over other research methods here is that different 
case studies can demonstrate different observations about the same theory: “Each case 
tells us something new, and new observations are always valuable, whether they confirm 
previous theory or add something unexpected” (Stiles, 2007, p. 123). If, on the other hand, 
a case study indicates a new observation that contributes to theory development or 
revision, then it begins to function as working hypothesis case study.  
Many authors have argued that case studies are equipped with an important task 
of falsification: a process by which a theoretical proposition is subjected to a series of 
observations. If one case falsifies the original theoretical proposition, then the theory 
must be revised or rejected altogether. Karl Popper’s famous example of “all swans are 
white” illustrates this falsification process: just one observation of a black swan falsifies 
the proposition that all swans are white. Midgley (2006) provides a psychoanalytic 
example: if a single case demonstrates that patient’s neurosis was not caused by sexual 
abuse in childhood, then a theory suggesting that all neurosis in adulthood is a result of 
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early sexual abuse (as Freud’s seduction theory did) needs to be revised or replaced by a 
theoretical model that explains both abuse and non–abuse neurosis.  
However, Mahrer (1988) argues that there are significant drawbacks to research 
that is driven toward falsification of existing theories. In his view, disconfirmation of 
existing psychotherapy theories is nearly impossible: “I know of no established theory of 
psychotherapy that declared bankruptcy because of research that failed to confirm, 
disconfirmed, or falsified its theoretical propositions and network of theoretical 
assumptions; nor is there a logical necessity for that to occur” (p. 694). This is because 
there is a significant difficulty in moving between a) findings from a falsifying case study, 
to b) the specific theoretical proposition that is being falsified, to c) the network of 
theoretical assumptions that make up the overall theory.  
Mahrer further argues that theories in the fields of psychoanalysis and 
psychotherapy are not usually based on straightforward predictions or testable 
conditions. Therefore, when a falsifying case appears, its findings are generally 
“constrained to propositions” (p. 695) – they do not target the core theoretical principles 
that make up the theory in the first place. Even in Midgley’s (2006) example of neurosis, 
it is not clear whether a case of non–abuse neurosis should discredit the entirety of the 
theory immediately. Instead, this may mean that neurosis has a variety of causes, and 
sexual abuse is only one of them. Working hypothesis case studies can be used as a 
resolution to this issue: although they frequently contain a falsification of a theoretical 
proposition (e.g., falsifying the claim that all neurosis is caused by early sexual abuse), 
they can also begin outlining new suggestions or hypotheses based on further case 
observations. Thus, the theory is not refuted in its entirety, but it is being reworked or 




 3.4.2 Epistemological guidelines for working hypothesis case studies  
 
As with the other two epistemological concepts, working hypothesis case studies have no 
concrete epistemological guidelines or canons of evidence. Whilst most case studies are 
useful for developing new ideas or reaching a deeper understanding about a 
phenomenon, this does not mean that they automatically include a justification for a given 
hypothesis (Midgley, 2006a). The question here is: on what grounds or criteria can we 
justify an existing theoretical proposition or rule it out and claim that a change in the 
patient’s behaviour was caused by something else (an alternative hypothesis)?  
Marshall Edelson notoriously defended case studies by arguing that they can be 
used to test clinical propositions (Edelson, 1985, 1986). In doing so, Edelson made it very 
clear that psychoanalysis is “not exempt from ordinary canons of scientific method and 
reasoning” (1985, p. 571). In his view, case studies must be formulated in an 
epistemologically sound, rigorous manner in order to be considered as evidence for a 
given hypothesis. In a series of papers, Edelson explicates the following points 
(summarised by Midgley, 2006a, p. 134–135):  
 
Table 16. Epistemological guidelines for working hypothesis case studies 
(1) The study should clearly and prominently state the hypothesis being tested in the 
case; 
(2) Facts or observations should be clearly separated from interpretations of these 
observations; 
(3) It should be clearly shown how the hypothesis about the case explains or accounts 
for the observations; 
(4) Observations which, if they had occurred, would have been grounds for ejecting the 
hypothesis should be specified; 
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(5) Observations that appear to contradict the hypothesis should be reported and clear 
grounds for dealing with these counter–examples should be given; 
(6) Since any set of observations can be explained in different ways, some argument 
should be given for why the observations are better explained by this hypothesis 
rather than a particular alternative hypothesis; 
(7) Even if the observations can be better explained by this hypothesis rather than a rival 
one, the study should consider what factors operating in the clinical setting may have 
resulted in the obtaining of favourable data, even if the hypothesis were false; 
(8) The study should make clear to what extent the hypothesis about this case can be 
generalised to similar cases or treatments. 
 
Edelson’s epistemological guidelines tackle two important gaps in theory testing case 
studies: generating a hypothesis by carefully comparing it to rival hypotheses and 
counter–examples (points 5, 6, 7), and testing a candidate theory following the new 
hypothesis (point 8). These points directly address Mahrer’s (1988) criticisms about 
falsifying case studies. In this sense, working hypothesis case studies follow a Kuhnian 
model: instead of validating or falsifying a theory in its entirety (Popper’s research ideal), 
the working hypothesis model seeks to identify theoretical anomalies and redefine or 
revise them accordingly to new observations. 
 
 3.4.3 Discovery–oriented approach 
 
According to Mahrer (1988), the way out of ineffective affirmation or disconfirmation of 
psychotherapy laws and axioms is a discovery–oriented approach: “When hypothesis 
testing is done properly it includes discovery” (p. 696). The difference between 
falsification and a discovery–oriented approach is that the latter is not concerned about 
having a predetermined theoretical expectation. Instead, the discovery–oriented 
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approach is based on the “intention to learn more; to be surprised; to find out what one 
does not already expect, predict, or hypothesize; to answer a question whose answer 
provides something one wants to know but might not have expected, predicted, or 
hypothesized” (ibid). This does not mean that a case study based on a discovery–oriented 
approach does not involve any motivating interest; it should, as per Edelson’s guidelines, 
either state a clear hypothesis or outline which psychotherapeutic condition, operation 
or consequence will be assessed.  
A discovery–oriented approach allows for some flexibility in case study research: 
whilst some cases are not intended to test hypotheses, they may lead to important clinical 
discoveries “on the way”, which results in working hypotheses and new theoretical 
propositions. For instance, clinical case studies often demonstrate how effective or 
ineffective theories, techniques, and diagnostic entities are in practice with particular 
patients. However, these case studies rarely begin as theory testing cases. Instead, an 
existing theory or technique is used for treatment, but when found ineffective, it is almost 
always replaced by an alternative. In this sense, a complete falsification of a theory is 
unproductive for clinical treatment. This is particularly well documented in Vaskinn et 
al.’s (2011) clinical case study with a working hypothesis on the treatment of a 
schizophrenic patient:  
 
Table 17. CASE EXAMPLE: A working hypothesis case on the treatment of a 
schizophrenic patient (Vaskinn et al., 2011) 
(1)  Theoretical anomaly/falsification stage. The case describes a patient called 
Martin who has been diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia and antisocial 
personality disorder. Although literature on schizophrenia and violence is 
inconclusive, previous diagnostic assessment suggested that Martin’s violent 
outbursts are caused by his paranoid schizophrenia. However, the case authors 
soon found out that Martin’s violent behaviour (assaults on staff members and 
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material damage to the ward) occurred only in the institutional (hospital) 
setting. As a result, a thorough diagnostic re–examination has been conducted. 
The antisocial personality diagnosis has been ruled out, and the originally 
postulated causal link between Martin’s schizophrenia and antisocial 
behaviour has been rejected. 
 
(2)  Development of an alternative hypothesis. An alternative hypothesis was 
necessary in order to (1) address Martin’s problematic behaviour in the 
hospital and to (2) provide an appropriate form of treatment. Upon further 
observation, the authors found that Martin suffered from an impaired self–
view: he lacked self–confidence and was ridden with doubts about his future 
outside of the hospital. It was particularly at times of rejection, criticism, and 
failure that Martin would display violent and aggressive behaviour toward the 
hospital staff members. As such, the authors proposed that Martin’s poor self–
view contributed to his feelings of inadequacy and caused his violent 
behaviour. 
 
(3)  Testing the hypothesis. The authors suggested that, if Martin’s violence was 
caused by his impaired view of self, then the new treatment must increase 
Martin’s sense of agency. Sense of agency was defined as a personal perception 
of competency and freedom that enables the individual to make sense of the 
world and act congruently in response to various situations. The new 
treatment should therefore seek to increase Martin’s sense of ownership to his 
own behaviour as well as his physical mode of communication (violence). 
 
Narrative therapy was chosen as an appropriate form of treatment to test the 
new hypothesis: since patients with psychiatric diagnoses often have negative 
views about themselves and the prospects of their recovery, narrative therapy 
could be used to change the patient’s personal narrative into one that is more 




At the beginning of treatment, Martin’s sense of self was described as 
“entangled with delusions and hallucinations [...] he was convinced that his 
voices were real and that he could escape them” (p. 253). As such, Martin had 
little awareness of who he was outside psychotic states. Narrative therapy was 
therefore used to separate Martin’s sense of self ‘outside’ and ‘inside’ psychosis. 
Externalising language was used to conceptualise psychosis as a problem from 
a distance. The therapist consciously employed questions and phrases that 
stressed the division between Martin as a person and his experiences of 
psychosis as an illness. This narrative approach soon proved to be productive: 
Martin began to separate himself from his symptoms, which were now seen as 
external problems that could be observed and thought about from a distance. 
In addition, Martin no longer saw himself as a “schizophrenic”; instead, he 
referred to himself as a “person suffering from schizophrenia”. 
 
These developments proved to be crucial in deconstructing and reframing 
Martin’s violent reactions. Martin was now able to talk about his anxiety 
regarding life outside the hospital without resorting to violence. Since Martin’s 
treatment focused on strengthening his sense of agency, the therapist gradually 
gave Martin more responsibility and control over the treatment process. For 
example, Martin actively participated in the development of therapeutic 
strategies (e.g., initiating conversations with designated staff members, 
choosing time–outs in the open seclusion area, describing experiences of 
psychosis, etc.).   
 
(4)  Implications for other cases. At the beginning of the case, the authors argue 
that, should narrative treatment prove to be useful, this case could have 
important implications for psychotherapy of schizophrenic patients since “the 
psychotherapy of schizophrenia has not fared well, as little scientific evidence 
of its efficacy could be provided, especially for psychoanalytically oriented 




Given Martin’s improvements, the case authors conclude that treatment 
deadlocks with schizophrenic patients may be overcome by switching from a 
biomedical approach to a psychotherapeutic narrative treatment (i.e., the 
strengthening of patients’ sense of agency). They stress that the case findings 
are particularly relevant for the treatment of schizophrenic patients 
demonstrating aggressive and violent behaviours in hospital wards. 
 
(5)  Assessing the findings. Whilst literature on psychotherapy with 
schizophrenic patients is scarce and pessimistic, Martin was able to actively 
participate in his treatment plan and become more independent. This 
ultimately led to Martin’s discharge. The case provides a detailed report of 
Martin’s progress during the treatment and follow–up: he learned to take 
responsibilities for emerging problems, participated in the development of his 
treatment plan, and gained confidence in his future outside of the hospital. This 
fulfils the testing of a candidate theory part of the case: since Martin’s 
antipsychotic medication did not affect his self–view or decrease his violent 
outbursts, the authors could assume that his treatment gains (increased sense 
of agency) were the results of narrative therapy.  
 
 
 3.4.4 Recommendations for future research 
 
As Mahrer (1988) points out, the quality of evidence in a working hypothesis case study 
is not based on the magnitude of the discovery (which is more relevant to ‘representative’ 
cases in analytic generalisation). This is because discoveries in working hypothesis cases 
will usually revolve around psychotherapy conditions and operations rather than core 
theoretical principles. Even though Vaskinn et al.’s (2011) narrative treatment approach 
proved to be successful in Martin’s case, it would take multiple cases with different 
patients in order to generalise the implications of this therapeutic intervention. As such, 
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working hypothesis case authors should not “rush toward general laws, truths, and 
principles” (Mahrer, 1988, p. 699) as in analytic generalisation.  
 Whilst Edelson’s (1985, 1986) guidelines also stress the particularisation of the 
case narrative rather than its generalisation, there is still an implication that researchers 
should consider the extent to which the hypothesis from a single case can be generalised 
to similar cases (rule 8 in table 16). However, this can be a difficult task, especially for 
clinical case studies that involve highly particular conditions and operations. Future 
research should seek to address this epistemological gap, which would also provide a 
clearer differentiation between a ‘representative’ case and a working hypothesis case 
study.  
 
3.5 The use of multiple epistemological concepts in systematic case studies 
 
Thus far this paper has focused on describing how each of the three epistemological 
concepts contributes to knowledge generation in single case studies. However, case 
studies often employ (implicitly or explicitly) multiple forms of epistemological 
reasoning to arrive at their findings.  
 Systematic case studies are ideal for utilising multiple epistemological 
frameworks: they gather both qualitative and quantitative data to formalise assessments; 
they rely on existing clinical, theoretical and research bodies to provide coherent 
descriptions of the studied object; and finally, they go beyond therapist interpretations 
and clinical hypotheses by outlining treatment processes and subsequent “course 
corrections” (Dattillo & Edwards, 2010). These components distinguish the systematic 
case study as a mixed method approach that is invested in combining two central 
components of psychotherapy research: 1) providing detailed qualitative descriptions of 
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the treatment process and patients’ subjective experiences, and 2) making more general 
theoretical inferences that are relevant to the broader field of psychotherapy practice and 
research (Vertue & Haig, 2008; Fishman, 1999, 2013; Iwakabe & Gazzola, 2009). 
 This means that systematic case study authors are also more likely to provide 
detailed descriptions of their reasoning processes (although not necessarily in the sense 
of acknowledging concrete epistemological concepts or frameworks). This is usually 
done via clinical reasoning (decision–making and problem–solving processes) and case 
formulation (identifying mechanisms, processes and symptoms that are causal to 
patients’ behaviours and conditions in order to formulate a guided treatment decision) 
aspects of the study (Vertue & Haig, 2008). In this way, a single systematic case study can 
produce a number of knowledge claims, pertinent to several different strands of 
psychotherapy research.  
 But the problem of not being explicit enough in justifying one’s epistemological 
reasoning, which I already addressed in earlier sections, continues to remain. The 
epistemological issues in clinical case studies generally involve not going far enough in: 
choosing between rival or competing causal accounts (retroductive reasoning); explicitly 
defining generalisable aspects that make single case studies “representative” (analytic 
generalisation); and comparing candidate theories to rival hypotheses and counter–
examples (working hypothesis). Although these very same issues are also relevant to 
systematic case studies, the multiplicity of different data sources in the systematic case 
study method poses yet another overarching problem: not distinguishing between the 
different forms of epistemological frameworks sufficiently enough (or at all).  
 For example, a systematic case study may provide a very detailed case 
formulation, thus contributing to well–informed treatment processes and a positive 
therapeutic outcome (Vertue & Haig, 2008). However, if all the different epistemological 
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frameworks remain largely implicit or unacknowledged in the case narrative, the findings 
will not be easily transferrable to other cases. As such, epistemically complex systematic 
case studies should be pragmatically clear on the different standards and aims with which 
they are producing their knowledge claims (Fishman & Messer, 2013):  
 
To understand and cope with the world, we take on different conceptual perspectives 
as we might put on different pairs of glasses, with each providing a different 
perspective. [...] Pragmatic truth lies in the usefulness of the perspective in helping us to 
solve particular problems and achieve particular goals in today’s world (p. 159). 
 
In order to demonstrate how multiple epistemological concepts can be utilised in 
systematic case studies, I will discuss Durland’s (in press) series of case studies on 
telephone–based Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) for depression in Parkinson’s 
Disease (dPD). The study involves four case studies and features all three epistemological 
concepts discussed in this paper. For this paper’s purposes, I will focus on two of the four 
cases – “Alice” (a responsive case with a positive outcome) and “Ethan” (a non–
responsive case with a negative outcome).  
 It is important to note that I am interested in the reasoning processes used by 
Durland in his capacity as researcher. Although this overlaps with his role as a clinician, 
the below discussion focuses on how he produces knowledge claims that are pertinent to 
psychotherapy research more broadly (i.e., how he moves from a single case to guidelines 




Table 18. CASE EXAMPLE: Two systematic case studies on telephone–based Cognitive 
Behavioural Therapy (TH–CBT) for depression in Parkinson’s Disease (dPD) utilising 
multiple epistemological concepts (Durland, in press) 
(1)  Case description 1: “Alice”. Alice is a 70–year old married, domiciled, and 
retired Caucasian woman living in Central New Jersey. She has been diagnosed 
with Parkinson’s Disease (PD) 9 years prior to intake. Her husband and caretaker, 
69–year old Bob, reported a close relationship with Alice, with no significant 
marital discord. For most of her life, Alice felt happy and energetic, with a full 
social calendar. Ever since her PD diagnosis, however, she became less 
comfortable and interested in socialising with people. A year and a half prior to 
intake, Alice reported feelings of sadness, sensitivity, setbacks, and 
disappointment.  She did not engage with social activities or other people aside 
her husband, and there were several periods lasting weeks where Alice barely left 
the house. Alice’s depressive symptoms include depressed mood, anhedonia, 
insomnia, difficulties in concentration, poor appetite and weight loss. Before her 
PD diagnosis, Alice did not have any psychiatric illness; however, she regularly 
experienced panic attacks. 
 
(2)  Implicit epistemological reasoning processes. 
(2.1) Retroductive reasoning. Durland conceptualised Alice’s depression as 
being caused by the stress and functional impairment associated with Parkinson’s 
symptoms. In turn, this contributed to Alice’s disengagement with rewarding 
social activities, such as exercise, socialising, and church involvement: “I saw 
Alice’s depression as maintained by a self–reinforcing cycle of negative 
interpretation of her experiences and further withdrawal from rewarding 
activities” (p. 19). Drawing on Alice’s qualitative expressions in the treatment, 
Durland was able to identify the negative thoughts and beliefs that reinforced 
Alice’s depressive symptoms, for example: “It will be embarrassing for my friends 
to see me in the state I am in”; “I can’t handle the challenges of being involved at 
church like I used to”; and the core belief “I am fundamentally flawed” (p. 19).  
 
The latter thought is a crucial part of case formulation and retroductive reasoning. 
From a CBT perspective, thinking errors and cognitive biases are causally 
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responsible for disruptions in emotional regulation: “These thoughts contributed 
to Alice’s depressive symptoms by lowering her sense of self–efficacy and 
reducing her engagement in activities that might have improved her mood” (p. 
19). However, it is not clear how Durland came to identify Alice’s core belief. This 
can be clarified by drawing on the patient’s particular actions or thoughts. It is also 
important to clarify whether such core beliefs emerged spontaneously or during 
a self–report questionnaire.  
 
In addition, Alice’s husband, Bob, inadvertently reinforced Alice’s worries about 
social activities by compensating for Alice’s lack of activity (e.g., by speaking for 
Alice in social settings) and rewarding her for behavioural avoidance (e.g., by 
justifying her anxiety at the prospect of interaction).  
 
Durland’s qualitative case formulation enabled him to perform a retroductive 
analysis of Alice’s condition (dPD). As per the process of retroductive reasoning in 
a case study (see table 7), Durland outlined two possible causal mechanisms and 
their interactions in Alice’s dPD condition: 1) the physical and psychological 
impact of Parkinson’s symptoms, which led Alice to a self–reinforcing cycle of 
negative self–perception, and 2) further reinforcement from her husband and 
caregiver, Bob, who rewarded Alice for behavioural avoidance. As such, there are 
both physical (PD symptoms) as well as social (Alice’s self–perception and her 
husband’s behaviour) causal mechanisms at work. 
 
This retroductive analysis allowed Durland to make the following clinical 
decisions: encourage Alice’s engagement in meaningful social activities and 
increase Alice’s autonomy in social situations (with and without her husband 
Bob). Both activities were developed to target the underlying causal belief behind 
Alice’s dPD: “I am fundamentally flawed” (p. 19). 
 
(2.2) Working hypothesis. At the beginning of treatment (Module 2), Durland 
began to compare Alice’s expected enjoyment of social activities and her actual 
feelings: “[Alice] had a lunch date with friends, and had been surprised at how 
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much she enjoyed their company, and that while she experienced some 
[difficulties] with sufficient volume and following conversation, these issues had 
been much less significant than she had expected” (p. 21). On this occasion, Alice 
rated her Expected Pleasure as a 30 and her Actual Enjoyment as a 70. Herein, 
Durland considered the importance of “Acting In Accordance With Goals And Not 
Feelings”. This is one of the concepts for TH–CBT, which suggests that depressive 
symptoms often prevent individuals from engaging in various activities, and that 
this barrier may be overcome by just “getting started” (rather than immediately 
and fully participating in activities).  
 
Based on the discrepancy between Alice’s anticipated and actually experienced 
feelings, Durland formulated a working hypothesis that Alice would strongly 
benefit from engaging in various social activities even if she does not “feel like” it. 
From this point on, Durland and Alice framed “Acting In Accordance With Goals 
And Not Feelings” as a form of ‘experiment’: will Alice’s expectations match up 
with her actual mood during social activities? 
 
As per Edelson’s criteria of epistemologically sound and rigorous working 
hypotheses (see table 16), we can also observe that Durland sought to assess 
whether his hypothesis about the discrepancy between Alice’s expected and 
actual enjoyment was impacted by their (Durland, Alice, and Bob’s) 
interpretations of Alice’s feelings. To help with this, Durland revisited the 
cognitive model with Alice and Bob to discuss how thoughts and interpretations 
guide feelings: “Alice and Bob seemed to get caught up in the details of the 
examples and assessing whether they matched Alice’s literal experience” (p. 23). 
In an attempt to demonstrate a more relatable example, Durland provided a 
hypothetical comparison between Alice’s actual mood prior to a lunch date with 
friends, and what Alice’s mood would have been if she knew that she was going to 
enjoy her lunch with her friends as much as she eventually did. The hypothetical 
example provided a firmer ground for Alice and Bob’s further assessments of 
Alice’s Expected Pleasure and Actual Enjoyment. This is an illustration of how a 




In Module 3, both Alice and Bob “expressed a growing confidence in Alice’s 
autonomy” (p. 23) as a result of her active participation in social activities. This 
outcome supports Durland’s working hypothesis: since there have been no other 
changes in Alice’s lifestyle, we can assume that the “Acting In Accordance With 
Goals And Not Feelings” treatment component has been effective in producing a 
positive change in Alice’s self–perception. 
 
(2.3) Analytic generalisation. Durland continued to emphasise that Alice’s 
worldview was “the most amenable [out of all cases] to that of the TH–CBT 
program” (p. 139). As a result, Durland was able to explicate three important 
generalisable attributes from Alice’s case study:  
 
o Alice’s concrete cognitive style fits well with the clarity and structure of the 
CBT therapeutic approach; 
o Alice has fully accepted her PD diagnosis, and was therefore oriented 
toward active coping throughout the treatment; 
o Alice had a supportive caregiver who helped her with the treatment 
progress and allowed her to become more autonomous. 
 
Alice’s cognitive functioning was rated as relatively poor, particularly in abstract 
thinking and memory. She struggled to remember information from previous 
sessions and was often not able to generalise from specific examples to underlying 
concepts (e.g., when discussing cognitive distortions).  
 
The fact that Alice’s mood improved after she began engaging in social activities 
autonomously (as per Durland’s working hypothesis on the benefit of “Acting In 
Accordance With Goals And Not Feelings”) shows that the treatment was 
successful in restructuring Alice’s negative beliefs in spite of her cognitive issues. 
The three preconditions listed above enabled Alice to perform her homework, and 
engage with all the different treatment components. This ultimately led to a 




In the paper, Durland compared the case of Alice to three other cases, in which 
patients underwent the same form of treatment (TH–CBT program) for the same 
condition (dPD). This comparison is crucial for the process of analytic 
generalisation (see table 10 on p. 28): the case similarity ensures that there are 
many common attributes, which can be then further generalised to the broader 
population of patients with dPD. Alice’s case implies that Telephone–Based, 
Clinician–Guided Self–Help Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (TH–CBT) can have a 
very positive outcome for those patients who have limited cognitive functioning, 
have accepted their PD diagnosis, and continue to receive psychological support 
from caregivers or family members. 
 
(3) Case description 2: “Ethan”. Ethan is a 73–year old, married, domiciled, and 
retired Chinese–American man living in New York. He has been diagnosed with 
Parkinson’s Disease 6 years prior to intake. Ethan’s wife and caregiver, 73 year–
old Fay, reported no significant marital discord. Ethan reported first noticing 
depressive symptoms in 2007. After a six–month remission, the symptoms 
returned in 2008 and have been present ever since. Ethan stated being active, 
upbeat and physically active for most of his life. However, Ethan’s PD diagnosis 
and deteriorating eyesight began to limit his physical, cognitive and emotional 
capacities. Ethan’s symptoms include depressive mood, disturbed sleeping 
patterns, poor concentration, increased appetite, helplessness and hopelessness. 
Like Alice, Ethan reported feeling distressed by his PD diagnosis, especially when 
he spent time with friends and relatives who knew him “from before”. 
 
(4)  Implicit epistemological reasoning processes. 
(4.1) Retroductive reasoning. Unlike Alice, Ethan reported a history of 
significant psychological difficulties. As such, Durland’s case formulation begins 
with a retroductive assessment of these issues: in 2008, Ethan stated that he felt 
“sad” about 25% of the time, experienced disturbed sleeping patterns, increased 
appetite, poor concentration, and hopelessness. Ethan associated most of these 
symptoms with the physical (functional) impairment of his PD. Ethan was 
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distressed by his PD symptoms, and found them particularly difficult when he 
spent time with “friends and others who knew him “before PD” (p. 75). In addition 
to a PD diagnosis, Ethan was also diagnosed with Major Depression (Moderate, 
Recurrent), and was taking 75mg Zoloft daily. 
 
Durland conceptualised Ethan’s dPD as being caused by “significant functional 
impairment resulting from PD and other medical conditions (e.g., a cataract, 
putative celiac disease, lingering musculoskeletal injuries” (p. 76). This led to a 
disengagement with such rewarding activities as tennis, socialising, and singing. 
It also contributed to negative predictions of what engagement with these 
activities would feel like. Ethan’s qualitative expressions were particularly 
important in identifying the causal beliefs behind his dPD. They conveyed similar 
negative beliefs to Alice’s, but also involved severe feelings of guilt about the 
impact of Ethan’s functional impairment on others: “I am useless”; “If I go to the 
exercise class, it will be unsafe”; “I cannot navigate the world anymore”, and the core 
belief, “I am worthless”. As in Alice’s case, it is unclear whether Durland generated 
this belief on the basis of Ethan’s other responses or whether this belief emerged 
during the treatment/self–report questionnaires. 
 
Durland also noted that Ethan’s wife and caregiver, Fay, was actively contributing 
to Ethan’s poor self–view by “overemphasizing his deficits relative to his 
strengths, frequently communicating her frustration with his functional 
impairment, and positively reinforcing Ethan’s inactivity by taking charge of many 
activities Ethan was capable of performing” (p. 76–77). Durland outlined two 
possible causal mechanisms and their interactions in Ethan’s dPD condition: 1) 
the physical and psychological impact of Parkinson’s symptoms and other medical 
conditions, which led Ethan to a self–reinforcing cycle of negative self–perception 
and guilt, and 2) lack of support from Ethan’s wife and caregiver, Fay, who 
reinforced Ethan’s poor sense of self–efficacy and overemphasised his deficits. In 
comparison to the case of Alice, Ethan’s case proved to be more complex both in 




(4.2) Working hypothesis. Durland proposed that Ethan increases his 
engagement in social activities in a more careful and selective manner: “I [...] 
proposed that we look for new activities that were feasible for Ethan, and posited 
that involvement in meaningful activities, regardless of details, was likely to 
improve his mood” (p. 77). Ethan seemed to appreciate this, and offered examples 
of activities that helped him “forget about” physical pain and low mood.  
 
Like Alice, Ethan also reported several instances in which he had “not felt like 
participating” in […] activities beforehand, but found them highly rewarding once 
he was engaged” (p. 77–78). As such, Durland was able to utilise his earlier 
hypothesis involving the “Acting In Accordance With Goals and Not Feelings” 
concept, with which he proposed that “one of the most important means of 
overcoming depression involved pushing through [negative] feelings by engaging 
in the activity in spite of them” (p. 78). However, both Ethan and Fay had concerns 
about this: Ethan worried about physically hurting himself and being a burden to 
others, whilst Fay was concerned about Ethan missing out on beneficial activities 
due to fatigue. 
 
It is clear that Durland’s earlier working hypothesis, which worked well with Alice, 
had to be adjusted to account for all the different complex issues involved in 
Ethan’s dPD. This included exploring Ethan’s past and present pleasurable 
activities, and assessing how they can be incorporated into the treatment now. In 
the end, the working hypothesis in Ethan’s case involved a moderate engagement 
in meaningful (emotionally comforting and not overly physical) activities. Durland 
postulated that this would have a positive effect on Ethan’s negative self–view, 
particularly his underlying causal belief “I am worthless”.   
 
At the same time, Durland acknowledged that, unlike Alice, Ethan has not come to 
terms with his PD diagnosis, and struggled to adapt to a life with multiple medical 
conditions. Moreover, Ethan’s wife, Fay, contributed to Ethan’s self–reinforcing 
cycle of negative self–perception. For example, she considered Ethan’s computer 
work to be “mindless and unhealthy” (p. 79), whereas Ethan felt that doing certain 
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computer tasks (e.g., monitoring finances or fixing bugs) made him feel useful. 
These two factors posed barriers to Ethan’s treatment process and Durland’s 
working hypothesis.  
 
Indeed, throughout the subsequent sessions, there was little improvement to 
Ethan’s self–perceptions or engagement in social activities. In Module 4, Ethan 
struggled to understand how a negative thought can be changed based on 
evidence. He did not believe that he was useful on the basis of his contributions to 
the household (e.g., keeping track of bills and solving computer and phone 
problems), even after Fay communicated this. Durland noted that Ethan evaluated 
his productivity negatively, “in comparison to a younger, PD–free version of 
himself” (p. 85). By Module 10, it was evident that Ethan and Fay struggled to work 
together, and that some of the treatment techniques created further conflict 
between them. Durland conducted two Booster sessions with Ethen and Fay to 
discuss these issues and to work on a plan to resolve similar conflicts in the future. 
 
(4.3) Analytic generalisation. Just like in the case of Alice, there are several 
aspects that can be generalised from Ethan’s case: 
 
o Ethan’s concrete cognitive style posed difficulties in adapting to the TH–
CBT program. 
o Ethan has not fully accepted his PD diagnosis, and he therefore 
continuously focused on his “pre–PD self”. 
o Although Ethan’s caregiver often helped him in understanding and 
engaging with different treatment processes, their different approaches to 
certain therapeutic techniques also proved to be a cause for conflict. 
 
Ethan’s PD symptoms involved deficits in executive functioning, working memory 
and reinforcement learning, which were particularly challenging for achieving the 
aims set out in the TH–CBT program. Furthermore, Ethan struggled to internalise 
and identify cognitive distortions. This meant that Ethan was unable to assess his 
negative thoughts against salient pieces of evidence (e.g., Ethan being useful to the 
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household). As such, the underlying causal mechanisms – the impact of Ethan’s PD 
condition and the core belief “I am fundamentally flawed” – have remained largely 
unchallenged.  
 
As could be seen from the earlier retroductive analysis, Durland identified another 
causal mechanism in Ethan’s dPD: the interpersonal exchanges between Ethan 
and his wife and caregiver Fay. Since Ethan’s cognitive deficits had such a 
significant impact on his engagement with the treatment, Fay’s involvement in the 
treatment was highly important. However, this also inadvertently contributed to 
a decrease in Ethan’s autonomy. Moreover, since Fay expressed critical views 
about Ethan’s activities, Durland “felt more hesitant to risk alienating her by 
addressing her critical attitude toward Ethan” (p. 107). These significant and 
pervasive interpersonal issues created yet another barrier to the treatment 
process.  
 
It is important to note, however, that Ethan was able to put the needs of the group 
(his family and friends) ahead of his own individual feelings toward the end of the 
treatment: “Ethan seemed surprised at how much his low mood had impacted his 
family members, and was able to recognize this impact as a significant “cost” of his 
negative thoughts” (p. 113). 
 
From an analytic generalisation standpoint, any representative case – whether it 
is responsive or non–responsive, positive or negative – can be used to generate 
knowledge about a theory that pertains to a population. Ethan’s case provides 
important implications for the potential barriers faced by PD patients in TH–CBT 
program. Furthermore, since Ethan’s case deviated from the three most important 
attributes identified in Alice’s case (concrete cognitive style, acceptance of PD 
diagnosis and supportive caregiver), it also provides support  for Durland’s 
original analytic generalisation about the compatibility between PD patients like 
Alice and the therapeutic techniques used in TH–CBT program. This is known as 
theoretical replication: the case produced contrasting results (negative 
outcome/no response to the working hypothesis) for predictable reasons (Ethan’s 
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incompatible cognitive style, lack of acceptance of PD diagnosis, and interpersonal 
issues with his wife/caregiver). 
 
 
3.6 Concluding comments 
 
There have been two predominant views on case studies in the fields of psychoanalysis 
and psychotherapy. The first view deems case studies as an insufficient methodology for 
producing clinical evidence or theoretical developments; this puts them in need of 
corroboration from statistical and/or experimental research. The second, and more 
popular view amongst psychoanalytic clinicians, is that case studies convey subjective 
interpretations that cannot be rigorously assessed by any scientific canons. This paper 
does not position itself with either of these views. Instead, I have argued that case studies 
are a viable methodology in itself, capable of producing different kinds of knowledge, and 
that it can – and should – respond to the relevant epistemological rules and canons of 
evidence.  
Drawing from different social science resources, this paper described three 
epistemological concepts appropriate for case study research: retroductive reasoning, 
analytic generalisation and working hypothesis. It is important to note that, although one 
case can utilise multiple epistemological frameworks, the three epistemological concepts 
described in this paper seek to generate different kinds of knowledge. It is therefore 
crucial that case study researchers know how to choose the relevant epistemological 
concept for their work, and how to combine different kinds of epistemological 
frameworks. 
Retroductive reasoning is suitable for research endeavours that seek to trace 
causal powers and mechanisms in complex social phenomena, such as those in clinical 
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practice. Analytic generalisation can be used to generalise from observations in single 
case studies to theory. Working hypothesis case studies are particularly useful for 
assessing and revising existing theoretical propositions by testing them in practice with 
specific patients. Clear differentiation between these epistemological concepts will allow 
case study researchers to utilise them more effectively, and, as Easton (2010) argued, to 
use epistemological frameworks explicitly rather than implicitly (or not at all). 
 It is also necessary to acknowledge some of the drawbacks and persisting 
challenges across all three epistemological concepts. Unlike analytic generalisation and 
working hypothesis, retroductive reasoning is a far more ambitious epistemological 
concept since it is embedded within the philosophy of CR and its ontological 
preconceptions about the world. Moreover, the process of retroduction places a high 
value on the production of causal knowledge, which is less relevant for the other two 
epistemological concepts. Causally significant findings are, of course, highly desirable for 
case study research in psychotherapy and psychoanalysis, especially because patients’ 
experiences often involve a number of complex causal powers that cannot be adequately 
captured by statistical analyses.  
However, much of the literature on retroduction remains to be on metaphysical 
grounds; it tells us what we can know about reality, but not how we can apply realist 
claims in an empirical way. This problem is partly caused by ambiguous and/or 
conflicting accounts of CR. For instance, Acher et al. (2016) defined CR “not as an 
empirical program [...] not even truly a theory [...] rather, a reflexive philosophical stance 
concerned with providing a philosophically informed account of science”. But as White 
(1997) argued, producing informed and realistic knowledge is much more than just being 
sceptical. After all, the central premise of both Bhaskar’s and Sayer’s definitions of 
retroduction is the production of causal expectations (and Sayer is clear that this can be 
127 
 
done empirically). Archer et al.’s definition seems to undermine this. It is therefore 
important to explicate clear definitions of retroductive reasoning and its relation to case 
study methodology. 
Since the concepts of analytic generalisation and working hypothesis are not 
embedded in complex epistemological frameworks (i.e., they do not contain a philosophy 
about the world and knowledge), they have been used implicitly in psychoanalytic and 
psychotherapy case studies. The examples provided in this paper – Heimann’s (1950) 
work on countertransference and Vaskinn et al.’s (2011) case on narrative therapy – are 
cases that fall under these epistemological concepts implicitly, but do not make any 
explicit epistemological claims. This in itself is problematic because it means that case 
study researchers who are producing generalisations or hypotheses are less likely to 
address concrete epistemological guidelines or canons of evidence. In order to attend to 
these issues, I sought to make the case–to–theory logic developed by Yin (2013) and 
Kennedy (1979) relevant to the current generalisation issues in psychotherapy research. 
Similarly, I developed Cronbach’s (1975) definition of the working hypothesis case study 
in relation to theory testing issues in psychoanalysis and psychotherapy. The more 
explicitly case studies follow the latter epistemological guidelines, the better equipped 
we will be to assess what is a ‘good’ working hypothesis or analytic generalisation in the 
field.  
Finally, this paper sought to demonstrate how the use of multiple epistemological 
concepts allows for rigorous case study research. Systematic case studies are 
methodologically suitable for this task because they utilise different forms of data and 
produce a number of knowledge claims, pertinent to several different strands of 
psychotherapy research. By discussing Durland’s (in press) systematic case studies on 
telephone–based Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (TH–CBT) for depression in Parkinson’s 
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Disease (dPD), I demonstrated how the three epistemological concepts can be used 
together in case narratives.  
The writing of case studies is a creative exercise, and there are no general ‘norms’ 
when it comes to conveying clinical material. However, as case study researchers, we 
have a responsibility to clarify how we arrived at our knowledge claims, and why these 
claims are important to our field. The impetus of this paper is to make this process easier 
by providing epistemological guidelines and canons of evidence that can improve the 





Chapter 4: Scientific thinking styles: The different ways of thinking 
in psychoanalytic case studies 
 
Abstract 
Historian and philosopher John Forrester argues that psychoanalysis is characterized by 
a style of scientific thinking and reasoning that he coins “thinking in cases”. Since Freud, 
case studies have been used as a medium for sharing, demonstrating, discovering, 
expanding, consolidating and “thinking” psychoanalytic knowledge. In this paper, we 
seek to clarify and enrich Forrester’s idea of thinking in cases. We first attend to issues 
around the lack of definition for thinking styles, and we propose a more detailed 
description for what might constitute a scientific thinking style. Second, we outline how 
thinking in cases differs from other kinds of thinking styles. In doing so, we argue that 
some of the criticisms directed at case studies are the result of a confusion between 
statistical and experimental thinking styles and thinking in cases. Finally, we propose that 
there is more than one way of thinking in cases. We distinguish between cases as 
exemplars for analytic generalization, cases as exemplars for analogical learning, and 
cases in the service of empirical generalization. By making these implicit thinking styles 
explicit, we seek to demonstrate the importance of case studies at all levels of 
psychoanalysis: clinical, research, training and teaching. 
 






In this paper, we will argue and elaborate Cambridge historian and philosopher John 
Forrester’s idea that thinking in cases is a unique style of thinking and doing science, with 
particular relevance to psychoanalysis. When Freud turned from neurology to 
psychoanalysis, it was not just a shift in theoretical model, but also a departure from one 
scientific thinking style to another. Using classic cases by Freud, Stoller and Winnicott, 
Forrester (1996, 2017) developed the idea that case studies are the medium (or one 
might say container) par excellence for sharing, demonstrating, discovering, expanding, 
consolidating and “thinking” psychoanalytic knowledge. After all, psychoanalysis is both 
“(1) a particular method of treating nervous disorders and (2) the science of unconscious 
mental processes” (Freud, 1926, p. 264), and the case study is the format that straddles 
both sides. Borrowing Thomas Kuhn’s (1962) concept of the exemplar, Forrester (2017) 
was able to outline how case studies lead to practical knowledge and collective scientific 
labour: 
 
One learns how to do science not by learning the rules of principles or concepts 
and then applying them to concrete situations; rather, one learns how to do 
science by learning how to work with exemplars: extending them, reproducing 
them, turning a novel situation into a version of a well–understood exemplar (p. 
7–8). 
 
The aim of this paper is to clarify and enrich Forrester’s “positive epistemology” for 
psychoanalysis (Mayer, 2017) based on the idea of thinking in cases as a scientific 
thinking style. A scientific thinking style is not a philosophically defined ways of 
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reasoning such as induction or deduction, but a philosophically informed account of what 
scientists actually do. It entails not only cognitive operations relating to methodology and 
argumentation, but also practices of generating, sharing, relocating, assimilating, 
transforming and empathizing with knowledge. Although we rely on the philosophical 
work by Ian Hacking and Alistair Crombie to outline the development of the concepts of 
scientific thinking and doing, we also seek to examine some of the criticisms posed to the 
definition of scientific thinking style. 
 After addressing the concept of scientific thinking style, we seek to draw these 
philosophical ideas closer to thinking in cases in the field of psychoanalysis. Ever since 
the inception of psychoanalysis, psychoanalytic case studies have been criticized for a 
variety of reasons: lack of generalizability, replicability issues and subjective bias, to 
name a few. We argue that some of these concerns can be productively explored by 
explicating the process of thinking and doing science in psychoanalytic case studies. We 
outline how thinking in cases differs from other kinds of thinking styles, such as statistical 
and experimental thinking styles. Attending to these differences is crucial as it allows to 
differentiate not only how (process) but also what (end–goal) knowledge each thinking 
style seeks to produce. 
 Furthermore, we propose that there is more than one way of thinking in cases: 
beyond exemplars for analytic generalization, one can also think in cases as exemplars 
for analogical learning, and cases as part of a population for empirical generalization. 
Identifying the various modes of thinking in cases in psychoanalysis allows for a closer 
inspection of different processes and scientific canons “in action” in classic and 
contemporary psychoanalytic cases. Given the fact that thinking in cases as a scientific 
thinking style is not unique to psychoanalysis, psychoanalysis can learn from 
epistemological and methodological advances in other case–oriented disciplines. For this 
132 
 
reason, our paper draws on the recent work done in the social sciences in relation to the 
case study method. Hammersley and Gomm (2000) write in the introduction to their 
important book Case Study Method that case studies had been eclipsed as a method of 
social research in the 1980s. Since then, recognition of the case method has been 
increasing, and Yin (2014) provides data to substantiate this claim. Interestingly, a 
similar trend has been noted in psychoanalysis, with increasing numbers of case studies 
being published in scientific journals (Desmet et al., 2013) in many schools of 
psychoanalysis (Willemsen et al., 2015). An international team of researchers have 
brought together these increasing numbers of published case studies in a searchable 
online archive (https://www.singlecasearchive.com). The invigorating work done by the 
European Psychoanalytic Federation Working Party on Comparative Clinical Methods 
(Tuckett, 2008) and the International Psychoanalytical Association (IPA) Project 
Committee on Clinical Observation and Testing (Bernardi, 2014) confirms the continued 
interest in developing the case study method. These developments show that the case 
study is still a relevant epistemic genre, not only in psychoanalysis, but also in social 
sciences. By clarifying thinking in cases as a scientific thinking style, we hope to push 
forward our understanding of the value of the psychoanalytic case and to make a 
contribution to psychoanalysis as a science in clinical, teaching and research contexts. 
 
4.2 What is a scientific thinking style? 
 
Philosopher Ian Hacking (1992, 2012) has argued that there is not one universal science 
that brings together the social, human and natural sciences. Instead, he has proposed that 
there is a plurality of sciences that use different styles of thinking, doing, talking, arguing 
and showing what each science settles to be objective truths. As such, styles of scientific 
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thinking and doing are practical and active modes of investigating and “finding out”. Each 
thinking style conveys how (not just what) researchers find out about their studied 
phenomena. In other words, thinking styles have a performative quality: they are ways of 
doing science.  
 It is difficult to define what a style of scientific thinking and doing is, because, as 
Buchdahl (1993) has suggested, “the existence of ‘style’ […] is never simply 
representational” (149). According to historian of science Alistair Crombie (1988), 
thinking styles consist in: 
 
The various elements that make up an intellectual style in the study and treatment 
of nature: conceptions of nature and of science, methods of scientific inquiry and 
demonstration diversified according to the subject matter, evaluations of scientific 
goals with consequent motivations, and intellectual and moral commitments and 
expectations generating attitudes to innovation and change (p. 2). 
 
Crombie (1988) identified six thinking styles, and there is no reason to assume that this 
is an exhaustive list: mathematical postulation and proof, experimental observation and 
measurement, analogical or hypothetical modelling, taxonomy and classification of 
natural kinds, statistical analysis of regularities, populations and probabilities, and 
historical–genetic thinking. These thinking styles are not objective in themselves: they 
are not “natural” or “given” ways of acquiring truth. Rather, they were developed by 
humans (and as such, they are grounded in human cognition and cultural history) as a 
means to conduct investigations or answer to certain scientific standards. For example, 
before the mid–seventeenth century, there was no real concept of probability and 
statistics in Europe; nowadays, a statistical thinking style is advocated by Nobel prize–
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winning psychologist Daniel Kahneman (2011) as the most reasonable way to take 
decisions in any field of social life. 
 An important feature of scientific thinking styles resides in the fact that they 
introduce new objects, propositions or explanations about their studied phenomena. 
That is not to say that the studied phenomena do not exist outside the thinking style. 
Rather, thinking styles introduce new, but fundamentally different ways of representing 
the phenomena. Each thinking style allows scientists to speak, think and act in a unique 
way about their object of study. Compare for instance the following meaningful 
propositions made about a depressed patient in three different scientific thinking styles: 
 
1) Within the statistical thinking style, one can say: “Patient X scores above the 
clinical cut–off on the Beck Depression Inventory–II.” This proposition represents 
the depression of the patient as a metric and situates that metric within a 
population (i.e., the sample that was used to statistically infer a cut–off score). 
2) Within taxonomy and classification thinking style, one can say: “Patient X can be 
diagnosed as having a major depression in terms of the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders.” This proposition represents the depression as 
belonging to a class that is defined by a number of diagnostic criteria, and situates 
this class in relation to other classes (e.g. the class of bipolar disorder, the higher 
order class of affective disorders, etc.). 
3) Anticipating the next section in this paper, we would like to add that, within the 
psychoanalytic thinking in cases style, one can say: “Patient X suffers a core 
psychic conflict between love versus anger, hostility and ambivalence towards the 
lost object.” This proposition represents the depression as a psychic conflict that 
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is situated within the patient’s past and current life (e.g. past and current 
experiences of loss, separation, deprivation and grievance). 
 
Each proposition is only meaningful within its style. For instance, proposition 1) relies on 
the application of a specific instrument (questionnaire), according to a specific 
methodology (standardized test situation), on the basis of specific assumptions 
(depression is a unidimensional, quantifiable object of study), by a person with specific 
skills (test administration and test interpretation), in order to show the depression in a 
specific way (line graph, chart, numerical table), with a particular goal (to determine the 
severity of a depression) and a certain persuasiveness (e.g. the statistics behind the 
development of the questionnaire). For someone who operates within the taxonomy and 
classification thinking style, proposition 1) is not meaningful (although they might 
understand the proposition based on previous encounters with the statistical thinking 
style), and it does not help to make a categorical diagnosis of patient X. In that sense, each 
thinking style creates its own objects (in this case, depression as a unidimensional 
construct, as a mental illness or as an expression of a psychic conflict) and is associated 
with very different research practices. This does not mean, however, that the object is 
entirely constructed by the style: the experience of depression remains to be very real, 
but its conceptualization differs in each thinking style. 
 Hacking (1992, 2012) asserts that styles of scientific thinking and doing are self–
authenticating, in a sense that they do not answer to some other, higher or deeper 
standard of truth and reason than their own: 
 
There is no higher standard to which [thinking styles] directly answer […] It is 
our knowledges that are subject to revolution, to mutation, and to several kinds 
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of oblivion; it is the content of what we find out, not how we find out, that is 
refuted (1992, p. 13). 
 
We do not take this to mean that there are no standards of verification, but rather that 
standards of verification are internal to the style in which they are developed. Scientific 
thinking styles provide their own in canons of verification that provide conditions for 
truth: 
 
Each style has become what we think of as a rather timeless canon of objectivity, 
a standard model of what it is to be reasonable about this or that type of subject 
matter […] and to be reasonable in this or that domain (Hacking, 1992, p. 10). 
 
Hacking gives the example of significance testing in the statistical thinking style: 
statistical calculation allows the scientist to estimate a parameter and at the same time 
estimate the probability of this estimate to be correct. This canon of verification through 
significance testing is not a reflection of a higher or deeper “meta–canon” for determining 
the truth; it is an internal standard. 
 Critics have accused Hacking of epistemic relativism for his claim about the self–
authenticating nature of scientific thinking styles, because all epistemic systems (that are 
encompassed by different thinking styles) could be perceived, in some sense, as equally 
valid (Kusch, 2010; Sciortino, 2016). This means that the justifiability of a given 
proposition depends entirely on the respective style of reasoning and its implicit canons 
of verification. The risk here is that, even if different styles might value each other’s 
claims, there will be “epistemic ambivalence” because the two will have their respective 
verification canons upon which different truth claims can be judged. There is also the 
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issue of “epistemic disagreement”: as different thinking styles have their own epistemic 
principles for putting forward relevant propositions (e.g., average income statistics do 
not express a proposition relevant to the experimental thinking style), the same 
proposition can be relevant to one domain of reasoning, but not to the other. Thus, there 
is a broader issue of how we justify and/or compare truth claims put forward by different 
thinking styles, which has not been sufficiently addressed in Hacking’s writings. 
 The debate about epistemic relativism is still ongoing and we do not claim to be 
able to resolve this deep philosophical controversy. We do want to point out, however, 
with Kusch (2010), that Hacking is not referring to the “anything goes” kind of relativism: 
“once a style of reasoning is in place, its epistemic principles determine whether a 
meaningful sentence is justified or unjustified, rational or irrational” (p. 167). Let us take 
the earlier mentioned propositions concerning the depressed patient: 1) “patient X scores 
above the clinical cut–off on the Beck Depression Inventory–II”; 2) “patient X can be 
diagnosed as having a major depression in terms of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders”; and  3) “patient X suffers a core psychic conflict between love versus 
anger, hostility and ambivalence towards the lost object”. The validity of these three 
propositions is not entirely independent as they all relate to the same reality: the 
depression in patient X. But each proposition is only meaningful in its respective thinking 
style. Therefore, it might be perfectly possible that proposition 1) is validated in the 
statistical thinking style, while propositions 2) and 3) are invalidated (or irrelevant) in 
their respective thinking styles. However, it is not possible that patient X simultaneously 
suffers and does not suffer from a core psychic conflict between love versus anger, 
hostility and ambivalence towards the lost object. 
 Although psychoanalysis has been riddled with discussions of its scientific status, 
little attention has been paid to its underlying scientific thinking style. In this paper, we 
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build on Forrester’s (1996, 2017) insight that psychoanalysis, along with several other 
disciplines, is characterized by a thinking style that is based on the concept of the case. 
Case studies have taken up a central place in the development of psychoanalysis, and they 
remain central despite fierce criticisms (Willemsen et al., 2015). Our aim is to describe 
the various ways in which the psychoanalytic thinking style “puts the case to work”. 
Herein, we refer to the case study as a broad epistemic genre – a way of doing science 
(Morgan, 2012). This involves not only thinking in (or with) written case studies, but also 
in cases as teaching examples, cases for supervision, patient cases in clinical practice, etc. 
In this sense, we seek to describe how the case has been used by psychoanalysts, both 
classic and contemporary, in their clinical work, their thinking, speaking, presenting and 
writing about psychoanalysis. 
 
Table 19. KEY CONCEPT: Scientific thinking style 
(1) Employed by natural, social and human scientists during processes of knowledge 
generation; 
(2) Not a ‘natural’ or ‘given’ way of acquiring truth, but developed by humans and 
therefore grounded in human cognition and cultural history; 
(3) A practical and active mode of investigating how (not just what) knowledge is 
arrived at; 
(4) A way to introduce, define and investigate objects of study, propositions, laws, and 
explanations; 
(5) A set of criteria of what is convincing evidence within the discipline (Hacking’s self–
authenticating conditions); 
(6) Displayed in individual thinking processes as well as in discussions, publications, 
presentations, etc., within the discipline; 




4.3 Thinking in cases  
 
Hacking’s thesis about the use of different styles of scientific thinking and doing proved 
to be crucial to John Forrester’s work (Mayer, 2017). Forrester, who spent much of his 
life researching the history and philosophy of psychoanalysis, agreed with Hacking that 
there is a plurality of sciences, methods and thinking styles. Alongside the list of six 
thinking styles, Forrester (1996) proposed a seventh: thinking in cases. This style of 
thinking and doing is not unique to psychoanalysis and can be seen “in action” in other 
disciplines, such as medicine, law, social work, anthropology, management science and 
psychotherapy. Although these disciplines differ in their studied phenomena and 
methods of enquiry, they nevertheless share a scientific interest in thinking about their 
“objects” through cases. For example, every teacher in psychoanalysis knows that it is 
impossible to explain the idea of psychic conflict without referring to a vignette. It is as if 
knowledge in each of these disciplines can never fully emancipate from concrete 
instances. The case–based reasoning in these disciplines can be observed in the following 
ways (Forrester, 2017): 
 
1) They have a different relation to theory, in the sense that the specificity of 
the case is central; 
2) They reason in analogy by creating complex networks of similar and 
dissimilar cases; 
3) Their theories are aimed at problem–solving (action) rather than 




By describing the features of case–based reasoning, Forrester sketches a “positive 
epistemology” for psychoanalysis – positive since Forrester starts from the strengths of 
thinking in cases as a scientific thinking style (Mayer, 2017). Forrester works on the 
assumption that psychoanalysis will benefit more from a thorough investigation of how 
the thinking style operates within case–based disciplines and how it can be improved 
from the inside, rather than to criticize it on the basis of canons of verification that are 
used in other thinking styles. At the same time, however, Forrester acknowledges the 
limitations of the case study as a method for knowledge generation. Before we continue 
the description of thinking in cases, we want to remind the reader of some of the essential 
criticisms raised against psychoanalytic case studies. 
 The first, and arguably most common, criticism is that of subjective bias: 
psychoanalytic case studies are seen as potentially “contaminated” by the 
psychoanalyst’s feelings, values and intersubjective pressures. Such biases may emerge 
from the psychoanalyst’s unresolved transference relationships and/or uncontained 
countertransference dynamics (Hinshelwood, 2013) as well as “excessive” group 
loyalties within the field (e.g., generating normative or unexceptional case studies in 
order to conform to existing psychoanalytic ideas) (Spence, 2001). Psychologist Frank 
Sulloway went as far as to say that Freud’s case histories “blend into the kind of 
psychoanalytically reconstructed history that helped to create the Freud legend.…Case 
histories are by no means compelling empirical demonstrations of the correctness of his 
psychoanalytic views” (1991, p. 521). An even earlier and now classic criticism by the 
philosopher of science Karl Popper (1962) deemed Freud’s psychoanalytic case studies 
unfalsifiable because they are “able to explain practically everything that happened 
within the [field]…Whatever happened always confirmed it” (p. 45). This resulted in 
significant research reservations: how can we use knowledge from unique and highly 
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contextual single cases for other clinical situations? And more importantly, how can we 
verify that the knowledge produced in these cases is not simply “confirming the theory” 
or “creating the Freud legend”? 
 The second criticism raises concerns about the generalization of case study 
findings. Observations from single case studies are often thought to be of limited value to 
the study of broader clinical populations as they “provide no indication as to whether the 
[conclusions apply] to all other, many other, a few other, or no other human beings” (Janis 
in Wallerstein and Sampson, 1971, 41). The issue of generalization has become 
increasingly important for clinical research, thus leading to further questions about the 
value of single case observations. 
 Finally, there is an overarching question of what one can learn from reading 
psychoanalytic case studies: are we learning about the patient and their clinical condition 
or are we tracing the psychoanalyst’s interpretations? In most instances, the case study 
reader is inevitably learning about both. However, there may very well be instances 
where the representation of the case subject – the patient – is impossibly intertwined 
with the case author’s – the psychoanalyst’s – reasoning and thinking processes. This 
point is further elucidated by Walsh (2020): 
 
But if case–study writing entails communicating something of the intimacy of the 
analytic encounter […] then, irrespective of the particular clinical phenomenon it 
broaches, the case–study is a medium that will necessarily fall short of 
representing the case–subject in its entirety (p. 7–8). 
 
This paper does not aim to solve these shortcomings of the case study method. At most, 
we try to introduce some new ideas in the debate about objectivity and generalization in 
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psychoanalytic case studies by drawing on methodological and epistemological advances 
in the social sciences. With Forrester, we argue that thinking in cases is a separate style. 
Beyond Forrester, we propose that psychoanalysts, past and present, think in cases in 
more than one way: we can think not only in cases as exemplars for analytic 
generalization, but also in cases as exemplars for analogical learning and cases as part of 
a population for empirical generalization. 
 
 4.3.1 Thinking in cases as exemplars for analytic generalization 
 
The first mode of scientific thinking is the most typical for psychoanalysis, and arguably 
the most controversial: thinking in cases as exemplars for analytic generalization. This 
thinking style in not unique to psychoanalysis, as it can also be found in neurology, 
sociology and anthropology. Forrester (1996, 2017) used Kuhn’s concept of exemplars to 
describe how knowledge from psychoanalytic case studies can be reproduced and 
extended in other cases. Beyond Forrester’s account, however, there is little clarification 
as to how the singularity of the psychoanalytic case can be transformed into generalizable 
observations relevant for other cases. As such, we will be referring to the more recent 
work done by philosopher of science Mary Morgan (2014), in which she describes a 
specific strategy of moving from the particular to the general called the finding of 
exemplar representatives. In order to clarify the generalization process in this mode of 
thinking in cases, we will discuss Robert Yin’s (2014) concept of analytic generalization. 
 An exemplar representative is “one case study that defines the type and thus its 
characteristics” (Morgan, 2014, p. 1014). The strategy consists in establishing case–
specific knowledge as typical and therefore relevant for the understanding of the type of 
interest. Morgan refers to the Kula ring as an exemplar representative for the 
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understanding of gift exchange systems. Malinowski’s ethnographic description of the 
ritual exchange of apparently worthless necklaces and armbands between tribes on the 
Trobriand Islands has become a central point of reference for thinking about the nature 
of gift–giving in many different cultures and times. Study of the Kula ring reveals that gift–
giving can be a means to forge a social connection and that the act of giving is more 
important than the object that is given. This knowledge about the type helps to 
understand practices of gift giving in different contexts, for instance on Christmas day in 
Western societies.  
 A closer look at Freud’s oeuvre reveals that psychoanalysis is founded through the 
use of similar exemplars. The way Freud organized his material in The Interpretation of 
Dreams (1900) is very illustrative in this respect: after a first chapter in which he 
reviewed the literature, he devoted his second chapter to the presentation of his 
exemplar, the famous dream of Irma’s injection. The analysis of the specimen dream ends 
with the postulation of a crucial insight (Freud, 1900): 
 
If we adopt the method of interpreting dreams which I have indicated here, we 
shall find that dreams really have a meaning and are far from being the expression 
of a fragmentary activity of the brain, as the authorities have claimed. When the 
work of interpretation has been completed, we perceive that a dream is the 
fulfilment of a wish (p. 121, emphasis added). 
 
In other words, the dream about Irma’s injection has offered Freud the possibility to 
redefine the type to which dreams belong: dreams are not “fragmentary activity of the 
brain” as the writers Freud discussed in the first chapter had claimed, but are 
psychologically meaningful phenomena. In the same way as Malinowski’s study of the 
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Kula ring redefined our thinking about various practices of gift–giving, the dream of 
Irma’s injection allowed Freud to reframe our thinking about dreams.  
 In a letter to Fliess, Freud described the opening chapters of The Interpretation of 
Dreams as follows (Freud, 1950, Letter 114): 
 
The whole thing is planned on the model of an imaginary walk. First comes the 
dark wood of the authorities (who cannot see the trees), where there is no clear 
view and it is easy to go astray. Then there is a cavernous defile through which I 
lead my readers – my specimen dream with its peculiarities, its details, its 
indiscretions and its bad jokes – and then, all at once, the high ground and the open 
prospect and the question: “Which way do you want to go?” (p. 290). 
 
It is clear that Freud intentionally put forward one particular case because this particular 
case allowed him to open up a new perspective on dreams. He entitled this chapter “An 
analysis of a specimen dream” [Die analyse eines Traummusters]. The German Muster 
means model, example, pattern. The other dreams that are described later on in the book 
are used to refine and expand the description of the type and to verify it, for instance by 
supplying cases that defy the type as initially described (e.g. the nightmare). 
 Freud used the same approach in The Psychopathology of Everyday Life (1901), 
which he introduced by analysing the forgetting of the name of Signorelli. The principles 
he described on the basis of this Muster are then used to understand a wide range of 
parapraxes. The exemplar allowed Freud to lay out from the start the type (in this case, 
parapraxes as psychologically meaningful phenomena) in its full richness and complexity. 
The case is assumed to demonstrate something important about the type. In Figure 1, this 
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reasoning process is represented graphically: type X is studied by looking at case Y, under 
the assumption that case–specific features A, B and C are important features of the type. 
 
 
Figure 1. The process of thinking in cases as exemplars for analytic generalization 
 
This reasoning process is what social scientist Robert Yin (2014) calls analytic 
generalization: “the logic whereby case study findings can extend to situations outside of 
the original case study, based on the relevance of similar theoretical concepts or 
principles” (p. 237). In analytic generalization, first an inference is made from an instance 
(a case) to a hypothesis, a construct or a theory (what we call the type) at a conceptually 
higher level. Second, this hypothesis, construct or theory can then be applied to other 
instances (cases) where it seems relevant. Analytic generalization needs to be 
distinguished from empirical generalization. 
 In empirical generalization, an inference is made about the features of a 
population on the basis of a sample from that population (Gomm, Hammersley & Foster, 
2000, p. 103). Empirical generalization starts from knowing which population a case 
belongs to (the case is selected because it belongs to a specific population), and the 
generalization results in new knowledge about a specific population. For instance, one 
could be interested in determining whether all dreams are wish fulfilments. We will 
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return to this in the section on “Thinking in cases as part of a population for empirical 
generalization”. Analytic generalization, on the other hand, starts from a theoretically 
defined situation (the case is defined as a type of…), and the analytic generalization is 
achieved through corroboration, modification, rejection, expansion or advancement of 
the theoretical understanding of the type. For instance, with the dream of Irma’s injection, 
Freud demonstrated that the dream is a meaningful psychological phenomenon rather 
than a disintegrated cerebral activity. 
 In the case as an exemplar for analytic generalization, the researcher starts from 
a theoretical or clinical problem and finds a case to investigate the issue. Suitable cases 
are cases that contain rich data and are clearly linked to the type of interest. The 
researcher describes the core features of the case, the relations between these core 
features and the way in which these features are embedded in the complexity of the 
whole case. By comparing this description with existing theory, it will become clear which 
theoretical relations can be (dis)confirmed, and which new theoretical relations are 
revealed in situ. 
 The Schreber case study (Freud, 1911) is a good example of how Freud built a case 
into an exemplar. The aim of the Schreber case study is to investigate the clinical 
phenomenon of paranoia in relation to other forms of psychopathology. Freud did not 
choose Schreber because he is in any way a typical case of paranoia. In fact, he stresses at 
one point that Schreber is an “unusual and in itself bewildering” case (1911, p. 18). Freud 
did not explain why he chose to focus on Schreber (although he does point out that he 
does not take on paranoid patients for psychoanalysis and therefore has no other option 
than to work with material from outside the consultation room). The paper is organized 
in three sections entitled “Case history”, “Attempts at interpretation” and “On the 
mechanism of paranoia”. The titles already reveal the process of analytic generalization, 
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which moves from the particularity of the case over an interpretation of the case, towards 
a general claim about paranoia. In the third section, Freud came to the conclusion that 
paranoia is “an independent clinical type” (1911, p. 76) that can be differentiated from 
schizophrenia. The principle features that Freud found in Schreber are, first, that the 
mechanism of projection is crucial, and second, that there is a homosexual impulse at the 
basis of his pathology. 
 In the final step of his reasoning process, and also in the third paragraph “On the 
mechanism of paranoia”, Freud used Schreber to make a statement about all forms of 
paranoia (delusions of persecution, erotomania, delusions of jealousy and megalomania): 
 
it is a remarkable fact that the familiar principal forms of paranoia can all be 
represented as contradictions of the single proposition: “I (a man) love him (a 
man)”, and indeed that they exhaust all the possible ways in which such 
contradictions could be formulated (Freud, 1911, p. 63). 
 
At this point in his reasoning, Freud has moved from the case of Schreber to paranoia as 
a clinical type and arrived at a conclusion about all forms of paranoia. In other words, the 
features that he used to define a type (paranoia) on the basis of one in–depth case study, 
become relevant to many other cases. This reasoning process is similar to what we found 
in The Interpretations of Dreams (the dream of Irma’s injection → the dream as a type → 
various forms of dreams) and in The Psychopathology of Everyday Life (the forgetting of 
the name of Signorelli → forgetting as a type → various forms of parapraxes). 
 It is important to note that we are not arguing that Freud’s conclusions about 
Schreber are correct, as indeed questions can be raised about the use of an autobiography 
as the sole source of information and about Freud’s method of selecting and interpreting 
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information from this source. Our point is that his thinking style, which relies on the 
exemplar, is not revelatory of a predilection for anecdotal evidence on Freud’s part, but 
constitutes a thinking style that is shared with other disciplines and that we now 
understand better through contemporary work in philosophy of science and the social 
sciences. 
 An important limitation of the case as exemplar for analytic generalization lies in 
the fact that one can end up in a circular mode of thinking. If a type X is studied by looking 
at case Y, then the features of case Y might get confused with the features of type X. In 
other words, how can one know whether or not certain features are case specific? This 
can only be determined by studying more cases. Freud did not constrain his research to 
just one case. In order to verify his claims about Schreber, he discussed the mechanism of 
projection in his correspondence with Abraham (1911, 41) and, in relation to 
homosexuality and paranoia, Freud (1911) wrote: 
 
Distrusting my own experiences on the subject, I have during the last few years 
joined with my friends C. G. Jung of Zurich and Sandor Ferenczi of Budapest in 
investigating upon this single point a number of cases of paranoid disorder which 
have come under observation. The patients whose histories provided the material 
for this enquiry included both men and women, and varied in race, occupation, 
and social standing. Yet we were astonished to find that in all these cases a defence 
against a homosexual wish was clearly recognizable at the very centre of the 
conflict which underlay the disease, and that it was in an attempt to master an 
unconsciously reinforced current of homosexuality that they had all of them come 




Two observations can be made here. First, it is striking how Freud presented the Schreber 
case study as part of a collaborative, international research project involving members 
from the newly created International Psychoanalytic Association. Pletsch (1982) pointed 
out the shift in the audience that is addressed by Freud in his case studies: the early case 
studies (e.g., Studies on Hysteria and the case of Dora) address a medical audience, while 
later case studies give the impression of a contribution entre nous and were published in 
the first psychoanalytic periodical, the Jahrbuch für psychoanalytische und 
psychopathologische Forschungen. Second, Freud was aware that one case study does not 
prove anything, but several case studies conducted by different people can lead to robust 
knowledge. These other cases act as replications of the original case study. Unfortunately, 
Freud did not elaborate on the comparison with other cases in the context of the Schreber 
study. 
 A contemporary use of the case as an exemplar can be found in the paper by 
Leuzinger– Bohleber and Teising (2012) on prenatal and genetic diagnostics (PND). They 
describe the case of a pregnant woman, Mrs F, with a genetically transmitted illness, who 
discovers that her unborn child will have haemophilia. Mrs F decides to have an abortion, 
but later has another pregnancy and gives birth to a healthy girl. The research question 
in this paper is whether this case “can offer a specific and enlightening perspective on this 
complex and delicate topic [i.e. how people deal with a negative PND]” (p. 294). In order 
to answer this question, the authors have rich data at their disposal, notably the analyst’s 
report of Mrs F’s psychoanalysis and two follow–up interviews 16 years after completion 
of the treatment. Leuzinger–Bohleber and Teising find that the confrontation with the 
negative PND triggered an archaic state of mind in Mrs F, characterized by splitting and 
unconscious phantasies of murder. In the discussion, it becomes clear that the authors 
think this finding has a broader relevance (analytic generalization): they describe the 
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decision to have an abortion as potentially traumatic for any woman, as it can trigger the 
archaic state of mind they found in Mrs F, and they conclude that “all women/couples 
undergoing late interruptions of pregnancy following PND absolutely need a counterpart 
to their reactivated archaic inner world in their outside reality – whether in a loving 
partnership, family, friends, or in the professional medical care during PND” (p. 312). 
Interestingly, similar to Freud in the Schreber study, Leuzinger–Bohleber and Teising 
(2012) refer several times to other cases they have studied that supposedly confirm their 
findings, without discussing these cases in any detail. This confirms the idea that 
replication of findings is intrinsic to thinking in cases as exemplars, although, 
unfortunately, these replication studies are barely published (a blemish that marks other 
sciences as well). 
 
 4.3.2 Thinking in cases as exemplars for analogical learning 
 
Thinking in exemplar cases for analytic generalization is not the only mode of thinking in 
cases. Forrester (1996) seems to allude to this when he briefly mentions the use of the 
single case for analogical learning, calling it a “pedagogic tool that duplicates or repeats 
an essential element of medical practice” (p. 14, emphasis added). The implication here 
is that case studies can be used to teach and illustrate situations that are common in 
clinical practice by offering a vicarious experience of that situation. But Forrester did not 
further differentiate between the learning and teaching function of cases from the 
theory–building function of cases. Although one case can be both an exemplar for analytic 
generalization (providing rich data allowing for an analytic generalization in relation to 
a type) and an exemplar for analogical learning (providing rich description, detailed 
experiential accounts and “know–how” knowledge), we argue that these are, in fact, two 
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different forms of thinking in cases with different processes and end–goals. Whereas 
thinking in cases as exemplars for analytic generalization involves the process of 
relocating knowledge about a concrete case into an abstract type, we argue that thinking 
in cases as exemplars for analogical learning involves the process of re–locating 
knowledge about one concrete case to another concrete case. 
 Educational psychologist Robert Stake’s book on The Art of Case Study Research 
(1995) is a central resource on the topic of cases as exemplars and their pedagogic 
qualities. He first notes the importance of having case narratives that are well attuned to 
human affairs: rich descriptions of relationships, perceptions and emotions rather than 
objective observables or causal laws. Stake (2010) refers to cultural anthropologist 
Geertz’s concept of “thick description”: the case narrative should present a detailed 
description of the individual or situation and convey an empathic understanding of the 
latter, including the researcher’s interpretations. Herein, Stake (1978) argues, lies the 
advantage of case studies in comparison to other research methods: “Case studies will 
often be the preferred method of research because they may be epistemologically in 
harmony with the reader’s experience and thus to that person a natural basis for 
generalization” (p. 5). 
 At first glance, Stake’s proposition about learning from cases as exemplars seems 
to be counter–intuitive: on the one hand, he argues that case studies should contain 
interpersonal and highly contextual data (particularization), and on the other, he 
suggests that this data can be used to learn something with a broader relevance. For him, 
the “as if it happened to us” experiential quality of cases allows the readers to engage and 
recognize similarities between case narratives and their own personal or professional 
experiences. In other words, the propositional aspects of such case studies capitalize 
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upon the reader’s experience: there is a mental connection with the atmosphere, 
thoughts, feelings and motivations of the case. Stake (1995) coined this process a 
naturalistic generalization: “Naturalistic generalisations are conclusions arrived at 
through personal engagement in life’s affairs or by vicarious experience so well 
constructed that the person feels as if it happened to themselves” (p. 85). However, this 
process should be described as analogical learning, as it relies on making an analogy 
rather than a generalization. 
 This is an important difference from the process of analytic generalization in 
thinking in cases as exemplars; whereas the latter is focused on extrapolating inferences, 
hypotheses and findings to theory, analogical learning is predominantly used to make 
practical decisions in the consulting room. Furthermore, although analogical learning can 
teach us something that is common in clinical practice (and so shares an interest in 
“commonalities” with other ways of scientific thinking), this is not done via statistical 
patterns of frequency and co–variation. Instead, the focus is on reasoning by analogy and 
experiential knowing: it went like this before in case x, so it is possible that it will go like 
that again in cases y and z. For example, a clinician dealing with trauma patients reads a 
case about transference–related challenges with a patient suffering from traumatic 
neurosis. The clinician learns about clinical techniques and countertransference 
reactions that are useful in establishing a therapeutic relation with trauma patients and 
begins using them with his own patients. One could call this acquiring professional 
experience: by studying diverse clinical situations, the clinician is able to recognize, 
through the process of analogical learning, how to act in their own professional practice. 
Freud was well aware of this quality of the case and how important it is in the training of 
psychoanalysts. He made the famous comparison between learning psychoanalysis and 
learning how to play chess: the openings and end games can be studied in books, but the 
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infinite variety of moves in between can only be learned through a diligent study of games 
fought out by masters (Freud, 1913). 
 In Figure 2, this reasoning process is represented graphically: case 1 represents a 
set of four properties (A, B, C and D) that are defined in a detailed and rich case narrative. 
Case 2 is similar to case 1 – they share three properties (A, B, C) but there is an unknown 
fourth property in case 2. Through the process of analogical learning, the reader can infer 
that, since it was property D in case 1, then it is possible that it will be property D in case 
2 as well. Therefore, through the reader’s engagement with the rich and experiential 
narrative of case 1, they can make a practical assumption that case 2 contains a similar 
pattern or situation. 
 
Figure 2. The process of thinking in cases as exemplar for analogical learning 
 
Although this style of thinking does not involve relocating knowledge to a more abstract 
level (as in analytic generalization), it nevertheless demonstrates a local knowledge 
transfer: case 1 may demonstrate a powerfully experiential narrative that can be 
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transferred not just to case 2, but to many other cases. However, this analogical learning 
will still depend on the particular (not general) nature of case 1: while it describes 
something that is typical or common to clinical practice (e.g. transference), it is its 
vicarious experience and “know–how” properties that ultimately make this case 
transferrable (in a practical rather than theory–building sense) onto other cases. 
 Recognizing a new situation as a version of a previous situation is not purely a 
cognitive operation. Stake (1978) argues that naturalistic generalization can only emerge 
from knowledge that contains “lived experience” and interpretive understanding of “how 
things are, why they are, how people feel about them, and how these things are likely to 
be later or in other places” (p. 6). These ideas are not new or exclusive to case 
methodology. At the turn of the twentieth century, German philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey 
(1910) argued that there are, essentially, two different ways of doing science: through 
law–governed explanations (Erklären) and through relational understanding of human 
experiences (Verstehen). For Dilthey, the explanatory mode of investigation is well suited 
for the study of causal connections, physical properties and law–governed regularities. 
However, he argued that the empiricism of explanatory accounts undermines the 
uniqueness, subjectivity and meaning of “lived experiences”; that there are important 
non–quantifiable elements in the study of the human psyche that can be only studied 
through understanding: “We understand ourselves and others only when we transfer our 
own lived experience into every kind of expression of our own and other people’s lives” 
(Dilthey in Stake, 1978, p. 5). 
 This kind of understanding can be linked to the Hungarian–British scientist 
Michael Polanyi’s concept of tacit knowledge. Polanyi’s basic proposition is that “we can 
know more than we can tell” (1966, p. 4) – that is, we can learn from experiences, 
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activities, ideas and skills that are not easily expressible but nevertheless remain central 
in how we engage with and learn about the world. Tacit knowledge can be described as a 
“know–how” knowledge: it involves learning from experiences, interpersonally sharable 
statements, ruminations, metaphors, associations, meanings, ideas and applications. Such 
knowledge is deeply contextual, which is what makes it difficult to transcribe or verbalize. 
This difficulty, however, need not be considered as a problem or flaw in thinking in cases 
as exemplars for analogical learning. It is not always easy to differentiate the subject from 
the author in psychoanalytic case studies due to the inextricable intimacy of the analytic 
encounter (Walsh 2020). However, this very intimacy prompts the production of tacit 
knowledge within the clinical paradigm, thus demonstrating the experiential, “know–
how” knowledge of dealing with transference and countertransference dynamics, 
emotional intensity and forms of unspoken dialogue between patient and analyst. With 
Walsh (2020), we would like to argue that the thinking in and writing of cases as 
exemplars for analogical learning is not only “no cause for lament” (p. 19), but also crucial 
for the study of clinical technique. 
 Freud was also mindful of the challenges that come with acquiring tacit 
knowledge, in particular with respect to psychoanalytic technique. In On ‘Wild’ Psycho–
Analysis (Freud, 1910a) he writes: “This technique cannot yet be learnt from books, and 
it certainly cannot be discovered without great sacrifices of time, labour and success. Like 
other medical techniques, it is to be learnt from those who are already proficient in it” (p. 
226). That is one of the reasons to undergo training analysis. In Analysis Terminable and 




It [the training analysis] has accomplished its purpose if it gives the learner a firm 
conviction of the existence of the unconscious, if it enables him, when repressed 
material emerges, to perceive in himself things which would otherwise be 
incredible to him, and if it shows him a first sample of the technique which has 
proved to be the only effective one in analytic work (p. 248). 
 
In other words, one has to experience how psychoanalysis works on oneself in order to 
be able to understand it and apply it to others. 
 This is where Polanyi’s tacit knowledge becomes central to Stake’s naturalistic 
generalization: compelling, engaging and realistic case narratives enable the reader to 
learn from experience. The reader is not learning from facts (explanatory or “know–that” 
knowledge) but from an everyday perspective of what it is like to work in this or that 
clinical setting. But even more importantly, conveying tacit knowledge in case narratives 
is not just about being able to re–tell a clinical story: there is a psychological dimension 
characteristic of a form of empathy (Von Wright 1971). Intentions, feelings and 
motivations enable the reader’s understanding because they point to the meaning and 
aim of the case, which may be different for each person. 
 From the perspective of cases as exemplars for analogical learning, a good 
exemplar will rely on particularized knowledge (Geertz’s “thick description”), a relational 
understanding of human experiences (Dilthey’s Verstehen) and a practical, “know–how” 
knowledge (Polanyi’s tacit knowledge). These three elements are crucial for the scientific 
canons (what we have identified as the propositional or persuasive qualities of the case 
narrative) of thinking in cases as exemplars for analogical learning: “It is the 
interpretation of the data, of the observations and measurements, that will stand, not as 
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proof but as persuasion of one meaning more than another” (Stake, 2010, p. 25, emphasis 
added). 
 Contemporary examples of this mode of thinking in cases can be found in any 
clinical training: during clinical workshops, intervisions and supervisions, 
psychoanalysts present a “thick description” of their relational understanding of their 
work with a patient, not only to better understand this particular patient, but also to 
develop “know–how” knowledge that can be useful in future clinician situations. The 
newest addition to this mode of thinking is the Three–Level Model developed in the IPA 
Project Committee on Clinical Observation and Testing (Bernardi, 2014). It consists in 
clinical working parties with psychoanalysts from different theoretical strands who 
discuss selected clinical material in relation to one patient. The focus is on “real analytic 
practice” rather than “ideal models” (p. 25). The aim is to arrive at a consensus of experts 
concerning the process of change in that particular patient. The clinical working parties 
often engage in a mental experiment by imagining different ways in which interpretative 
strategies from different theoretical orientations may or may not facilitate change in the 
patient. The Three–Level Model is explicitly not a research method that tries to determine 
which psychoanalytic theory is most rigorous and compatible with a specific patient 
population. Rather, clinicians feel that the discussion “helps them get closer to the 
patient’s vantage point […] and this helps to empathically anticipate the way the patient 
will receive the interpretations” (p. 27). 
 Similarly, the European Psychoanalytic Federation Working Party on Comparative 
Clinical Methods (Tuckett, 2008) involves case study discussions in which an analyst 
presents work in progress to a small group of 8–14 participants. The goal of these 
meetings is analogical learning: psychoanalysts from different clinical orientations 
present their work and share each other’s approaches to similar and divergent clinical 
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situations. Clinical assumptions and underlying theoretical models are examined, 
assessed and discussed in a structured way. The party’s overall purpose is to use the 
“lived experiences” common to each psychoanalytic tradition and training institute to 
achieve a deeper understanding of what constitutes psychoanalytic clinical work. 
 
 4.3.3 Thinking in cases as part of a population for empirical generalization 
 
The third mode of thinking in cases consists in considering cases to be part of a population 
for empirical generalization. A patient can be assumed to be member of one or more 
populations, be it a population defined by demographic, clinical or other characteristics. 
This assumption is very common in the statistical thinking style, but it is less obvious in 
the case–based disciplines: a legal case, a company or an Amazon tribe can be perfectly 
legitimate objects of study, without any need to determine, if at all possible, to which 
populations these cases belong. A similar point has been made by Peter Caws about 
psychoanalysis as “the science of the idiosyncratic subject” (2003, p. 625) that should 
avoid any generalization over the population of humans. We will argue, however, that 
psychoanalytic cases can be considered to be part of a population and that Freud already 
engaged in this mode of thinking in cases. 
 In thinking in cases as part of a population, the study of the patient becomes a 
means to learn about a population of interest. In this mode of thinking, knowledge claims 
are based on the study of more than one case. Each case is considered to be a variation 
within a population, and several cases need to be studied to get an understanding of the 
population characteristics. However, this does not imply that cases are grouped together 
to form a sample. In this respect, it is important to make the distinction between the mode 
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of thinking in cases and the statistical thinking style, which also aims to study population 
characteristics. 
 The statistical thinking style is based on decontextualization of observations: the 
object of interest is studied by discarding the context within which this object manifests 
itself. This decontextualization is a necessary condition for the quantitative estimation of 
population parameters, such as the average and the standard deviation (in technical 
terms, this is the assumption of independence of observations). This assumption seems 
acceptable for features such as bodily weight but is more contentious for psychological 
features such as personality. Psychoanalysis relies on the case method because this 
method consists in studying an object within a context where the boundaries between 
the object and its context are not clearly demarcated. If cases are considered to be part of 
a population, each case presents a variation of the phenomenon of interest within a 
context, and the interest is not in the average, but in the variation. 
 Unlike exemplar cases for analytical generalization, cases as part of a population 
can be used for empirical generalization. Empirical generalization “involves drawing 
inferences about features of a larger but finite population of cases from the study of a 
sample drawn from that population” (Gomm et al., 2000, p. 103). It is sometimes conflated 
with a statistical methodology; however, statistical sampling is just one technique to 
capture relevant heterogeneity within a population (allowing for empirical 
generalization). Empirical generalization can also be achieved from a combination of 
cases about a complexly varying phenomenon (Gomm et al., 2000). Psychoanalytic case 
studies are ideal for such a comparative exercise: because they do not isolate the 
phenomenon of interest from its context, case studies yield a large number of potentially 
relevant observations. If similar observations are made in a number of cases that differ 
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in their contextual data, one can begin to establish the variability of conditions under 
which the phenomenon of interest occurs (Iwakabe & Gazzola, 2009). 
 From first glance, thinking in cases as part of a population may appear similar to 
exemplar cases for analytic generalization, since both involve studying characteristics 
that can be relevant to many other cases. However, cases as part of a population are 
studied on the basis of their membership of a population of interest, while cases as 
exemplars for analytical generalization are studied on the basis of a conceptual type they 
represent. The idea behind cases as part of a population is that each case represents a 
relevant variation. By comparing one case (or a series of cases) to another, one will 
discover common themes as well as significant variations (cultural, social, economic, 
demographic, etc.) between them. Therefore, a good case as part of a population is one 
that can be situated in and compared with other cases from the population of interest. It 
should teach us not just about the studied individual, but also about the population the 
individual belongs to. 
 In Figure 3, this reasoning process is represented graphically: there is a series of 
cases (case 1, case 2 and case 3) that are grouped together because they share the same 
phenomenon. However, each case has a different combination of properties, which may 
be identical, similar or different from one another. This implies that the phenomenon of 
interest is occurring under a variety of conditions. Studying the variation presented in 
these cases will lead to a more robust knowledge about the phenomenon that can be 




Figure 3. The process of thinking in cases as part of a population for empirical 
generalization 
 
This form of scientific thinking is being used in the field of psychotherapy research 
(Iwakabe & Gazzola, 2009) but is also very promising for psychoanalysis (Meganck et al., 
2017). Given the long–lasting criticisms of (1) lack of generalizability in psychoanalytic 
case studies, and (2) statistically improper generalizations from observations in single 
case studies, it is important to clarify that the logic of empirical generalization has been 
acknowledged by Freud and is present in his work, and that it significantly differs from 
statistical generalization as well as from the previously discussed forms of analytic 
generalization and analogical learning. 
 The mode of thinking in cases as part of a population can be found in Freud’s A 
Child is Being Beaten (1924). Already on the second page of this article, Freud began to 
develop an account of beating phantasies by referring to a group of individuals: “The 
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individuals from whom the data for these analyses were derived were very seldom 
beaten in their childhood, or were at all events not brought up by the help of the rod” (p. 
180). Immediately afterwards, Freud described the difficulty of formulating a hypothesis 
about beating phantasies because the individuals’ responses about the nature of the 
phantasies were rarely specific and almost always varied from one another. Freud 
identified that, from all of the cases he refers to in A Child is Being Beaten, not one case is 
representative enough to fully characterize the phenomenon of beating phantasies (note 
the difference from the Schreber case where he did rely on one case as an exemplar to 
push forward the hypothesis about paranoia and homosexuality). Therefore, in order to 
formulate general theoretical claims about beating phantasies, Freud had to use six 
different cases of individuals with varying circumstances and diagnoses. 
 The six cases consisted of four female and two male patients, and were described 
at length diagnostically: two cases of obsessional neurosis (one extremely severe and the 
other of moderate severity), one case that displayed individual traits of obsessional 
neurosis, one case of “straightforward hysteria” (p. 183), one case with no clinical 
diagnosis (could be dismissed as a “psychasthenic”) and a sixth case that was left 
undescribed. Freud’s idea behind selecting these cases was to develop a concise 
theoretical account of beating phantasies by comparing the cases and studying their 
variations. In other words, Freud was not seeking to create a sample to study group 
characteristics as in statistical thinking, but to conduct a comparative study in which 
conditions under which beating phantasies occurred could be outlined. 
 As such, thinking in cases as part of a population involves working with cases that 
vary greatly in their situations, context and experiences of the studied phenomenon. 
Although these cases are not used for generating a sample of cases, measuring average 
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scores or the frequency of experiences, they are ideal for studying the variations under 
which the phenomenon occurs. This allows for testing different scientific hypotheses 
about the population of interest, as well as mapping out the impact and the relevancy of 
different variations (e.g. in Freud’s A Child is Being Beaten, gender was the most important 
variation: the experience of beating phantasies for boys was not analogous to girls’ 
experience). The thinking process involved in cases as part of a population is clearly 
aimed at generating a robust body of knowledge, in which the validity of scientific 
conclusions becomes greater the more similarities and variations are studied across a 
group of patients. 
 A contemporary illustration of thinking in cases as part of a population can be 
found in a case comparison study by Dahl et al. (2017) on transference. Their work is re–
evaluating a result from an earlier statistical study in which parental countertransference 
was received positively by patients with high levels of personality pathology and 
negatively by patients with low levels of personality pathology. Dahl et al.’s study features 
two patients, Victor and Tim. Both patients were treated by the same therapist, who 
reported high levels of parental countertransference. From a clinicians’ point of view, 
Victor presented a lower level of psychodynamic functioning than Tim; on self–rated 
measures, Victor’s personality problems were also rated higher than Tim’s. Going on the 
previous statistical generalization, the parental countertransference was to be 
experienced disparately by Victor and Tim given the difference in their personality 
pathology levels. 
 What Dahl et al. find is that both Victor and Tim benefited from the therapist’s 
strong parental countertransference. However, there were important variations in 
patients’ receptivity of countertransference. The authors write the following about 
164 
 
Victor’s case: “What strikes us first is that Victor seemingly heard the transference work 
as an invitation to a new kind of relationship with a benevolent parental figure” (p. 471). 
Tim, on the other hand, experienced the therapeutic relationship as a continuation of his 
early parental relations. This is evident from the following expression made by Tim to the 
therapist: “I assume you want me to, kind of, take hold of my situation and go on with 
pride or something. But […] I have to know that there is someone I can come and see if 
the anxiety attack is coming” (p. 472). In the limitations section, the authors note that 
findings at a case level do not indicate a generalizability. However, their study implies 
that a different generalization could be made from the one in the earlier statistical study: 
parental countertransference can be received positively by patients with various 
pathology levels. Since the study compared only two cases, the authors stress that there 
is a need for many case studies looking beyond the statistics to provide some of the finer 
grained details and variations of the transference encounter. 
 
4.4 Concluding comments 
 
By drawing on recent developments and debates in philosophy of science and social 
sciences, our paper sought to offer a new perspective on the case study method and 
psychoanalysis as a science. We build on Forrester’s idea of thinking in cases as 
exemplars and differentiate three modes of thinking in cases. We specified how thinking 
in exemplars for analytic generalization can lead from knowledge of one in–depth case 
study to knowledge about a type relevant to many other cases; how cases as exemplars 
for analogical learning produce “know–how” knowledge about vicarious clinical 
situations; and how cases as part of a population can be used for generalization through 
165 
 
the study of variation within the population. It is important to note that these modes of 
thinking are not new to psychoanalysis: we demonstrated that the three modes of 
thinking in cases are implicitly present throughout Freud’s oeuvre (not just when he is 
writing about cases). Moreover, these modes of thinking are not specific to 
psychoanalysis, as they have been described in relation to other fields such as 
anthropology, educational psychology, psychotherapy, etc. By making these implicit 
thinking styles explicit, we hope to contribute to the development and enrichment of 
what has already been done in psychoanalytic case studies for 
over 100 years. 
 In this paper, we sought to demonstrate not only how Freud and contemporary 
psychoanalysts think and do psychoanalytic science through case studies, but also how 
thinking in cases differs from other kinds of scientific thinking styles. Although Forrester 
(1996) did argue that thinking in cases is a unique thinking style, he did not provide a 
detailed argument of how it differs from other thinking styles. Throughout all three 
modes of thinking in cases, we differentiated the reasoning process in Freud’s case 
studies from statistical and experimental thinking styles. We concluded that, out of the 
three identified modes of thinking in cases, none seeks to arrive at direct replication or 
statistical generalization. Therefore, applying statistical or experimental canons of 
verification onto psychoanalytic case studies is not appropriate because the two scientific 
thinking styles differ in both how (process) and what (end–goal) knowledge they 
produce. 
 It must be made clear, however, that we do not seek to immunize each mode of 
thinking in cases from criticism. That is to say, we do not believe that Freud’s classic case 
studies (or contemporary psychoanalytic cases, for that matter) and their underlying 
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modes of thinking should be exempt from scrutiny, even if it derives from other fields and 
their respective styles of scientific thinking. As pointed out earlier, Hacking’s 
conceptualization of self–authenticating thinking styles leaves much to be desired, and 
this can be clearly observed in our field. Accusations of self–confirmation and circular (or 
insular) self–authentication processes have haunted psychoanalysis ever since Freud 
began writing his classic case studies. As such, we would like to stress that simply 
describing a thinking style does not establish it as successfully self–authenticating. 
 In addition, the fact that psychoanalysis is based on what Forrester described as a 
scientific thinking style does not mean that it is by definition scientific. In fact, one of the 
criticisms raised against Hacking’s theory on scientific thinking styles concerns the lack 
of clear demarcation criteria to distinguish between scientific and non–scientific 
reasoning styles (Kusch, 2010; Sciortino, 2016). For instance, according to Wayman 
(1982), a reasoning style that consists in making analogies between microcosm and 
macrocosm can be found in India, Greek cosmology and sixteenth–century Europe (e.g., 
“Man as the image of God”, the Vitruvian man, etc.). This would no longer be considered 
a scientific thinking style. Each thinking style has to develop its own canons of verification 
that provide conditions for truth, as per Hacking’s (1992) definition: “There is no higher 
standard to which [thinking styles] directly answer” (p. 13). Therefore, a further 
development to thinking in cases would involve developing such a canon of verification 
for all three modes of case–based reasoning. Mayer (2017) suggests that such a canon of 
verification might consist in the integration of the transferential and 
countertransferential dimension in case writing (reflexive objectivity). Willemsen, Della 




 Finally, we also discussed some of the work done by the European Psychoanalytic 
Federation Working Party on Comparative Clinical Methods (Tuckett, 2008) and the IPA’s 
Project Committee on Clinical Observation and Testing (Bernardi, 2014). We see all these 
developments as an attempt to, on the one hand, establish the relevant scientific canons 
for thinking in cases, and on the other, be conscious of some of the self–authenticating (or 
self–stabilizing) techniques that have been (or are still) used by psychoanalysts. 
 Another future direction would be describing thinking in cases as a scientific 
thinking style at all levels of psychoanalysis: the clinical reasoning process applied by 
practising psychoanalysts, the learning process of students in psychoanalysis who learn 
through cases, the didactical approach taken by teachers in psychoanalysis who refer to 
cases as crucial resources, and the scientific process applied by psychoanalytic 
researchers who convey their findings in cases. Clearly, “thinking psychoanalysis” entails 
thinking in cases in every corner of our field. It is therefore important that we seek to 
understand and develop how we think, speak, present and write in psychoanalytic cases, 




Chapter 5: Appraising Psychotherapy Case Studies in Practice–
Based Evidence: Introducing Case Study Evaluation–tool (CaSE) 
 
Abstract 
Systematic case studies are often placed at the low end of evidence–based practice (EBP) 
due to lack of critical appraisal. This paper seeks to attend to this research gap by 
introducing a novel Case Study Evaluation–tool (CaSE). First, issues around knowledge 
generation and validity are assessed in both EBP and practice–based evidence (PBE) 
paradigms. Although systematic case studies are more aligned with PBE, the paper argues 
for a complementary, third way approach between the two paradigms and their 
‘exemplary’ methodologies: case studies and randomised controlled trials (RCTs). 
Second, the paper argues that all forms of research can produce ‘valid evidence’ but the 
validity itself needs to be assessed against each specific research method and purpose. 
Existing appraisal tools for qualitative research (JBI, CASP, ETQS) are shown to have 
limited relevance for the appraisal of systematic case studies through a comparative tool 
assessment. Third, the paper develops purpose–oriented evaluation criteria for 
systematic case studies through CaSE Checklist for Essential Components in Systematic 
Case Studies and CaSE Purpose–based Evaluative Framework for Systematic Case Studies. 
The checklist approach aids reviewers in assessing the presence or absence of essential 
case study components (internal validity). The framework approach aims to assess the 
effectiveness of each case against its set out research objectives and aims (external 
validity), based on different systematic case study purposes in psychotherapy. Finally, 
the paper demonstrates the application of the tool with a case example and notes further 
research trajectories for the development of CaSE tool. 
 
Keywords: Systematic case studies; Psychotherapy research; Research appraisal tool; 






Due to growing demands of evidence–based practice, standardised research assessment 
and appraisal tools have become common in healthcare and clinical treatment (Hartling 
et al., 2012; Katrak et al., 2004; Hannes, Lockwood & Pearson, 2010). This allows 
researchers to critically appraise research findings on the basis of their validity, results, 
and usefulness (Hill & Spittlehouse, 2003). Despite the upsurge of critical appraisal in 
qualitative research (Williams et al., 2019), there are no assessment or appraisal tools 
designed for psychotherapy case studies.  
 Although not without controversies (Mitchels, 2000), case studies remain central 
to the investigation of psychotherapy processes (Midgley, 2006b; Willemsen et al., 2017). 
This is particularly true of systematic case studies, the most common form of case study 
in contemporary psychotherapy research (McLeod & Elliott, 2011; Davison & Lazarus, 
2007).  
Systematic cases usually involve a team of researchers, who gather data from 
multiple different sources (e.g., questionnaires, observations by the therapist, interviews, 
statistical findings, clinical assessment, etc.), and involve a rigorous data triangulation 
process to assess whether the data from different sources converge (McLeod, 2010a). 
Since systematic case studies are methodologically pluralistic, they have a greater 
interest in situating patients within the study of a broader population than clinical case 
studies (Iwakabe & Gazzola, 2009). Systematic case studies are considered to be an 
accessible method for developing research evidence–base in psychotherapy 
(Widdowson, 2011), especially since they correct some of the methodological limitations 
(e.g., lack of “third party” perspectives and bias in data analysis) inherent to classic 
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clinical case studies (Iwakabe & Gazzola, 2009). They have been used for the purposes of 
clinical training (Tuckett, 2008), outcome assessment (Hilliard, 1993), development of 
clinical techniques (Almond, 2004), and meta–analysis of qualitative findings (Timulak, 
2009). All these developments signal a revived interest in the case study method, but also 
point to the obvious lack of a research assessment tool suitable for case studies in 
psychotherapy.   
Table 20. KEY CONCEPT: Systematic case study 
Systematic case study is a systematised alternative to the classical clinical case study. 
Systematic case studies generally involve a team of researchers, gather data from 
multiple different sources (questionnaires, observations by the therapist, interviews, 
statistical findings, etc.), and feature data triangulation processes in order to assess 
whether the data from different sources converge.  
 
To attend to this research gap, this paper first reviews issues around the 
conceptualisation of validity within the paradigms of evidence–based practice (EBP) and 
practice–based evidence (PBE). Although case studies are often positioned at the low end 
of EBP (Aveline, 2005), the paper suggests that systematic cases are a valuable form of 
evidence, capable of complementing large–scale studies such as randomised controlled 
trials (RCTs). However, there remains a difficulty in assessing the quality and relevance 
of case study findings to broader psychotherapy research. 
As a way forward, the paper introduces a novel Case Study Evaluation–tool (CaSE) 
in the form of CaSE Purpose–based Evaluative Framework for Systematic Case Studies and 
CaSE Checklist for Essential Components in Systematic Case Studies. The long–term 




Table 21. How can Case Study Evaluation–tool (CaSE) be used in psychotherapy 
research and practice? 
1. Using CaSE for the assessment of systematic case studies and their relevance to 
the broader field of psychotherapy research and practice; 
2. Using CaSE to evaluate the varying evidential quality of systematic case studies, 
which is particularly problematic for qualitative meta–analysis and meta–
synthesis of published case studies in psychotherapy (Duncan & Sparks, 2019; 
Iwakabe & Gazzola, 2009; Thorne et al., 2004); 
3. Using CaSE to improve the evidential quality, formulation and implications of 
systematic case studies in psychotherapy. 
 
Given the significance of methodological pluralism and diverse research aims in 
systematic case studies, CaSE will not seek to prescribe explicit case study writing 
guidelines, which has already been done by numerous authors (Meganck et al., 2017; 
Willemsen et al., 2017; McLeod, 2010b). Instead, CaSE will enable the retrospective 
assessment of systematic case study findings and their relevance (or lack thereof) to 
broader psychotherapy research and practice. However, there is no reason to assume 
that CaSE cannot be used prospectively (i.e., producing systematic case studies in 
accordance to CaSE evaluative framework, as per point 3 in table 2). 
 The development of a research assessment or appraisal tool is a lengthy, ongoing 
process (Long & Godfrey, 2004). It is particularly challenging to develop a comprehensive 
purpose–oriented evaluative framework, suitable for the assessment of diverse 
methodologies, aims, and outcomes. As such, this paper should be treated as an 
introduction to the further development of CaSE tool. It will introduce the rationale 
behind CaSE and lay out its main approach to evidence and evaluation, with further 
development in mind. A case example from the Single Case Archive (SCA) 
(https://singlecasearchive.com) will be used to demonstrate the application of the tool 
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‘in action’. The paper notes further research trajectories and discusses some of the 
limitations around the use of the tool. 
 
5.2 Separating the wheat from the chaff: what is and isn’t evidence in 
psychotherapy (and who gets to decide?) 
 
 5.2.1 The common approach: evidence–based practice (EBP) 
 
In the last two decades, psychotherapy has become increasingly centred around the idea 
of an evidence–based practice (EBP). Initially introduced in medicine, EBP has been 
defined as “conscientious, explicit, and judicious use of current best evidence in making 
decisions about the care of individual patients” (Sackett et al., 1996). EBP revolves around 
efficacy research: it seeks to examine whether a specific intervention has a causal (in this 
case, measurable) effect on clinical populations (Barkham & Mellor–Clark, 2003). From a 
conceptual standpoint, Sackett and colleagues defined EBP as a paradigm that is inclusive 
of many methodologies, so long as they contribute toward clinical decision–making 
process and accumulation of best currently available evidence in any given set of 
circumstances (Gabbay & le May, 2011). Similarly, the American Psychological 
Association (APA, 2010) has recently issued calls for evidence–based systematic case 
studies in order to produce standardised measures for evaluating process and outcome 
data across different therapeutic modalities. 
However, given EBP’s focus on establishing cause–and–effect relationships 
(Rosqvist et al., 2011), it is unsurprising that qualitative research is generally not 
considered to be ‘gold standard’ or ‘efficacious’ within this paradigm (Edwards, 2013; 
Edwards et al., 2004; Aveline, 2005; Cartwright & Hardie, 2012; Longhofer et al., 2017). 
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Qualitative methods like systematic case studies maintain an appreciation for context, 
complexity and meaning making. Therefore, instead of measuring regularly occurring 
causal relations (as in quantitative studies), the focus is on studying complex social 
phenomena (e.g., relationships, events, experiences, feelings, etc.) (Erickson, 2012; 
Maxwell, 2004). Edwards (2013) points out that, although context–based research in 
systematic case studies is the bedrock of psychotherapy theory and practice, it has also 
become shrouded by an unfortunate ideological description: “anecdotal” case studies 
(i.e., unscientific narratives lacking evidence, as opposed to ‘gold standard’ evidence, a 
term often used to describe the RCT method and the therapeutic modalities supported by 
it), leading to a further need for advocacy in and defence of the unique epistemic process 
involved in case study research (Fishman et al., 2017).  
The EBP paradigm prioritises the quantitative approach to causality, most notably 
through its focus on high generalisability and the ability to deal with bias through 
randomisation process. These conditions are associated with RCTs but are limited (or, as 
some argue, impossible) in qualitative research methods such as the case study 
(Margison et al., 2000). 
Table 22. KEY CONCEPT: Evidence–based practice (EBP) 
Evidence–based practice (EBP) was introduced in medicine as a conscientious use of 
current best evidence in clinical–decision making about individual patients. EBP 
revolves around efficacy research, which assesses whether specific interventions 
produce causal (measurable) effects on clinical populations. Internal validity and 
randomisation of samples are crucial to efficacy research. An example of such research 
is randomised controlled trials (RCTs). 
 
‘Evidence’ from an EBP standpoint hovers over the epistemological assumption of 
procedural objectivity: knowledge can be generated in a standardised, non–erroneous 
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way, thus producing objective (i.e., with minimised bias) data. This can be achieved by 
anyone, as long as they are able to perform the methodological procedure (e.g., RCT) 
appropriately, in a “clearly defined and accepted process that assists with knowledge 
production” (Douglas, 2004, p. 131). If there is a well–outlined quantitative form for 
knowledge production, the same outcome should be achieved regardless of who 
processes or interprets the information. For example, researchers using Cochrane 
Review assess the strength of evidence using meticulously controlled and scrupulous 
techniques; in turn, this minimises individual judgment and creates unanimity of 
outcomes across different groups of people (Gabbay & le May, 2011). The typical process 
of knowledge generation (through employing RCTs and procedural objectivity) in EBP is 
demonstrated in figure 4. 
 
 




In EBP, the concept of validity remains somewhat controversial, with many critics stating 
that it limits rather than strengthens knowledge generation (Berg & Slaatelid, 2017; Berg, 
2019b; Lilienfeld et al., 2013). This is because efficacy research relies on internal validity. 
At a general level, this concept refers to the congruence between the research study and 
the research findings (i.e., ensuring that the research findings were not influenced by 
anything external to the study, such as confounding variables, methodological errors and 
bias); at a more specific level, internal validity determines the extent to which a study 
establishes a reliable causal relationship between an independent variable (e.g., 
treatment) and independent variable (outcome or effect) (Margison et al., 2000). This 
approach to validity is demonstrated in figure 5. 
 Social scientists have argued that there is a trade–off between research rigour and 
generalisability: the more specific the sample and the more rigorously defined the 
intervention, the outcome is likely to be less applicable to everyday, routine practice. As 
such, there remains a tension between employing procedural objectivity which increases 
the rigour of research outcomes and applying such outcomes to routine psychotherapy 





Figure 5. Internal validity 
 
According to McLeod (2002), inability to address questions that are most relevant for 
practitioners contributed to a deepening research–practice divide in psychotherapy. 
Studies investigating how practitioners make clinical decisions and the kinds of evidence 
they refer to show that there is a strong preference for knowledge that is not generated 
procedurally, i.e., knowledge that encompasses concrete clinical situations, experiences, 
and techniques. A study by Stewart & Chambless (2007) sought to assess how a larger 
population of clinicians (under APA, from varying clinical schools of thought and 
independent practices, sample size 591) make treatment decisions in private practice. 
The study found that large–scale statistical data was not the primary source of 
information sought by clinicians. The most important influences were identified as past 
clinical experiences and clinical expertise (M = 5.62). Treatment materials based on 
clinical case observations and theory (M = 4.72) were used almost as frequently as 
psychotherapy outcome research findings (M = 4.80) (i.e., evidence–based research). 
These numbers are likely to fluctuate across different forms of psychotherapy; however, 
they are indicative of the need for research about routine clinical settings that does not 
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isolate or generalise the effect of an intervention but examines the variations in 
psychotherapy processes. 
 
 5.2.2 The alternative approach: practice–based evidence (PBE) 
 
In an attempt to dissolve or lessen the research–practice divide, an alternative paradigm 
of practice–based evidence (PBE) has been suggested (Barkham & Mellor–Clark, 2003; 
Fox, 2003; Margison et al., 2000; Iwakabe & Gazzola, 2009; Green & Latchford, 2012; 
Laska et al., 2014). PBE represents a shift in how we think about evidence and knowledge 
generation in psychotherapy. PBE treats research as a local and contingent process (at 
least initially), which means it focuses on variations (e.g., in patient symptoms) and 
complexities (e.g., of clinical setting) in the studied phenomena (Fox, 2003). Moreover, 
research and theory–building are seen as complementary rather than detached activities 
from clinical practice. That is to say, PBE seeks to examine how and which treatments can 
be improved in everyday clinical practice by flagging up clinically salient issues and 
developing clinical techniques (Barkham & Mellor–Clark, 2003). For this reason, PBE is 
concerned with the effectiveness of research findings: it evaluates how well interventions 
work in real–world settings (Rosqvist et al., 2011). Although it is not unlikely for RCTs to 
be used in order to generate practice–informed evidence (Horn & Gassaway, 2007), 
qualitative methods like the systematic case study are seen as ideal for demonstrating the 
effectiveness of therapeutic interventions with individual patients (van Hennik, 2020). 
Table 23. KEY CONCEPT: Practice–based evidence (PBE) 
Practice–based evidence (PBE) was introduced as an alternative paradigm to EBP. PBE 
focuses on assessing the variations and complexities of treatment in routine clinical 
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practice. Research in PBE is concerned with the effectiveness of findings by examining 
how interventions work in real–world settings. External validity and contingency of 
findings is crucial to effectiveness research. An example of such research is the 
systematic case study. 
 
PBE’s epistemological approach to ‘evidence’ may be understood through the process of 
concordant objectivity (Douglas, 2004): “Instead of seeking to eliminate individual 
judgment, … [concordant objectivity] checks to see whether the individual judgments of 
people in fact do agree” (p. 462). This does not mean that anyone can contribute to the 
evaluation process like in procedural objectivity, where the main criterion is following a 
set quantitative protocol or knowing how to operate a specific research design. 
Concordant objectivity requires that there is a set of competent observers who are closely 
familiar with the studied phenomenon (e.g., researchers and practitioners who are 
familiar with depression from a variety of therapeutic approaches).  
 Systematic case studies are a good example of PBE ‘in action’: they allow for the 
examination of detailed unfolding of events in psychotherapy practice, making it the most 
pragmatic and practice–oriented form of psychotherapy research (Fishman, 1999, 2005). 
Furthermore, systematic case studies approach evidence and results through concordant 
objectivity (Douglas, 2004) by involving a team of researchers and rigorous data 
triangulation processes (McLeod, 2010b). This means that, although systematic case 
studies remain focused on particular clinical situations and detailed subjective 
experiences (similar to classic clinical case studies; see Iwakabe & Gazzola, 2009), they 
still involve a series of validity checks and considerations on how findings from a single 
systematic case pertain to broader psychotherapy research (Fishman, 2005). The typical 
process of knowledge generation (through employing systematic case studies and 
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concordant objectivity) in PBE is demonstrated in figure 6. The figure exemplifies a 
bidirectional approach to research and practice, which includes the development of 
research–supported psychological treatments (through systematic reviews of existing 
evidence) as well as the perspectives of clinical practitioners in the research process 
(through the study of local and contingent patient and/or treatment processes) 
(Teachman et al., 2012; Westen et al., 2004). 
 
 
Figure 6. Typical knowledge generation process in practice–based evidence (PBE) 
 
From a PBE standpoint, external validity is a desirable research condition: it measures 
extent to which the impact of interventions apply to real patients and therapists in 
everyday clinical settings. As such, external validity is not based on the strength of causal 
relationships between treatment interventions and outcomes (as in internal validity); 
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instead, the use of specific therapeutic techniques and problem–solving decisions are 
considered to be important for generalising findings onto routine clinical practice (even 
if the findings are explicated from a single case study; see Aveline, 2005). This approach 
to validity is demonstrated in figure 7.  
 
Figure 7. External validity 
 
Since effectiveness research is less focused on limiting the context of the studied 
phenomenon (indeed, explicating the context is often one of the research aims), there is 
more potential for confounding factors (e.g., bias and uncontrolled variables) which in 
turn can reduce the study’s internal validity (Barkham & Mellor–Clark, 2003). This is also 
an important challenge for research appraisal. Douglas (2004) argues that appraising 
research in terms of its effectiveness may produce significant disagreements or group 
illusions, since what might work for some practitioners may not work for others: “It 
cannot guarantee that values are not influencing or supplanting reasoning; the observers 
may have shared values that cause them to all disregard important aspects of an event” 
(Douglas, 2004, p. 462). Douglas further proposes that an interactive approach to 
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objectivity may be employed as a more complex process in debating the evidential quality 
of a research study: it requires a discussion among observers and evaluators in the form 
of peer–review, scientific discourse, as well as research appraisal tools and instruments. 
While these processes of rigour are also applied in EBP, there appears to be much more 
space for debate, disagreement, and interpretation in PBE’s approach to research 
evaluation, partly because the evaluation criteria themselves are subject of 
methodological debate and are often employed in different ways by researchers 
(Williams et al., 2019). This issue will be addressed more explicitly again in relation to 
CaSE development (section 5.4, ‘Developing purpose–oriented evaluation criteria for 
systematic case studies’). 
 
 5.2.3 A third way approach to validity and evidence 
 
The research–practice divide shows us that there may be something significant in 
establishing complementarity between EBP and PBE rather than treating them as 
mutually exclusive forms of research (Fishman et al., 2017). For one, EBP is not a 
sufficient condition for delivering research relevant to practice settings (Bower, 2003). 
While RCTs can demonstrate that an intervention works on average in a group, clinicians 
who are facing individual patients need to answer a different question: how can I make 
therapy work with this particular case? (Cartwright & Hardie, 2012). Systematic case 
studies are ideal for filling this gap: they contain descriptions of microprocesses (e.g., 
patient symptoms, therapeutic relationships, therapist attitudes) in psychotherapy 
practice that are often overlooked in large–scale RCTs (Iwakabe & Gazzola, 2009). In 
particular, systematic case studies describing the use of specific interventions with less 
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researched psychological conditions (e.g., childhood depression or complex post–
traumatic stress disorder) can deepen practitioners’ understanding of effective clinical 
techniques before the results of large–scale outcome studies are disseminated. 
Secondly, establishing a working relationship between systematic case studies 
and RCTs will contribute toward a more pragmatic understanding of validity in 
psychotherapy research. Indeed, the very tension and so–called trade–off between 
internal and external validity is based on the assumption that research methods are 
designed on an either/or basis; either they provide a sufficiently rigorous study design, 
or they produce findings that can be applied to real–life practice. Jimenez–Buedo & Miller 
(2010) call this assumption into question: in their view, if a study is not internally valid, 
then “little, or rather nothing, can be said of the outside world” (p. 302). In this sense, 
internal validity may be seen as a pre–requisite for any form of applied research and its 
external validity, but it need not be constrained to the quantitative approach of causality. 
For example, Levitt et al. (2017) argue that, what is typically conceptualised as internal 
validity, is, in fact, a much broader construct, involving the assessment of how the 
research method (whether qualitative or quantitative) is best suited for the research goal, 
and whether it obtains the relevant conclusions. Similarly, Truijens et al. (2019) suggest 
that we should think about validity in a broader epistemic sense – not just in terms of 
psychometric measures, but also in terms of the research design, procedure, goals 
(research questions), approaches to inquiry (paradigms, epistemological assumptions), 
etc.  
The overarching argument from research cited above is that all forms of research 
– qualitative and quantitative – can produce ‘valid evidence’ but the validity itself needs 
to be assessed against each specific research method and purpose. For example, RCTs are 
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accompanied with a variety of clearly outlined appraisal tools and instruments such as 
CASP (Critical Appraisal Skills Programme) that are well suited for the assessment of RCT 
validity and their implications for EBP. Systematic case studies (or case studies more 
generally) currently have no appraisal tools in any discipline. The next section evaluates 
whether existing qualitative research appraisal tools are relevant for systematic case 
studies in psychotherapy and specifies the missing evaluative criteria.   
 
5.3 The relevance of existing appraisal tools for qualitative research to systematic 
case studies in psychotherapy 
 
 5.3.1 What is a research tool? 
 
Currently, there are several research appraisal tools, checklists, and frameworks for 
qualitative studies. It is important to note that tools, checklists and frameworks are not 
equivalent to one another but actually refer to different approaches to appraising the 
validity of a research study. As such, it is erroneous to assume that all forms of qualitative 
appraisal feature the same aims and methods (Williams et al., 2019; Hannes et al., 2010).  
Generally, research assessment falls into two categories: checklists and 
frameworks. Checklist approaches are often contrasted with quantitative research, since 
the focus is on assessing the internal validity of research (i.e., researcher’s independence 
from the study). This involves the assessment of bias in sampling, participant 
recruitment, data collection and analysis. Framework approaches to research appraisal, 
on the other hand, revolve around traditional qualitative concepts such as transparency, 
reflexivity, dependability, and transferability (Williams et al., 2019). Framework 
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approaches to appraisal are often challenging to use because they depend on the 
reviewer’s familiarisation and interpretation of the qualitative concepts.  
Because of these different approaches, there is some ambiguity in terminology, 
particularly between research appraisal instruments and research appraisal tools. These 
terms are often used interchangeably in appraisal literature (Williams et al., 2019). In this 
paper, research appraisal tool is defined as a method–specific (i.e., it identifies a specific 
research method or component) form of appraisal that draws from both checklist and 
framework approaches. Furthermore, a research appraisal tool seeks to inform decision 
making in EBP or PBE paradigms and provides explicit definitions of the tool’s evaluative 
framework (thus minimising – but by no means eliminating – the reviewers’ 
interpretation of the tool). This definition will be applied to CaSE.  
Table 24. KEY CONCEPT: Research appraisal tool 
Research appraisal tool is a method–specific (or a research component–specific) form 
of appraisal that draws from both checklist and framework approaches. A research 
appraisal tool will usually provide explicit definitions for its evaluative framework and 
will be used by researchers who wish to demonstrate the evidential quality of their 
study to the readers. 
 
In contrast, research appraisal instruments are generally seen as a broader form of 
appraisal in the sense that they may evaluate a variety of methods (i.e., they are non–
method specific or they do not target a particular research component), and are aimed at 
checking whether the research findings and/or the study design contain specific 
elements (e.g., the aims of research, the rationale behind design methodology, participant 
recruitment strategies, etc.).  
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There is often an implicit difference in audience between appraisal tools and 
instruments. Research appraisal instruments are often aimed at researchers who want to 
assess the strength of their study; however, the process of appraisal may not be made 
explicit in the study itself (besides mentioning that the tool was used to appraise the 
study). Research appraisal tools are aimed at researchers who wish to explicitly 
demonstrate the evidential quality of the study to the readers (which is particularly 
common in RCTs). All forms of appraisal used in the comparative exercise below are 
defined as ‘tools’, even though they have different appraisal approaches and aims.  
 
 5.3.2 Comparing different qualitative tools 
 
Hannes et al. (2010) identified CASP (Critical Appraisal Skills Programme–tool), JBI 
(Joanna Briggs Institute–tool), and ETQS (Evaluation Tool for Qualitative Studies) as the 
most frequently used critical appraisal tools by qualitative researchers.  All three tools 
are available online and are free of charge, which means that any researcher or reviewer 
can readily utilise CASP, JBI or ETQS evaluative frameworks to their research. 
Furthermore, all three tools were developed within the context of organisational, 
institutional or consortium support.  
Table 25. CASP (Critical Appraisal Skills Programme–tool) 
CASP is part of the Oxford Centre for Triple Value Healthcare enterprise, which seeks 
to support healthcare systems and achieve optimal outcomes for populations. CASP has 
a variety of checklists, many of which are aimed at RCTs (e.g., RCT checklist, systematic 




Table 26. JBI (Joanna Briggs Institute–tool) 
JBI was developed by the Joanna Briggs Institute led by Alan Pearson. Like CASP, JBI 
offers a variety of appraisal checklists (e.g., cross sectional studies, diagnostic test 
accuracy studies, cohort studies, etc.) that are aimed at improving healthcare research 
and practice.  
 
Table 27. ETQS (Evaluation Tool for Qualitative Studies) 
ETQS was developed at the University of Leeds by Andrew Long in the Department of 
Health, under the Outcomes for Social Care for Adults (OSCA) Initiative (1997–99). Out 
of the three tools, ETQS is most attuned to the qualitative research paradigm; it seeks 
to assess and enhance evidence that is “different” from the common efficacy research 
in EBP (Long & Godfrey, 2004). 
 
It is important to note that neither of the three tools is specific to systematic case studies 
or psychotherapy case studies more broadly. This means that using CASP, JBI or ETQS for 
case study appraisal may come at a cost of overlooking elements and components specific 
to the systematic case study method.  
Based on Hannes et al. (2010) comparative study of qualitative appraisal tools as 
well as the different evaluation criteria explicated in CASP, JBI and ETQS evaluative 
frameworks, an assessment was developed to see how well each of the three tools is 
attuned to the methodological, clinical, and theoretical aspects of systematic case studies 
in psychotherapy. The latter components were based on case study guidelines featured 
in the journal of Pragmatic Case Studies in Psychotherapy as well as components 
commonly used by published systematic case studies across a variety of other 
psychotherapy journals (e.g., Psychotherapy Research, Research In Psychotherapy: 
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Psychopathology Process And Outcome, etc.) (see table 28 for detailed descriptions of each 
component). 
The evaluation criteria for each tool in table 28 follows JBI Critical Appraisal 
Checklist for Qualitative Research (published in 2017) and JBI Critical Appraisal Checklist 
for Case Reports (published in 2017); CASP Qualitative Checklist (published in 2018); and 
ETQS Questionnaire (first published in 2004 but revised continuously since). Table 29 





Table 28. Comparing the relevance of JBI (Joanna Briggs Institute), CASP (Critical Appraisal Skills Program) and ETQS (Evaluation Tool for 
Qualitative Studies) for appraising components specific to systematic case studies 
Systematic case study 
components 
JBI Evaluation Criteria CASP Evaluation Criteria ETQS Evaluation Criteria 
METHODOLOGICAL COMPONENTS 
 
Case Context and Method Congruity between the research 
methodology and the research 




Is a qualitative methodology 
appropriate? 
 
Was the research design 
appropriate to address the aims 
of the research? 
No assessment criteria for the 
suitability of the case study method 
Research Participants 
(description of patients, 
therapists, researchers) 
Cultural and theoretical context 
of the researcher; researcher’s 
impact on the research (and vice 
versa); adequate patient 
representation  
No assessment criteria for the 
description of researchers and 
data analysts 
 
How do the authors locate the study 
within the existing knowledge base? 
 
What role does the researcher adopt 
within the setting? 
 
Are the researcher’s own position, 




Research Procedure (data 
collection and analysis 
methods) 
Congruity between the research 
methodology and the analysis of 
data and interpretation of 
results 
 
Was the recruitment strategy 
appropriate to the aims of the 
research? 
Were the data collected in a way 
that addressed the research 
issue? 
Was the data analysis 
sufficiently rigorous? 
What theoretical framework guides or 
informs the study? 
 
What data collection methods are 
used to obtain and record data? 
 
How were data analyzed? 
CLINICAL COMPONENTS 
  
Case Introduction Clear description of patient 
demographics and current 
clinical condition 
No assessment criteria for case 
description 
 
What are the key characteristics of the 
sample (events, persons, times and 
settings)? 
Assessment of the Client’s 
Problems, Goals, Strengths, 
and History (includes many 
data sources and methods, 
such as diagnostic tools and 
questionnaires) 
Participants and their voices are 
clearly represented 
No assessment criteria for 
patient’s clinical assessment or 
the use of other methods and 
data sources 
No assessment criteria for the 
formulation and planning of the 
treatment 
No assessment criteria for 
patient’s clinical assessment or 
the use of other methods and 
data sources 
 
Within what geographical and care 
setting is the study carried out? 
Is sufficient detail given about the 
setting? 
 
No assessment criteria for patient’s 
clinical assessment or the use of other 
methods and data sources 
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Course of Therapy and 
Treatment Plan 
 
Clear description of patient’s 
history, including a timeline of 
relevant events 
No assessment criteria for 
course of treatment or progress 
Over what time period is the study 
conducted? 




(includes assessment of 
clinical outcomes and 
theoretical findings) 
 
Research conclusions flow from 
the analysis and interpretation 
of the data 
 
Is there a clear statement of 
findings? (e.g. triangulation, 
respondent validation, more 
than one analyst) 
 
Is there sufficient breadth (e.g. 
contrast of two or more perspective) 
and depth (e.g. insight into a single 
perspective)? 
 




No assessment criteria for 
research limitations 
 
No assessment criteria for 
research limitations 
 
Is there evidence of reflexivity?  
 
Is adequate evidence provided to 
support the analysis (validity and 
reliability)? 
 
Transferability of Findings No assessment criteria for 
transferability of findings 
 
How valuable is the research? 
Consider the findings in relation 
to current practice or policy, or 
relevant research–based 
literature and how findings can 
be transferred to other 
populations or other ways in 
which the research may be used 
To what setting and population are 





Table 29. Recommended reviewer responses to JBI (Joanna Briggs Institute), CASP (Critical Appraisal Skills Program) and ETQS (Evaluation 
Tool for Qualitative Studies) 
JBI Evaluation Responses CASP Evaluation Responses ETQS Evaluation Responses 
Checklist:  
 
Yes    





Yes    
No    
Can’t tell  
Additional space for comments 
available 
Open–ended questionnaire:  
 





 5.3.3 Using CASP, JBI and ETQS for systematic case study appraisal 
 
Although JBI, CASP and ETQS were all developed to appraise qualitative research, it is 
evident from the above comparison that there are significant differences between the 
three tools. For example, JBI and ETQS are well suited to assess researcher’s 
interpretations (defined as interpretive validity, a subcategory of internal validity; Hannes 
et al., 2010): the researcher’s ability to portray, understand and reflect on the research 
participants’ experiences, thoughts, viewpoints and intentions. JBI has an explicit 
requirement for participant voices to be clearly represented, whereas ETQS involves a 
set of questions about key characteristics of events, persons, times and settings that are 
relevant to the study. Furthermore, both JBI and ETQS seek to assess the researcher’s 
influence on the research, with ETQS particularly focusing on the evaluation of reflexivity 
(the researcher’s personal influence on the interpretation and collection of data). These 
elements are absent or addressed to a lesser extent in the CASP tool. 
The appraisal of transferability of findings (what this paper previously referred to 
as external validity) is addressed only by ETQS and CASP. Both tools have detailed 
questions about the value of research to practice and policy as well as its transferability 
to other populations and settings. Methodological research aspects are also extensively 
addressed by CASP and ETQS, but less so by JBI (which relies predominantly on congruity 
between research methodology and objectives without any particular assessment 
criteria for other data sources and/or data collection methods). Finally, the evaluation of 
theoretical aspects (also known as theoretical validity; Hannes et al., 2010) is addressed 
only by JBI and ETQS; there are no assessment criteria for theoretical framework in CASP. 
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Given these differences, it is unsurprising that CASP, JBI and ETQS have limited 
relevance for systematic case studies in psychotherapy. First, it is evident that neither of 
the three tools has specific evaluative criteria for the clinical component of systematic 
case studies. Although JBI and ETQS feature some relevant questions about participants 
and their context, the conceptualisation of patients (and/or clients) in psychotherapy 
involves other kinds of data elements (e.g., diagnostic tools and questionnaires as well as 
therapist observations) that go beyond the usual participant data. Furthermore, much of 
the clinical data is intertwined with the therapist’s clinical decision–making and thinking 
style (Kaluzeviciute & Willemsen, 2020). As such, there is a need to appraise patient data 
and therapist interpretations not only on a separate basis, but also as two forms of 
knowledge that are deeply intertwined in the case narrative.  
Secondly, since systematic case studies involve various forms of data, there is a 
need to appraise how these data converge (or how different methods complement one 
another in the case context) and how they can be transferred or applied in broader 
psychotherapy research and practice. These systematic case study components are 
attended to a degree by CASP (which is particularly attentive of methodological 
components) and ETQS (particularly specific criteria for research transferability onto 
policy and practice). These components are not addressed or less explicitly addressed by 
JBI.  
Overall, neither of the tools is attuned to all methodological, theoretical and 
clinical components of the systematic case study. Specifically, there are no clear 
evaluation criteria for the description of research teams (i.e. different data analysts 
and/or clinicians); the suitability of the systematic case study method; the description of 
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patient’s clinical assessment; the use of other methods or data sources; the general data 
about therapeutic progress). 
Finally, there is something to be said about the recommended reviewer responses 
(table 29). Systematic case studies can vary significantly in their formulation and 
purpose. The methodological, theoretical, and clinical components outlined in table 28 
follow guidelines made by case study journals; however, these are recommendations, not 
‘set in stone’ case templates. For this reason, the straightforward checklist approaches 
adopted by JBI and CASP may be difficult to use for case study researchers and those 
reviewing case study research. The ETQS open–ended questionnaire approach suggested 
by Long and Godfrey (2004) enables a comprehensive, detailed and purpose–oriented 
assessment, suitable for the evaluation of systematic case studies. That said, there 
remains a challenge of ensuring that there is less space for the interpretation of evaluative 
criteria (Williams et al., 2019). The combination of checklist and framework approaches 
would, therefore, provide a more stable appraisal process across different reviewers. 
 
5.4 Developing purpose–oriented evaluation criteria for systematic case studies 
 
The starting point in developing evaluation criteria for Case Study Evaluation–tool (CaSE) 
is addressing the significance of pluralism in systematic case studies. Unlike RCTs, 
systematic case studies are pluralistic in the sense that they employ divergent practices 
in methodological procedures (research process), and they may include significantly 
different research aims and purpose (the end–goal) (Kaluzeviciute & Willemsen, 2020). 
While some systematic case studies will have an explicit intention to conceptualise and 
situate a single patient’s experiences and symptoms within a broader clinical population, 
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others will focus on the exploration of phenomena as they emerge from the data. It is 
therefore important that CaSE is positioned within a purpose–oriented evaluative 
framework, suitable for the assessment of what each systematic case is good for (rather 
than determining an absolute measure of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ systematic case studies). This 
approach to evidence and appraisal is in line with the PBE paradigm. PBE emphasises the 
study of clinical complexities and variations through local and contingent settings (e.g., 
single case studies) and promotes methodological pluralism (Barkham & Mellor–Clark, 
2003). 
 
 5.4.1 CaSE Checklist for Essential Components in Systematic Case Studies 
 
In order to conceptualise purpose–oriented appraisal questions, we must first look at 
what unites and differentiates systematic case studies in psychotherapy. The commonly 
used theoretical, clinical and methodological systematic case study components were 
identified earlier in table 29. These components will be seen as essential and common to 
most systematic case studies in CaSE evaluative criteria. If these essential components 
are missing in a systematic case study, then it may be implied there is a lack of 
information, which in turn diminishes the evidential quality of the case. As such, the 
checklist serves as a tool for checking whether a case study is, indeed, systematic (as 
opposed to experimental or clinical; see Iwakabe & Gazzola, 2009 for further 
differentiation between methodologically distinct case study types) and should be used 
before CaSE Purpose–based Evaluative Framework for Systematic Case Studies (which is 
designed for the appraisal of different purposes common to systematic case studies). 
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 As noted earlier in the paper, checklist approaches to appraisal are useful when 
evaluating the presence or absence of specific information in a research study. This 
approach can be used to appraise essential components in systematic case studies, as 
shown below. From a pragmatic point view (Levitt et al., 2017; Truijens et al., 2019), CaSE 
Checklist for Essential Components in Systematic Case Studies can be seen as a way to 
ensure the internal validity of systematic case study: the reviewer is assessing whether 
sufficient information is provided about the case design, procedure, approaches to 




Table 30. Case Study Evaluation–tool (CaSE) Checklist for Essential Components in Systematic Case Studies  
Recommended responses: Yes, No, Unclear or Not Applicable 
METHODOLOGY 
1. The rationale behind choosing the case study method 
2. Description of research design and aims 
3. Description of research participants, including: 
3a. Patients/clients 
3b. Therapists, clinical supervisors 
3c. Researchers/data analysts (research team) 
4. Description of research procedures, including: 
4a. Evaluation of existing literature and research 
4b. Data collection methods 
4c. Data analysis methods 
4d. Data triangulation procedures 
4e. Research appraisal tools and instruments 
5. Description of researchers’ reflexivity (awareness of the relationship between the researcher and research study), including: 
5a. Research assumptions pertaining to objectives 
5b. Research biases pertaining to data analysis 
5c. Differentiation between assumptions and views made by different researchers/therapists 
6. Description of research limitations, including: 
6a. Congruity between research data and research aims and objectives 
6b. Research appraisal and validity 
7. Relevant ethical information, including: 
7a. Patient’s informed consent 
7b. Anonymisation of specific clinical material 
CLINICAL COMPONENTS 
8. Description of patient’s history, including: 
8a. Demographics 
8b. Cultural context 
8c. Socio–economic context 
8d. Interpersonal history (family and other relationships) 
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9. Description of patient’s clinical condition, including: 
9a. Current and past diagnosis (with reference to DSM, ICD and other diagnostic manuals) 
9b. Current and past symptoms and experiences 
9c. Previously received treatment 
9d. The use of medication  
10. Description of patient’s problems through: 
10a. Diagnostic tools (therapist’s assessment) 
10b. Self–report questionnaires (patient’s self–assessment) 
11. Description of course of therapy and treatment, including: 
11a. Therapeutic modality 
11b. Therapeutic setting (number of sessions, frequency, private/public practice) 
11c. Therapeutic relationship  
11d. Timeline of relevant treatment events/sessions 
11e. Follow–up information 
11f. Treatment outcomes 
11g. Complicating factors 
12. Description of clinical decision–making and reflexivity (awareness of the relationship between the therapist and the treatment process), 
including: 
12a. Clinical assumptions pertaining to diagnosis  
12b. Clinical biases pertaining to therapeutic techniques and interpretations (especially in relation to therapist’s therapeutic 
modality) 
13. Description of therapist where relevant, including: 
13a. Professional experience 
13b. Demographics 
13c. Cultural context 
13d. Socio–economic context 
THEORY 
14. Clear description of theoretical references and key concepts 
15. Description of how clinical decision–making relates to the chosen theoretical framework 
16. Clear statement of theoretical findings 
17. Clear description of evidence for and limitations of the chosen theoretical framework, including: 
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17a. Validity (does the case study attend its research objectives and aims sufficiently? Do researchers use relevant theoretical 
concepts, clinical techniques and research methods?) 
17b. Reliability (does the case study provide sufficient, detailed and reflexive information on how it arrived at its findings?) 
18. Description of transferability of findings (relevance to other cases), including: 
18a. Transferability to psychotherapy research 
18b. Transferability to psychotherapy practice 
18c. Relevance to policy in private and/or public healthcare 
18d. Relevance to specific clinical population and setting 
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 5.4.2 CaSE Purpose–based Evaluative Framework for Systematic Case Studies 
 
Identifying differences between systematic case studies means identifying the different 
purposes systematic case studies have in psychotherapy. Based on the earlier work by 
social scientist Robert Yin (1984, 1993), we can differentiate between exploratory 
(hypothesis generating, indicating a beginning phase of research), descriptive 
(particularising case data as it emerges) and representative (a case that is typical of a 
broader clinical population, referred to as the “explanatory case” by Yin) cases.  
Another increasingly significant strand of systematic case studies is transferable 
(aggregating and transferring case study findings) cases. These cases are based on the 
process of meta–synthesis (Iwakabe & Gazzola, 2009): by examining processes and 
outcomes in many different case studies dealing with similar clinical issues, researchers 
can identify common themes and inferences. In this way, single case studies that have 
relatively little impact on clinical practice, research or health care policy (in the sense that 
they capture psychotherapy processes rather than produce generalisable claims as in 
Yin’s representative case studies) can contribute to the generation of a wider knowledge 
base in psychotherapy (Iwakabe, 2003, 2005). However, there is an ongoing issue of 
assessing the evidential quality of such transferable cases. According to Duncan and 
Sparks (2019), although meta–synthesis and meta–analysis are considered to be ‘gold 
standard’ for assessing interventions across disparate studies in psychotherapy, they 
often contain case studies with significant research limitations, inappropriate 
interpretations and insufficient information. It is therefore important to have a research 
appraisal process in place for selecting transferable case studies. 
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Two other types of systematic case study research include: critical (testing and/or 
confirming existing theories) cases, which are described as an excellent method for 
falsifying existing theoretical concepts and testing whether therapeutic interventions 
work in practice with concrete patients (Kaluzeviciute, 2021), and unique (going beyond 
the ‘typical’ cases and demonstrating deviations) cases (Merriam, 1998). These two 
systematic case study types are often seen as less valuable for psychotherapy research 
given that unique/falsificatory findings are difficult to generalise. But it is clear that 
practitioners and researchers in our field seek out context–specific data, as well as 
detailed information on the effectiveness of therapeutic techniques in single cases (Stiles, 
2007). 
Table 31. KEY CONCEPT: Purpose–based systematic case studies 
1. Representative cases of a broader clinical population (typicality); 
2. Descriptive cases that capture specific psychotherapy processes as they 
emerge in treatment (particularity); 
3. Unique cases due to unusual variations that go beyond the ‘average’ population 
(deviation);  
4. Critical cases that test existing theories (faslficiation/confirmation); 
5. Exploratory cases that indicate a beginning phase of a multiple case study 
research (hypothesis generation);  
6. Transferable cases that seek to aggregate and transfer case study findings onto 
other cases (generalisability). 
 
Each purpose–based case study contributes to PBE in different ways. Representative cases 
provide qualitatively rich, in–depth data about a clinical phenomenon within its 
particular context. This offers other clinicians and researchers access to a ‘closed world’ 
(Macrill & Iwakabe, 2013) containing a wide range of attributes about a conceptual type 
(e.g., clinical condition or therapeutic technique). Descriptive cases generally seek to 
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demonstrate a realistic snapshot of therapeutic processes, including complex dynamics 
in therapeutic relationships, including instances of therapeutic failure (Maggio et al., 
2019). Descriptive cases are commonly used in psychotherapy training and supervision. 
Unique cases are relevant for both clinicians and researchers: they often contain novel 
treatment approaches and/or introduce new diagnostic considerations about patients 
who deviate from the clinical population. Critical cases demonstrate the application of 
psychological theories ‘in action’ with particular patients; as such, they are relevant to 
clinicians, researchers, and policymakers (Macrill & Iwakabe, 2013). Exploratory cases 
bring new insight and observations into clinical practice and research. This is particularly 
useful when comparing (or introducing) different clinical approaches and techniques 
(Trad & Raine, 1994). Findings from exploratory cases often include future research 
suggestions. Finally, transferable cases provide one solution to the generalisation issue in 
psychotherapy research through the previously mentioned process of meta–synthesis. 
Grouped together, transferable cases can contribute to theory building and development, 
as well as higher levels of abstraction about a chosen area of psychotherapy research 
(Iwakabe & Gazzola, 2009). 
With this plurality in mind, it is evident that CaSE has a challenging task of 
appraising research components that are distinct across six different types of purpose–
based systematic case studies. The purpose–specific evaluative criteria in tables 32.1–
32.6 was developed in close consultation with epistemological literature associated with 
each type of case study, including: Yin’s (1984, 1993) work on establishing the typicality 
of representative cases; Iwakabe and Gazzola’s (2009) and Duncan and Sparks’ (2019) 
case selection criteria for meta–synthesis and meta–analysis; Stake’s (1995, 2010) 
research on particularising case narratives; Merriam’s (1998) guidelines on distinctive 
attributes of unique case studies; Kennedy’s (1979) epistemological rules for 
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generalising from case studies; Mahrer’s (1988) discovery oriented case study approach; 
and Edelson’s (1986) guidelines for rigorous hypothesis generation in case studies.  
Research on epistemic issues in case writing (Kaluzeviciute, 2021) and different 
forms of scientific thinking in psychoanalytic case studies (Kaluzeviciute & Willemsen, 
2020) was also utilised to identify case study components that would help improve 
therapist clinical decision–making and reflexivity.  
For the analysis of more complex research components (e.g., the degree of 
therapist reflexivity), the purpose–based evaluation will utilise a framework approach, in 
line with comprehensive and open–ended reviewer responses in ETQS (Evaluation Tool 
for Qualitative Studies) (Long & Godfrey, 2004) (table 32). That is to say, the evaluation 
here is not so much about the presence or absence of information (as in the checklist 
approach) but the degree to which the information helps the case with its unique 
purpose, whether it is generalisability or typicality. Therefore, although the purpose–
oriented evaluation criteria below encompasses comprehensive questions at a 
considerable level of generality (in the sense that not all components may be required or 
relevant for each case study), it nevertheless seeks to engage with each type of purpose–
based systematic case study on an individual basis (attending to research or clinical 
components that are unique to each of type of case study).  
It is important to note that, as this is an introductory paper to CaSE, the evaluative 
framework is still preliminary: it involves some of the core questions that pertain to the 
nature of all six purpose–based systematic case studies. However, there is a need to 
develop a more comprehensive and detailed CaSE appraisal framework for each 
purpose–based systematic case study in the future.
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Table 32. Case Study Evaluation–tool (CaSE) Purpose–based Evaluative Framework for Systematic Case Studies 
Recommended responses: Open–ended questionnaire 
 
32.1 REPRESENTATIVE CASES (purpose: typicality) 
THE STUDIED PHENOMENON  
• What is the studied phenomenon or ‘conceptual type’ (e.g., clinical condition, therapeutic technique, patient’s symptoms)? There 
is generally one specific phenomenon. 
• Is the studied phenomenon sufficiently distinguished from other kinds of (potentially similar) phenomena? 
 
PATIENT DATA 
• Are patient characteristics relevant to the wider clinical population? (E.g., is there a good match between symptoms and 
experiences?) 
• What is the rationale for choosing this patient? 
• Does the patient present any unique or deviant characteristics? (E.g., symptoms that are not representative of the studied clinical 
condition) 
 
THE CLINICAL DISCOURSE 
• Is there a detailed clinical narrative in the form of therapist reflections and observations? 




• Is there a sufficient review of literature on the studied phenomenon? 
• Does the case refer to other cases and/or studies that replicate their findings? 
 
CASE PURPOSE 
• Does the case demonstrate the typical characteristics of the studied phenomenon?  
• Does the case provide findings relevant for the broader clinical population? 
• Can the case contribute to psychotherapy theory? 
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32.2 DESCRIPTIVE CASES (purpose: particularity) 
THE STUDIED PHENOMENON  
• What phenomena are studied in the case (e.g., clinical condition, therapeutic technique, patient’s symptoms)? There can be 
multiple phenomena. 
• Does the case present events and processes common to clinical practice? (E.g., therapeutic relationship difficulties) 
 
PATIENT DATA 
• Are patient characteristics described in detail, with particular attention to uniqueness, subjectivity and meaning of “lived 
experiences”? 
• Does the case narrative convey interpersonally sharable statements, ruminations, metaphors? 
• Is the patient clearly positioned within their cultural and psycho–social context? 
 
THE CLINICAL DISCOURSE 
• Does the case convey the process behind therapist’s practical decisions in the consulting room? 
• Does the case provide “know–how” knowledge on how practitioners can deal with clinically salient issues and situations? 
• Does the therapist provide a reflexive account on how their views and theoretical assumptions might impact the therapeutic 
relationship and clinical decision–making?  
 
RESEARCH  
• Does the case include patient’s self–assessment? (E.g., through self–report measures and dialogic exchange) 
• Does the case include excerpts of dialogue between therapist and patient? 
 
CASE PURPOSE 
• Does the case provide a relational understanding (with which readers can empathise) of the studied phenomenon?  
• Does the case narrative sufficiently portray “real analytic practice” rather than “ideal models”? (E.g., by demonstrating disparity 
between clinical theory/research and practice) 
• Can the case contribute to psychotherapy training and practice? 
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32.3 UNIQUE CASES (purpose: deviation) 
THE STUDIED PHENOMENON   
• What phenomena are studied in the case (e.g., clinical condition, therapeutic technique, patient’s symptoms)? There can be 
multiple phenomena. 
• Does the case explain how the studied phenomena are different or unique from the established theory/research? (E.g., the 
patient’s experience of transference is different from the experiences of transference across a broader clinical population) 
 
PATIENT DATA 
• Are patient characteristics described in detail, with particular attention to uniqueness, subjectivity and meaning of “lived 
experiences”? 
• What is the rationale for choosing this patient? 
 
THE CLINICAL DISCOURSE 
• Does the case convey a detailed description of therapeutic interventions and their effectiveness? 
• Does the therapist provide a reflexive account on how their views and theoretical assumptions might impact clinical decision–
making, particularly in terms of their understanding of the uniqueness/deviation in the case?  




• Does the case convey more than one theoretical and/or research perspective? (E.g., clinical assessment by multiple practitioners 
or data analysis by multiple researchers) 
• Are there considerations of alternative explanations to the observed deviation/uniqueness of the case? (E.g., by referring to 
other published case studies or research) 
 
CASE PURPOSE 
• Does the case provide insight into a novel phenomenon? (E.g., by describing unique patient symptoms or experiences) 
• Does the case provide novel theoretical knowledge in relation to unique/deviant phenomenon? (E.g., by developing a new 
therapeutic technique) 
• Can the case contribute to psychotherapy theory, training and/or practice? 
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32.4 CRITICAL CASES (purpose: falsification/confirmation) 
THE STUDIED PHENOMENON  
• What is the studied phenomenon in the case (e.g., clinical condition, therapeutic technique, patient’s symptoms)? There is 
generally one specific phenomenon. 
• Does the case seek to test an existing theory/research about the studied phenomenon? (E.g., testing the effectiveness of a well–
established therapeutic intervention) 
 
PATIENT DATA 
• Are patient characteristics described in detail? 
• Is the patient clearly outlined within their cultural and psycho–social context? 
• What is the rationale for choosing this patient? 
 
THE CLINICAL DISCOURSE 
• Does the case link therapist narrative and observations with the theoretical/research considerations? 
• Does the case convey a detailed description of therapeutic interventions and their effectiveness? 
 
RESEARCH  
• Does the case convey more than one theoretical and/or research perspective? (E.g., clinical assessment by multiple practitioners 
or data analysis by multiple researchers) 
• Does the case show how the theory/research that is being tested accounts for the clinical observations in the case? 
• Does the case provide a sufficient explanation on why their chosen theory/research is more appropriate than another? 
• If the case falsifies an existing theory/research, are there sufficient sample considerations? (E.g., the case may be unique and 
therefore the original theory/research still stands) 
 
CASE PURPOSE 
• Does the case examine an existing theory/research successfully? (E.g., by showing whether a theory is effective with a specific 
patient) 
• If the case falsifies an existing theory/research, does it offer any novel suggestions or revisions to the falsified 
theory/research? 
• If the case confirms an existing theory/research, does it rule out alternative explanations for the tested hypothesis? (E.g., to 
show that a therapeutic intervention is effective, the positive effects of other variables like medication may need to be ruled out) 
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32.5 EXPLORATORY CASES (purpose: hypothesis generation) 
THE STUDIED PHENOMENON  
• What phenomena are studied in the case (e.g., clinical condition, therapeutic technique, patient’s symptoms)? There can be 
multiple phenomena. 
• Is the case discovery–led, in the sense that it explores data as it emerges? 
• Does the case contain new hypotheses about the studied phenomena? 
 
PATIENT DATA 
• Are patient characteristics described in detail? 
• Is the patient clearly outlined within their cultural and psycho–social context? 
 
THE CLINICAL DISCOURSE 
• Does the case link therapist narrative and observations with the theoretical/research considerations? 
• Does the case narrative explore the “how” and “what” questions in relation to patient experiences and treatment processes? 
• Does the case identify complex processes and mechanisms in the treatment and link them to theory? 
 
RESEARCH  
• Is there a sufficient review of literature of the studied phenomenon? 
• Does the case convey more than one theoretical and/or research perspective? (E.g., clinical assessment by multiple practitioners 
or data analysis by multiple researchers) 
• Does the data converge? Are different/conflicting findings reported? 
 
CASE PURPOSE 
• Does the case convey more than one set of outcomes? 
• Does the case indicate future research trajectories?  
• Can the case contribute to psychotherapy theory, training and/or practice? 
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32.6 TRANSFERABLE CASES (purpose: generalisability) 
THE STUDIED PHENOMENON  
• What is studied phenomenon (e.g., clinical condition, therapeutic technique, patient’s symptoms)? There is generally one specific 
phenomenon. 
• Is the studied phenomenon explicitly defined and differentiated from other kinds of (potentially similar) phenomena? 
 
PATIENT DATA 
• Are patient characteristics described in detail? 
• Is the patient clearly outlined within their cultural and psycho–social context? 
• Does the patient present characteristics typical of the studied phenomenon? Is there sufficient information (clinical, 
theoretical) to link the patient with the studied phenomenon?  
 
THE CLINICAL DISCOURSE 
• Is there a detailed clinical narrative in the form of therapist reflections and observations? 
• Does the case shed light on specific characteristics of the therapeutic process? (E.g., the development of therapeutic alliance)  
• Is the case narrative theme–focused? (E.g., the case identifies specific treatment patterns across different sessions) 
• Is there a clear description of the therapeutic process, usually involving a session–by–session description? 
 
RESEARCH  
• Is there a sufficient review of literature on the studied phenomenon? 
• Does the case involve a specific therapeutic, theoretical and research framework, and is the framework made explicit by the 
researchers? 
• Is there a clear description of the research process? (E.g., step–by–step description of data analysis procedures) 
 
CASE PURPOSE 
• Does the case provide information about common or specific psychotherapy processes? 




5.5 Using CaSE on published systematic case studies in psychotherapy: an 
example 
 
To illustrate the use of CaSE Purpose–based Evaluative Framework for Systematic Case 
Studies, a case study by Lunn et al. (2016) titled “Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy With a 
Client With Bulimia Nervosa” was selected from the Single Case Archive (SCA) and 
analysed in table 33. Based on the core questions associated with the six purpose–based 
systematic case study types in tables 32.1–32.6, the purpose of Lunn et al.’s (2016) case 
was identified as critical (testing an existing theoretical suggestion).  
 Sometimes case study authors will explicitly define the purpose of their case in the 
form of research objectives (as was the case in Lunn et al.’s study); this helps identifying 
which purpose–based questions are most relevant for the evaluation of the case. 
However, some case studies will require comprehensive analysis in order to identify their 
purpose (or multiple purposes). As such, it is recommended that CaSE reviewers first 
assess the degree and manner in which information about the studied phenomenon, 
patient data, clinical discourse, and research are presented before deciding on the case 
purpose.  
 Although each purpose–based systematic case study will contribute to different 
strands of psychotherapy (theory, practice, training, etc.) and focus on different forms of 
data (e.g., theory testing vs extensive clinical descriptions), the overarching aim across all 
systematic case studies in psychotherapy is to study local and contingent processes, such 
as variations in patient symptoms and complexities of the clinical setting. The 
comprehensive framework approach will therefore allow reviewers to assess the degree 
of external validity in systematic case studies (Barkham & Mellor–Clark, 2003). 
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 Furthermore, assessing the case against its purpose will let reviewers determine 
whether the case achieves its set goals (research objectives and aims). The example 
below shows that Lunn et al.’s (2016) case is successful in functioning as a critical case as 
the authors provide relevant, high–quality information about their tested therapeutic 
conditions.  
 Finally, is also possible to use CaSE to gather specific type of systematic case 
studies for one’s research, practice, training, etc. For example, a CaSE reviewer might 
want to identify as many descriptive case studies focusing on negative therapeutic 
relationships as possible for their clinical supervision. The reviewer will therefore only 
need to refer to CaSE questions in table 32.2 on descriptive cases. If the reviewed cases 
do not align with the questions in table 32.2, then they are not suitable for the CaSE 
reviewer who is looking for “know–how” knowledge and detailed clinical narratives.
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Patient data The clinical discourse Research Case purpose 
Critical  The studied 
phenomenon is 
identified as the 
treatment of bulimia 
nervosa. The case tests 
the need of adapting 
therapeutic approaches 
to individual patients on 
the basis of their specific 
therapeutic needs and 
goals rather than 
providing manualised 
therapy across the entire 
clinical population. 
A patient was selected from an 
RCT trial where Cognitive 
Behavioural Therapy (CBT) was 
found, on average, more 
effective than psychoanalytic 
psychotherapy (PP) However, 
this patient’s symptoms and 
context indicated that she may 
benefit from techniques and 
principles common to PP, which 
is why she was chosen for this 
case study. The case involves a 
lengthy patient description, 
including previous diagnosis of 
anorexia nervosa, binge and 
purge episodes, early object 
relations, and childhood–rooted 
trauma. The case provides 
substantial information on 
patient’s psychological context 
and demographics but does not 
contain cultural information 
(this may have been deemed not 
relevant).  
The case contains a detailed 
description of therapeutic 




unconscious, split–off, or 
disavowed aspects of 
patient’s experiences. 
Therapist observations and 
clinical decision–making are 
informed by the theoretical 
PP principles, particularly in 
terms of affirming and 
interpreting patient’s 
experiences. The 
effectiveness of therapeutic 
interventions is described as 
highly positive: patient has 
stopped binging and purging 
and was able to develop a 
closer relationship with her 
family.  
Several theoretical and 
research perspectives are 
explored in order to tailor 
the most suitable 
approach for the patient, 
including attachment 
styles, mentalization, and 
integrative approaches. 
One of the authors acted 
as a therapist, while the 
two other authors were 
involved in data analysis; 
this improved the data 
triangulation process. 
Several hypothetical 
assumptions were made 
about therapeutic setting 
and relationship and their 
suitability for this patient; 
they are shown to be 
highly effective and 
helpful later in the case 
(e.g., nondirective PP 
therapy was experienced 
as more helpful by the 















case is an 
important critical 
follow–up to larger 
RCT study, which 
by and large 
favoured CBT to PP 




5.6 Concluding comments 
 
This paper introduces a novel Case Study Evaluation–tool (CaSE) for systematic case 
studies in psychotherapy. Unlike most appraisal tools in EBP, CaSE is positioned within 
purpose–oriented evaluation criteria, in line with the PBE paradigm. CaSE enables 
reviewers to assess what each systematic case is good for (rather than determining an 
absolute measure of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ systematic case studies). In order to explicate a 
purpose–based evaluative framework, six different systematic case study purposes in 
psychotherapy have been identified: representative cases (purpose: typicality), 
descriptive cases (purpose: particularity), unique cases (purpose: deviation), critical cases 
(purpose: falsification/confirmation), exploratory cases (purpose: hypothesis 
generation), and transferable cases (purpose: generalisability). Each case was linked with 
an existing epistemological network, such as Iwakabe and Gazzola’s (2009) work on case 
selection criteria for meta–synthesis. The framework approach includes core questions 
specific to each purpose–based case study (tables 32.1–32.6). The aim is to assess the 
external validity and effectiveness of each case study against its set out research 
objectives and aims. Reviewers are required to perform a comprehensive and open–
ended data analysis, as shown in the example in table 33.  
Along with CaSE Purpose–based Evaluative Framework (table 32), the paper also 
developed CaSE Checklist for Essential Components in Systematic Case Studies (table 30). 
The checklist approach is meant to aid reviewers in assessing the presence or absence of 
essential case study components, such as the rationale behind choosing the case study 
method and description of patient’s history. If essential components are missing in a 
systematic case study, then it may be implied that there is a lack of information, which in 
turn diminishes the evidential quality of the case. Following broader definitions of 
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validity set out by Levitt et al. (2017) and Truijens et al. (2019), it could be argued that 
the checklist approach allows for the assessment of (non–quantitative) internal validity 
in systematic case studies: does the researcher provide sufficient information about the 
case study design, rationale, research objectives, epistemological/philosophical 
paradigms, assessment procedures, data analysis, etc., to account for their research 
conclusions? 
It is important to note that this paper is set as an introduction to CaSE; by 
extension, it is also set as an introduction to research evaluation and appraisal processes 
for case study researchers in psychotherapy. As such, it was important to provide a step–
by–step epistemological rationale and process behind the development of CaSE 
evaluative framework and checklist. However, this also means that further research 
needs to be conducted in order to develop the tool. While CaSE Purpose–based Evaluative 
Framework involves some of the core questions that pertain to the nature of all six 
purpose–based systematic case studies, there is a need to develop individual and 
comprehensive CaSE evaluative frameworks for each of the purpose–based systematic 
case studies in the future. This line of research is likely to enhance CaSE target audience: 
clinicians interested in reviewing highly–particular clinical narratives will attend to 
descriptive case study appraisal frameworks; researchers working with qualitative 
meta–synthesis will find transferable case study appraisal frameworks most relevant to 
their work; while teachers on psychotherapy and counselling modules may seek out 
unique case study appraisal frameworks. 
Furthermore, although CaSE Checklist for Essential Components and CaSE Purpose–
based Evaluative Framework are presented in a comprehensive, detailed manner, with 
definitions and examples that would enable reviewers to have a good grasp of the 
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appraisal process, it is likely that different reviewers may have different interpretations 
or ideas of what might be “substantial” case study data. This, in part, is due to the 
methodologically pluralistic nature of the case study genre itself; what is relevant for one 
case study may not be relevant for another, and vice–versa. To aid with the review 
process, future research on CaSE should include a comprehensive paper on using the tool. 
This paper should involve evaluation examples with all six purpose–based systematic 
case studies, as well as a “search” exercise (using CaSE to assess the relevance of case 
studies for one’s research, practice, training, etc.).  
Finally, further research needs to be developed on how (and, indeed, whether) 
systematic case studies should be reviewed with specific ‘grades’ or ‘assessments’ that go 
beyond the qualitative examination in table 33. This would be particularly significant for 
the processes of qualitative meta–synthesis and meta–analysis. These research 
developments will further enhance CaSE tool, and, in turn, enable psychotherapy 
researchers to appraise their findings within clear, purpose–based evaluative criteria 




Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
6.1 Summary of thesis findings and contributions  
This thesis contributes to the discussion of how clinical and systematic case studies, as 
two methodologically distinct types of case study (Iwakabe & Gazzola, 2009), can be used 
in psychotherapy and psychoanalytic research. Specifically, the findings explore the 
significance of capturing qualitatively rich psychological data in therapeutic practice. 
Although such data is inherently difficult to document given the fact that all qualitative 
investigations require the active participation of the researcher, which may subsequently 
introduce researcher bias (e.g., preference and/or allegiance to one’s 
theoretical/therapeutic framework and “narrative smoothing”; see Truijens, 2016; 
Spence, 1984, 2001; Midgley, 2006a), this thesis argues that, despite these challenges, we 
cannot omit data containing ‘unstandardised’ treatment experiences.  
 For one, standardising (e.g., via statistics or self–report measures) patient 
responses does not always lead to data that is congruent or reflective of patient’s genuine 
(i.e., constitutive of patient’s psychic reality; Hanly & Hanly, 2001) reactions to the 
treatment process. Chapter 2 presents a discussion of case study narratives which 
demonstrate the importance of detailed phenomenological patient observations as well 
as showcase some of the issues in translating subjective experiences into quantitative 
language (Tacq, 2010). For instance, one of the cases discussed in the thesis by Truijens 
et al. (2019) argues that data standardisation in psychotherapy can become a heavy 
burden not only for practitioner–researchers developing such standardised measures 
but patients as well. As respondents to psychometric and survey measures, patients are 
often asked to express difficult (sometimes traumatic) feelings, attitudes, and 
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experiences into quantitative language. Subsequently, the quantitative evaluation may 
miss the mark in tracking the severity and complexity of patient experiences, such as 
feelings of distress, confusion, fear or provocation felt in response to questionnaire items. 
This may have a significant impact on treatment process and outcome, which was 
observed in Truijens et al.’s (2019) case narrative:  
 
On a broader level, the questionnaires seem to provoke [the patient’s] phobic object, 
which is her overall fear to be ill or crazy. […] [The patient’s] phobic object comes into 
play at the most basic level of scoring, as she worries whether a specific score can be 
a sign of abnormality. Beyond that she also questions whether her feelings in general 
indicate abnormality: “So what number is that, then, that anger? […] And is that 
acceptable? And, does that fall under the label normal? Like, is that normal, and to what 
extent?” (p. 23, emphasis added). 
 
Questions that fall outside standardised measures, such as in the above passage, are 
significant, as they often point to complex self–assessments, ideas, and feelings 
experienced by patients during (and beyond) treatment (Desmet et al., 2021). Chapter 2 
through to 5 positioned the latter subjective experiences as foundational for 
psychotherapy practice and research. Instead of perceiving such data as ‘irredeemably 
biased’, the thesis findings suggest that subjective data in psychotherapy should instead 
be treated as micro–processes containing detailed information about patient symptoms, 
responses, reactions; therapeutic techniques, interventions and outcomes; therapist 
attitudes, feelings, and interpretations, and other experiences that can inform therapeutic 
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practice and theory (Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2005; McLeod & Elliott, 2011). Specifically, 
micro–processes that attend to the ‘singularities’ of individual treatment have been 
identified as significant in tailoring therapeutic interventions to unique patient needs 
(Desmet et al., 2021). Chapters 2 and 3 explored how therapeutic modalities and 
techniques are often selected on the basis of detailed case descriptions containing 
patient’s interpersonal patterns, relational experiences, and responses to the therapist 
(Levine & Faust, 2013; Van Nieuwenhove et al., 2019). The clinical case study by Vaskinn 
et al. (2011), which was used in the thesis to demonstrate the epistemic significance of 
hypothesis generation in psychotherapy research, is exemplary of tailoring therapeutic 
interventions in this manner. The case provides a detailed description of a patient 
diagnosed with schizophrenia, which led to the identification of significant symptom and 
behavioural deviations (the patient perceived himself as incapable of existing outside of 
the hospital care). This allowed the therapists to develop a new treatment plan (narrative 
therapy focused on developing a more autonomous self–view), leading to positive 
treatment outcome and, eventually, discharge from the hospital.  
 Although the findings from Vaskinn et al.’s (2011) case are not necessarily 
generalisable to the broader population of individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia (as, 
indeed, the patient’s symptoms and experiences were considered to be diagnostically 
uncommon), this shows that particularising patient descriptions and addressing 
individual treatment needs is significant for both the practice of psychotherapy 
(treatment outcome) as well as research (developing novel therapeutic techniques based 
on the singularity and complexity of individual patient experiences). This argument has 
been central in defending the value of highly particular case study narratives throughout 
the thesis, especially in relation to some of the misconceptions surrounding case study 
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research in Chapter 2. This includes the following ‘conventional truths’ (Flyvbjerg, 2006): 
subjective experiences are inherently flawed data; therapist–patient relationships are too 
far removed from researcher–participant relationships; all therapeutic relationships are 
based on the processes of suggestibility (Grünbaum, 1984) and scientific judgment 
(Foucault, 1979); and finally, that generalisation (specifically, statistical generalisation) 
is the end–goal for all forms of clinical research, including case studies. By addressing 
these critical accounts, thesis Chapters 2 and 3 explored several philosophical systems, 
including social constructivism (which positioned case narratives as forms of 
classification, judgment, and correction between the psychoanalytic expert and the 
passive patient), positivism (which considered case studies as unscientific anecdotal 
reports with non–generalisable findings and subjective bias), and critical realism (a 
performative epistemology working against the grain of both positivism and social 
constructionism, which has been identified as epistemically significant for the case study 
method in the thesis). To this date, perspectives comparing philosophical and 
epistemological frameworks with knowledge generation practices in psychotherapy and 
psychoanalysis have been scarce; as such, the thesis contributes and further extends 
research at the intersection of epistemology and case study research (Truijens, 2016; 
Cartwright & Hardie, 2012; Cartwright, 2015). 
Similarly, Chapters 2 and 4 consider the importance of practitioner–researcher 
experiences and perspectives in case narratives. Since case studies are often developed 
by researchers who simultaneously act as clinical practitioners (psychotherapists, 
psychologists, psychoanalysts, mental health and social care workers, etc.), clinical and 
systematic case narratives offer a methodologically unique perspective (Dattillio et al., 
2010): they show how it feels to be in the session with patients in concrete clinical 
situations. In this sense, the practitioner–researcher’s subjectivity (or, as Hinshelwood 
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puts it, ‘the analyst’s mind’; see Hinshelwood, 2019) is seen as a research instrument, 
necessary for the engagement with the patient’s subjectivity (Morrow, 2005). This 
approach has been integral to classic psychoanalytic case studies: for example, Freud’s 
case of Dora (1901/1905) demonstrates Freud’s own difficulty as a psychoanalyst to 
engage with Dora’s transference feelings, which led to the premature ending of the 
treatment. A closer look at Freud’s oeuvre shows that subjective experiences have been 
integral to Freud’s development of The Interpretation of Dreams (1900), in which he 
discussed the concept of a dream as a psychologically meaningful phenomenon (as 
opposed to the previously posed view of fragmentary brain activity) based on his own 
dream (now famously known as Irma’s injection; see Freud, 1900). Thesis Chapters 2 and 
4 can therefore be seen as historical expositions, drawing parallels between Freud’s use 
of subjectivity in his classic (originating) cases, and contemporary psychotherapy and/or 
social science concepts involving subjectivity, such as Morrow’s (2005) ‘researcher–as–
instrument’ and Stake’s (1995) naturalistic generalisation. 
Beyond Freud, the thesis discussed contemporary case studies in psychoanalysis 
and psychotherapy more broadly in order to explore issues of ‘taboo feelings’, namely, 
countertransference (Rabin, 2003; Sharma & Fowler, 2016). Although these 
contemporary cases feature a similar dilemma to Freud’s work (i.e., the difficulty of 
working through challenging feelings of love, sexual attraction, hatred, hostility, and 
ambivalence felt by therapists to their patients), they also include a far more explicit 
reflexive dimension that many found lacking in Freud’s classic case studies (Sulloway, 
1991; Spence, 1984, 2001). For this reason, Chapter 2 suggests that case narratives 
should be positioned not only at a cognitive level of researcher’s thoughts and beliefs but 
also at an emotional level: what did it feel like to have this particular dialogue or experience 
this specific moment with the patient? Emotionally attuned and reflexive case narratives 
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allow other practitioners working with similar clinical situations identify techniques and 
theories that may be relevant to their practice (Willemsen et al., 2017). Beyond 
reflexivity, the thesis also identified several other persisting methodological weaknesses, 
common to both classic psychoanalytic as well as contemporary clinical case studies: 
maintaining explicit interpretive heuristics (describing the theoretical and therapeutic 
frame); leaving room for alternative interpretations, perspectives and viewpoints; and 
considering employing other methods to provide a more complex account of the clinical 
situation.  
In defending the case study method, and, specifically, case narratives containing 
qualitatively rich psychological data, the thesis maintained a methodologically pragmatic 
stance. For instance, when considering the current state of the case study method, the 
thesis proposes a flexible approach toward investigative techniques in line with 
Fishman’s (2000) concept of pragmatic psychology, which has been particularly 
important for the development of systematic case studies (Iwakabe & Gazzola, 2009). The 
thesis acknowledges that utilising several methods and forms of data (i.e., beyond 
therapist interpretations, such as psychometrics, statistics, self–report questionnaires, 
etc.) in a single case study can improve the validity and rigour of research findings 
(McLeod & Elliott, 2011; Iwakabe & Gazzola, 2009; McLeod, 2016) as well as epistemic 
knowledge generation practices (Vertue & Haig, 2008; Fishman, 1999, 2013). These 
additions to case study research are important and are clearly explicated in the thesis 
when discussing classic criticisms posed to Freudian case studies. 
Similarly, when considering psychotherapy research on a broader scale, Chapters 
2, 3, and 5 provide pragmatic suggestions on how clinical and systematic case studies can 
be combined (or, at the very least, co–exist) with large–scale outcome studies like RCTs. 
Although RCTs are excellent in establishing what works on average across a larger clinical 
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population, they are not suitable for identifying deviations (i.e., what goes beyond the 
statistically average parameters) in treatment processes and outcomes for individual 
patients (Dattilio et al., 2010; Fishman et al., 2017). This sets a powerful precedent for the 
argument of pragmatic methodology in psychotherapy: by combining findings from 
single case studies (e.g., micro–processes containing individual patient responses to 
therapeutic interventions) and large–scale outcome studies (e.g., macro–processes 
indicating the average effectiveness of a therapeutic intervention across concrete clinical 
populations), we can generate more complex clinical and treatment decisions. In this way, 
systematic and clinical case studies can contribute to the body of evidence in 
psychotherapy without losing their epistemological roots – qualitatively rich and 
contextually embedded descriptions revolving around specific patients and clinical 
phenomena (Mackrill & Iwakabe, 2013). 
Although this thesis highlighted the significance of qualitatively rich psychological 
data and subjective exchanges between therapists and patients, these two components 
have also been identified as historically problematic for the case study method (Popper, 
1959; Grünbaum, 1984, 1988; Gabbard, 1995; Luyten et al., 2006). Critics have rightfully 
pointed out that clinical interpretations based on personal reasoning are not a sufficient 
condition for developing causal claims, hypotheses or generalisable case study findings 
(Bateson, 1979). This has been particularly problematic for psychoanalytic case studies, 
which, although riddled with scientific controversies, have received relatively little 
attention regarding their epistemic practices (Forrester, 1996). In an attempt to address 
this issue, thesis Chapter 3 sought to articulate and develop epistemological standards 
that could help case study researchers explicitly justify their knowledge claims. Drawing 
from philosophy of science and the social sciences, the thesis identified three relevant 
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epistemological concepts for case study research: retroductive reasoning, analytic 
generalisation, and working hypothesis.  
Retroductive reasoning has been implicitly present in both psychoanalytic and 
psychotherapy case studies: clinicians often go backwards (e.g., through patient’s 
history) to identify some underlying causal mechanism behind their current mental 
experiences. At the same time, however, no relevant epistemic guidance or canons of 
evidence have been explicated to choose between different retroductive (and 
subsequently, causal) accounts. In response to this limitation, the thesis identified 
epistemological red flags which increase the chances of a naïve retroductive analysis. 
Such epistemological red flags can be employed when comparing different clinical 
interpretations of the same case (or the same clinical phenomenon). Retroductive 
reasoning is especially important for case studies featuring complex mental phenomena 
and experiences, in which multiple agents and events might causally contribute to 
patient’s condition (Wolff & Jandasek, 2017). In psychoanalytic or psychotherapy 
research, the use retroduction as an explicitly identified epistemic concept and/or 
practice has been limited despite the fact that it is commonly used as an implicit 
reasoning strategy.  
Analytic generalisation, although a far more explicated epistemic strategy (Yin, 
2013), suffers from a similar lack of epistemological guidance: it is unclear what makes a 
single case study ‘representative’ in terms of the data components that could be 
generalised onto broader theory in psychoanalysis and psychotherapy. The thesis draws 
on earlier work on from educational research (Kennedy, 1979) on generalisable 
attributes in single cases, and positions them in a psychotherapy research context. The 
thesis findings suggest new research ‘norms’ (analogous to the statistical ‘norms’ of 
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random sampling and replication), which could enable researchers to derive analytic 
generalisations from ‘ordinary’ (rather than classic or ‘first of its kind’) cases. 
The concept of working hypothesis has not been explicated prior to this thesis. 
Although Cronbach (1975) proposed the idea of studying ‘local conditions’ rather than 
focusing on generalisable outcomes, he did not provide a clear explanation of how one 
can employ working hypothesis case studies in research. Following the work of Stiles 
(2003; 2007), Mahrer (1988) and Edelson (1985, 1986), Chapter 3 developed this 
concept further and differentiated between working cases (which test how theory works 
in practice) and working hypothesis cases (which go beyond falsification of a theoretical 
proposition by outlining new theoretical suggestions or hypotheses based on detailed 
case observations). This epistemic strategy is particularly significant for discovery–
oriented research, where researchers may not have explicit intentions to test hypotheses 
but may have to revise therapeutic interventions or theoretical propositions due to 
events unfolding in practice (e.g., if a patient is not responding to a specific therapeutic 
modality or intervention, changes will have to be made to the treatment plan and/or 
theory) (Vaskinn et al., 2011).  
The epistemological work carried out in Chapter 3 was developed with 
practitioner–researchers in mind; as such, all social science, philosophy and 
epistemology concepts and frameworks have been translated to psychotherapy and 
psychoanalytic research contexts, and all three epistemic strategies feature clinical or 
systematic case study examples. A detailed section on the use of multiple epistemological 
concepts in systematic case studies has also been included in order to address the 
audience of pragmatic practitioner–researchers who are interested in developing 
epistemically rich case studies. 
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Chapter 4 was developed due to persisting criticisms about the generalisability of 
case study findings (Janis in Wallerstein & Sampson, 1971). Although the topic of 
generalisability has been critically reviewed in Chapter 2, which points out some of the 
overarching shortcomings of generalisability processes in psychology research (Yarkoni, 
2019), and Chapter 3, which specifically focuses on the process of analytic generalisation 
(Yin, 2013), Chapter 4 delves into yet another issue pertaining to generalisation: namely, 
the scientific thinking and reasoning style behind it. The thesis repositions the argument 
that there is only one form of generalisation – namely, statistical – by discussing Hacking’s 
(1988) and Crombie’s (1988) work on different scientific thinking styles, among which 
statistical thinking is just one.  
Chapter 4 is based on Forrester’s (1996, 2017) idea of thinking in cases: a form of 
scientific thinking present not only in psychoanalysis but also medicine, law, social work, 
anthropology, management science and psychotherapy. Forrester argued that thinking in 
cases has been all too often confused with other thinking styles, like statistical and 
experimental, leading to misinterpretations of what it actually means to think in cases as 
exemplars for analytic generalisation. The thesis explicates how thinking in cases as 
exemplars can be observed in Freud’s work; beyond Forrester, Chapter 4 also explicates 
two new forms of scientific thinking: cases as exemplars for analogical learning and cases 
in the service of empirical generalisation. Identifying the reasoning processes behind these 
three different forms of non–statistical generalisation contributes to the scientific 
discussion of how psychoanalytic (and contemporary psychotherapy) case studies can be 
used in clinical, teaching, and research contexts. This work lies at the intersection of 
psychoanalysis, philosophy and social sciences, and as such, it contributes to ongoing 
methodological debates of what can (or should) be considered a scientific thinking style, 
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which has been a pertinent topic for psychoanalysis as a discipline since its inception 
(Luyten et al., 2006). 
As a natural progression toward the development of the case study method, 
Chapter 5 introduces a novel Case Study Evaluation–tool (CaSE) for systematic case 
studies in psychotherapy. Currently, there are no appraisal tools the case study method 
in any given field. This, in part, may be due to the methodological versatility of the case 
study method: unlike other qualitative (e.g., structured interviews) and quantitative (e.g., 
RCTs) methods, case studies generally do not have a ‘set in stone’ methodological 
template, besides publishing guidelines (e.g., in journals such as Pragmatic Case Studies 
in Psychotherapy and Psychotherapy Research) and clinical writing guidelines (Willemsen 
et al., 2017).  
This methodological pluralism and versatility inspired the development of CaSE. 
The chapter in itself functions as an epistemological exposition, first showcasing the need 
for a critical appraisal tool in case study research through a discussion of such concepts 
as ‘evidence’ and ‘validity’ in practice–based evidence (PBE) and evidence–based practice 
(EBP) paradigms. The thesis contains a comparative exercise between existing 
qualitative research tools (JBI, CASP, ETQS) and the key methodological, theoretical, and 
clinical components common to systematic case studies. Drawing on the limited 
applicability of existing tools, CaSE Purpose–based Evaluative Framework is developed on 
the basis of different purposes that systematic case studies have in psychotherapy: 
representative cases (purpose: typicality), descriptive cases (purpose: particularity), 
unique cases (purpose: deviation), critical cases (purpose: falsification/confirmation), 
exploratory cases (purpose: hypothesis generation), and transferable cases (purpose: 
generalisability). Each purpose has been linked with an existing epistemological network, 
which enabled the thesis to explicate evaluative criteria specific for each type of case 
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study. The tool also contains a CaSE Checklist for Essential Components in Systematic Case 
Studies, which is designed to assess the presence or absence of essential systematic case 
study components.  
Although CaSE will need further development, particularly in terms of the 
framework criteria as well as the qualitative examination outcomes, this is a significant 
step in further justifying the evidential status of systematic psychotherapy case studies. 
As such, Chapter 5 contributes to an existing strand of research which seeks to defend 
and develop the validity and rigour of the case study method in psychoanalysis and 
psychotherapy (Iwakabe & Gazzola, 2009; Fishman, 1999, 2005; Stiles, 2007; Wedding & 
Corsini, 2013; Desmet et al., 2013; Willemsen et al., 2015; Meganck et al., 2017; Desmet 
et al., 2021). CaSE can already be used as a preliminary appraisal measure by 
practitioner–researchers working in all therapeutic modalities and practice sectors. 
 
6.2 Limitations and future perspectives 
The bulk of the work presented in this thesis is concerned with the development (or 
further systematisation) of clinical and systematic case studies. Although the thesis is 
clearly maintaining (and defending) the idiographic narrative approach throughout 
Chapters 2 to 5, it must be acknowledged that some critics would find the overarching 
pragmatic tone of this work as potentially delegitimising the classic clinical case study 
method, which has been historically more aligned with therapist interpretations and 
clinical observations (Iwakabe & Gazzola, 2009; Widdowson, 2011). For example, 
psychoanalyst Hoffman (2009) argues that systematic empirical research is often at odds 
with the existential uncertainty, personal values and “consequential uniqueness” found 
in rich clinical case narratives. This, according to Hoffman, also extends to some of the 
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epistemic differences: he argues that, although one could use clinical case studies as 
hypothesis–generating (which is, indeed, one of the key methodological arguments made 
in Chapter 3), he would instead perceive them as generating “important plausible 
possibilities for practicing analysts to have in mind in their work. The term hypothesis 
encourages the expectation of “testing” that will make greater generalisation possible, 
and I do not consider that expectation to be warranted” (Hoffman, 2009, p. 1046, 
emphasis in original).  
 This criticism extends into ongoing methodological debates about what kind of 
research (and what kind of research findings) is possible in single case studies. One such 
heated debate can be observed between Fonagy and Wolpert (2018) in The British Journal 
of Psychiatry, where both parties present dramatically different views on what is a ‘good’ 
case history in psychotherapy and psychoanalysis. As a case study researcher, it is not 
difficult to find oneself at odds between all the different ‘sides’ concerning the case study 
method. However, what I have tried to portray in this thesis is that, while qualitatively 
rich clinical observations are quintessential for the practice and research of 
psychotherapy, it is also reasonable to not rush toward causal inferences, research 
hypotheses (or even possibilities, as Hoffman called them) or generalisable findings 
without a substantially rigorous methodological framework. The latter, however, also 
needs to be developed in a way that would be relevant for case study research – not as a 
broad qualitative methodology, not as small–scale experimental analysis, not as a 
‘secondary’ method to large–N studies, but as a methodologically unique form of 
qualitative research with its own distinct types of case study and forms of evidence. From 
this point of view, it would be important to develop a second version of Case Study 
Evaluation–tool (CaSE) for the critical appraisal of clinical, methodological, and 
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theoretical components common to clinical case studies in psychotherapy.  
The epistemological work carried out in this research will also require further 
development. In particular, the thesis identified several application issues for the critical 
realist concept of retroduction in Chapter 3. Much of the existing literature – including 
Bhaskar’s (1977) and Sayer’s (1992) work – remains on philosophical and/or 
metaphysical grounds: it tells us about the critical realist ontology but does not inform us 
of any specific epistemological guidelines that would allow researchers to apply 
retroduction in an empirical way. Although this thesis sought to attend to this issue by 
differentiating between epistemologically critical and epistemologically naïve 
retroductive explanations, future research is needed to address broader inconsistencies 
in the critical realist philosophical system. That is, not all proponents of critical realism 
see it an empirical program or epistemic strategy (Archer et al., 2016), a stance that goes 
against Sayer’s and Bhaskar’s work in which causal expectations are crucial to the 
application of critical realism (and subsequently, retroduction) in empirical research. 
Therefore, further research is necessary to demonstrate the ‘hands on’ application of 
retroductive reasoning in psychotherapy and psychoanalysis. Herein, Pocock’s (2015) 
article serves as a good example of how retroductive processes can be applied in complex 
family therapy cases; this needs to be replicated in other therapeutic modalities. 
Beyond retroduction, similar issues can be observed in other epistemological 
concepts discussed in thesis Chapters 3 and 4. Although the epistemic strategies of 
analytic generalisation and working hypothesis have been implicitly observed in 
psychoanalytic and psychotherapy case studies, the lack of explicit epistemological 
considerations for either of these concepts remains problematic. As observed in Chapter 
4, although Freud used the case of Schreber (Freud, 1911) as an exemplar for analytic 
generalisation in order to develop the psychoanalytic theory of paranoia, this in itself 
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does not justify the theory (especially since it is based on a published autobiography 
rather than treatment processes). Similarly, it is not clear how exactly we can 
differentiate between a working hypothesis case study and a ‘representative’ exemplar 
case for analytic generalisation. Future research is therefore needed to develop the 
epistemic guidance for these strategies, and to demonstrate them in contemporary 
clinical and systematic case studies in psychotherapy. In addition, a broader discussion 
of scientific (and a clarification of whether they are, indeed, scientific) standards 
employed in different forms of thinking in cases is needed to ensure that psychoanalytic 
(and, more broadly, psychotherapy) case studies do not employ circular standards of 
self–authentication and verification (Hacking, 1992, 2012). The dangers of this have been 
outlined in Chapter 2 through the discussion of psychoanalytic insularity; however, 
further work is needed to identify such insular attitudes in case study narratives. 
Finally, it is important to acknowledge some of the limitations and anticipated 
criticisms for the Case Study Evaluation–tool (CaSE). There are ongoing debates about 
how one should (and consequently, should not) appraise research findings within the 
evidence–based practice (Barkham & Mellor–Clark, 2003; Gabbay & le May, 2011; 
Truijens, 2016). The thesis refers to the concept of procedural objectivity, with which 
knowledge is generated and appraised in a standardised, non–erroneous way, thus 
producing objective (i.e., with minimised bias) data. Proponents of procedural appraisal 
would not find CaSE a convincing tool in the assessment of case study findings for (at 
least) two reasons.  
First, CaSE is embedded in purpose–oriented evaluation criteria. Although 
Chapter 5 outlines what each purpose is, and what the evaluation criteria for each type of 
purpose–based case study might be, it is evident that there is still space for interpretation 
and disagreement about the different kinds of purposes a case study might have in 
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psychotherapy. This is an issue for all framework–based forms of appraisal (Widdowson, 
2011): they rely (although to varying degrees) on the reviewer’s interpretation of the 
tool.  
Second, the qualitative analysis exemplifying the use of CaSE Purpose–based 
Evaluative Framework for Systematic Case Studies (table 33) does not contain a clear 
outcome assessment beyond the qualitative examination (i.e., a specific ‘grade’). Although 
this would be useful for case study researchers utilising meta–synthesis and meta–
analysis methods, some case study (and, more broadly, qualitative) researchers find that 
employing grades (or other quantitative measurements) may constrict the idiographic 
elements of research (Berg & Slaatelid, 2017; Berg, 2019). These issues must therefore 
be addressed in consultation and dialogue with other case study researchers in 
psychotherapy.  
As such, I hope that the development of CaSE tool, which began in this doctoral 
project, will flourish beyond this thesis. It would be fruitful to see this tool develop in 
collaboration with the Single Case Archive (SCA; https://www.singlecasearchive.com), 
which has been central to the growth of this project (and, indeed, the development of my 
role as a case study researcher) as well as like–minded researchers from the Society for 
Psychotherapy Research (SPR), many of whom are eager to see the resurrection of the 
case study method in psychotherapy (Meganck et al., 2017; Williamsen et al., 2017; 
Desmet et al., 2021; Truijens et al., 2019; Krivzov et al., in press). Although the case study 
method is as old as human history (Flyvbjerg, 2011), it is evident from this thesis, as well 
as the rapidly expanding lines of research in psychotherapy and social sciences that, in 
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